Student Loan Scam Drained Millions From Vulnerable Borrowers
Intercontinental Solutions and Express Enrollment deceived struggling borrowers with false promises of loan relief, charging illegal upfront fees and misusing sensitive financial data. The FTC won a permanent ban and $7.4 million judgment.
The Federal Trade Commission sued Intercontinental Solutions LLC, Express Enrollment LLC, and their principals Marco Manzi, Robert Kissinger, and Ivan Esquivel for operating a student loan debt relief scam. The companies used deceptive telemarketing to lure desperate borrowers with false promises of loan forgiveness or reduced payments, charged illegal upfront fees before providing any service, and improperly obtained consumers’ sensitive financial information. A federal court imposed a permanent ban on the defendants from selling any debt relief services or engaging in telemarketing, appointed a receiver to liquidate the companies, and entered a $7.4 million monetary judgment to compensate victims.
If you paid upfront fees for student loan relief services, check if you qualify for reimbursement from the FTC settlement fund.
The Allegations: A Breakdown
| 01 | Intercontinental Solutions and Express Enrollment made false promises to borrowers that they could reduce or eliminate student loan debt. They told consumers their services would lower monthly payments, secure loan forgiveness, or dramatically reduce principal balances when they had no ability to deliver these outcomes. | high |
| 02 | The companies charged illegal upfront fees before providing any actual debt relief services. They collected money from desperate borrowers before completing any work, violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule that prohibits advance fees for debt relief. | high |
| 03 | Telemarketers falsely claimed they were affiliated with, endorsed by, or connected to government entities or official federal student loan programs. They created the impression that borrowers were dealing with official channels when they were actually dealing with private for-profit companies. | high |
| 04 | The defendants used false and fraudulent statements to obtain sensitive consumer financial information including Social Security numbers, FSA IDs, bank account numbers, credit card numbers, and consumer credit reports. They violated the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act through this pretextual data harvesting. | high |
| 05 | The companies created remotely created payment orders from consumer bank accounts without proper authorization. They withdrew money directly from checking accounts as payment for services that provided no actual benefit. | high |
| 06 | Marco Manzi, Robert Kissinger, and Ivan Esquivel personally participated in and controlled these deceptive practices. The individual defendants formulated the marketing strategies, oversaw telemarketing operations, and directed the companies’ fraudulent business model. | high |
| 07 | The defendants misrepresented refund policies, making it appear consumers could easily get their money back if dissatisfied. In reality, victims faced obstacles and delays when seeking refunds for services that failed to deliver promised results. | medium |
| 08 | The companies targeted vulnerable populations already struggling with student debt. They preyed on borrowers’ desperation and lack of financial literacy to sell expensive services that consumers could have obtained free or at low cost directly from the government. | high |
| 01 | The FTC did not file its complaint until August 2023, allowing the defendants to operate their fraudulent student loan debt relief scheme for an extended period. Thousands of borrowers fell victim before federal authorities intervened. | high |
| 02 | The court had to issue an emergency ex parte temporary restraining order with asset freeze on August 16, 2023 because the companies posed an immediate threat of continued consumer harm. The need for emergency intervention shows regulators failed to detect and stop the scheme earlier. | medium |
| 03 | The defendants violated multiple existing laws including Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, numerous provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and Section 521(a) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. These violations continued despite legal frameworks supposedly designed to prevent exactly this type of fraud. | high |
| 04 | The court appointed a receiver on an emergency basis to take control of the companies’ assets and operations. This extraordinary measure became necessary because normal regulatory oversight had failed to prevent the massive consumer harm. | medium |
| 05 | The stipulated order reveals that the FTC relied on financial statements submitted by the defendants in August and September 2023. Regulators had no independent verification of the companies’ finances or consumer harm until after filing the lawsuit. | medium |
