What They Skipped

On December 17, 2025, an EPA inspector walked into Marysville Ethanol LLC’s facility at 2512 Busha Highway in Marysville, Michigan. The inspector was there to verify compliance with the Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. These are not optional. They exist because facilities that handle hazardous chemicals can kill people if something goes wrong.

What the inspector found was not a minor paperwork gap. It was a systematic abdication of responsibility across every category of mandatory safety documentation. Nine distinct violations of 40 CFR Part 68. Nine separate failures to document the systems that are supposed to prevent chemical disasters.

Here is what Marysville Ethanol did not do:

• 40 CFR § 68.15(c): They did not document the names or positions and lines of authority through an organizational chart or similar document. Nobody knew who was in charge when something went wrong.
• 40 CFR § 68.65(c)(1): They did not document safe upper and lower limits for temperatures, pressures, flows, or compositions for covered equipment including rail and truck loading racks, pumps, tanks, and loadout flares. They did not evaluate the consequences of deviation from those limits.
• 40 CFR § 68.65(d)(1): They did not include process safety information such as material and energy balances for covered processes built after June 21, 1999.
• 40 CFR § 68.65(d)(2): They did not document that their covered process equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).
• 40 CFR § 68.69(a)(1)(iv): They did not document emergency shutdown procedures, including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators.
• 40 CFR § 68.69(a)(2): They did not document consequences of deviation from operating limits or the steps required to correct or avoid deviation.
• 40 CFR § 68.69(a)(3)(ii): They did not document precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment.
• 40 CFR § 68.69(c): They did not review operating procedures as often as necessary to ensure they reflect current practices, and they did not certify annually that the procedures are current and accurate.
• 40 CFR § 68.79(d): They did not promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each finding of their compliance audit, and they did not document that deficiencies have been corrected.

Every single one of these requirements exists because people have died when facilities skip them. The regulations are written in the blood of workers and community members who were in the wrong place when a chemical process spiraled out of control.

The Non-Financial Ledger

The EPA settlement document is five pages of bureaucratic language. It does not name the workers who showed up every day to a facility that had not documented how to protect them. It does not name the families living downwind who had no way to know whether the plant next door had emergency procedures in place.

The violations span every category of process safety management. Organizational authority. Safe operating limits. Emergency shutdown. Exposure precautions. Compliance audits. These are not obscure technicalities. They are the minimum framework required to operate a facility that handles substances capable of causing mass casualties.

Consider what it means to work at a plant where nobody has documented the safe upper and lower limits for temperatures and pressures. You show up. You operate equipment. You load trucks and rail cars with hazardous materials. And if something starts to go wrong, there is no written guidance on when the numbers you are seeing mean you need to shut everything down immediately.

Consider what it means to live near a facility that has not documented the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required. You trust that the plant has protocols. You trust that someone in a control room knows exactly when to hit the emergency stop. The EPA found that those protocols were not documented. The assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators was not documented.

This is not a story about a missed form or a late filing. This is a story about a company that operated for an unknown length of time without the foundational safety documentation required by federal law. The settlement agreement does not say how long. It does not say whether anyone was injured. It does not say whether any near-miss incidents occurred that would have been prevented if proper procedures had been in place.

It just says they will pay $6,480 and the matter is resolved.

Legal Receipts

The settlement language is precise and damning. From EPA Docket No. CAA-05-2026-0043:

“Based on December 17, 2025, inspection and documents submitted by the Respondent, EPA has determined that Respondent violated the following provisions: (1) 40 C.F.R. § 68.15(c): Respondent failed to document names or positions and the lines of authority through an organizational chart or similar document.”

This is the first violation listed. The foundational failure. Nobody documented who is in charge. In an emergency, when seconds matter, there is no written record of the chain of command.

“(2) 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1): Respondent failed to include the safe upper and lower limits for temperatures, pressures, flows or compositions, or an evaluation of consequences of deviation from all covered equipment including rail and truck loading racks, pumps, tanks, loadout flares.”

Safe operating limits are the red lines. The numbers that tell an operator when a process is about to become dangerous. Marysville Ethanol did not document them. They did not evaluate what happens when those limits are exceeded.

“(5) 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(iv): Respondent failed to include emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner.”

Emergency shutdown procedures are the last line of defense. When everything else has failed, someone needs to know exactly what to do and have the authority to do it. Marysville Ethanol did not document those procedures. They did not assign that responsibility.

“(9) 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d): Respondent failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit and failed to document that deficiencies have been corrected.”

They did compliance audits. They found deficiencies. They did not document how they responded. They did not document that the problems were fixed. The audit became a performance. A box to check. Not a tool for accountability.

The settlement terms are equally revealing:

“Respondent waives its right to contest the specific factual allegations contained herein, and neither admits nor denies these specific factual allegations.”

This is standard settlement language. It allows the company to pay the fine without admitting wrongdoing. It closes the case without forcing Marysville Ethanol to publicly acknowledge that they operated unsafely.

Societal Impact Mapping

Environmental Degradation

Ethanol production involves volatile organic compounds, flammable liquids, and high-pressure systems. The Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions exist because a release at an ethanol facility can ignite, explode, or contaminate soil and groundwater. Marysville Ethanol operates near residential areas and agricultural land in St. Clair County, Michigan. A catastrophic release would not respect property lines.

The facility’s failure to document material and energy balances for covered processes built after June 21, 1999, means there is no verified accounting of what substances are present, in what quantities, and how they flow through the system. You cannot model the environmental impact of a release if you do not have accurate process safety information.

Public Health

The lack of documented precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment, creates direct health risks for workers. Ethanol facilities handle denatured alcohol, sulfuric acid, and other hazardous substances. Exposure can cause respiratory damage, chemical burns, and long-term health effects.

The failure to document emergency shutdown procedures means that in a runaway reaction or equipment failure, there is no clear protocol for protecting workers and the surrounding community. Emergency responders arriving at the scene would have no documented procedures to reference. They would be operating blind.

Economic Inequality

A $6,480 fine is a rounding error for an industrial ethanol producer. Marysville Ethanol LLC is part of a multi-facility network. Their operating budget for a single day likely exceeds this penalty amount. The settlement terms note the EPA considered “Respondent’s size of business, its full compliance history, its good faith efforts to comply” in reaching this figure.

The workers at this facility do not have the option to settle their exposure to undocumented hazards for $6,480. They show up because they need the paycheck. The families living nearby do not get to negotiate the risk that an uncontrolled chemical release poses to their property and their children. They just live with it.

The regulatory system is supposed to correct this imbalance. It is supposed to impose penalties severe enough to change corporate behavior. A $6,480 fine does not change behavior. It is a cost of doing business.

What Now?

The settlement was signed by Aric Melvin, Plant Manager, for Marysville Ethanol LLC on June 25, 2026. It was ratified by Ann L. Coyle, Regional Judicial Officer, for EPA Region 5 on July 6, 2026. The case is closed. Marysville Ethanol has certified that it has corrected the violations.

You will not find their Board of Directors listed in the settlement document. You will not find the names of the executives who oversaw this facility while it operated without proper safety documentation. The document identifies the Plant Manager because he signed the agreement. Everyone above him remains unnamed.

Regulatory Watchlist:

• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5: Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division, Chicago, IL. Contact: r5airenforcement@epa.gov
• Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB): Independent federal agency investigating chemical incidents. Recommendations often cite failures similar to those documented here.
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): Enforces Process Safety Management standards under 29 CFR 1910.119, which overlap with EPA’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions.

What You Can Do:

If you work at or live near an industrial facility handling hazardous chemicals, you have the right to request information about their Risk Management Plan under the Clean Air Act. Facilities covered by 40 CFR Part 68 must make a summary of their plan available to the public. Your local EPA regional office can provide guidance on how to access this information.

Support local and national organizations advocating for stronger chemical safety regulations and meaningful enforcement penalties. The current system allows companies to settle serious violations for amounts that do not deter future misconduct. Changing that requires political pressure and public awareness.

Document everything. If you witness unsafe conditions at a workplace, report them to OSHA and keep records of your report. If you observe unusual releases or incidents at a nearby facility, report them to the National Response Center (1-800-424-8802) and your state environmental agency. Your documentation can become part of the enforcement record.

Organize. Workplace safety and community environmental justice are collective problems requiring collective solutions. Join or form a union if you work in an industrial facility. Join or support a community environmental justice organization if you live near one. The regulatory agencies respond when communities demand accountability.