| 06 | The monetary judgment of over $7.4 million is partially suspended based on the defendants’ claimed inability to pay. This suspension mechanism reveals how inadequate asset recovery processes allow fraudsters to shield their ill-gotten gains from full restitution. | high |
| 01 | The defendants built their entire business model around extracting upfront fees from borrowers who could not afford them. They prioritized revenue collection over actually helping struggling consumers reduce their debt burden. | high |
| 02 | The companies operated in a market created by the student debt crisis, where millions of Americans desperately seek relief from crushing loan obligations. Instead of providing legitimate assistance, the defendants exploited this desperation for maximum profit extraction. | high |
| 03 | Telemarketers received compensation and incentives for signing up borrowers regardless of whether those consumers would actually benefit from the services. The sales-driven culture prioritized enrollment numbers and fee collection over consumer outcomes. | high |
| 04 | The defendants targeted the same borrowers who qualified for free or low-cost government relief programs. They inserted themselves as expensive middlemen, charging fees for services consumers could access directly without cost. | high |
| 05 | Marco Manzi held ownership stakes and signing authority over the corporate defendants, profiting directly from the fraudulent operations. He personally benefited financially from the scheme that drained money from vulnerable borrowers. | high |
| 06 | The companies continued aggressive telemarketing and enrollment even as consumer complaints mounted. They prioritized maintaining revenue flow over addressing the growing evidence that their services failed to deliver promised results. | medium |
| 07 | The defendants structured their operations across multiple corporate entities including Intercontinental Solutions LLC and Express Enrollment LLC. This multi-entity structure helped obscure the flow of money and shield principals from accountability. | medium |
| 01 | The court assessed total consumer injury at $7,403,445 based on the harm caused by the defendants’ illegal practices. This figure represents only the documented monetary losses, not the full economic and psychological damage to victims. | high |
| 02 | Victims paid upfront fees that pushed them deeper into debt rather than providing relief. Borrowers who were already struggling with student loans found themselves owing even more money after engaging with the defendants’ services. | high |
| 03 | The defendants’ false promises caused borrowers to delay or forgo pursuing legitimate relief options. While waiting for the promised results that never came, victims missed deadlines for actual government programs that could have helped them. | high |
| 04 | The companies drained financial resources from individuals and families who could least afford the loss. The economic harm concentrated on working-class borrowers, first-generation college students, and others already facing financial hardship. | high |
| 05 | Many victims experienced cascading financial consequences including inability to pay other bills, damaged credit scores, and increased vulnerability to additional financial predation. The harm extended far beyond the initial fees collected by the defendants. | high |
| 06 | The receivership must liquidate all company assets within 365 days and distribute recovered funds to harmed consumers. However, the receiver’s ability to recover meaningful restitution for all victims remains uncertain given the companies’ claimed financial condition. | medium |
| 07 | Local communities suffered economic damage as money that could have supported small businesses, housing costs, or family needs instead flowed to the corporate defendants. The fraud extracted wealth from communities already facing economic challenges. | medium |
| 01 | Victims experienced severe emotional and psychological distress from discovering they had been defrauded. The stress of realizing they paid for worthless services while their debt problems worsened caused anxiety, depression, and feelings of shame. | high |
| 02 | The defendants improperly obtained and stored sensitive consumer information including Social Security numbers and bank account details. This data breach exposed victims to identity theft risk and ongoing security vulnerabilities. | high |
| 03 | Chronic financial stress from the additional debt burden caused by the scheme contributed to physical health problems. Victims faced increased risk of cardiovascular issues, weakened immune systems, and stress-related illness. | medium |
| 04 | Many victims delayed or skipped necessary medical care because the fees they paid to the defendants consumed money they needed for healthcare. The financial harm directly translated into deferred treatment and worsened health outcomes. | high |
| 05 | The fraud eroded victims’ trust in institutions and formal systems meant to help them. This damaged social capital makes individuals less likely to seek legitimate assistance in the future, compounding their isolation and vulnerability. | medium |
| 06 | Families experienced relationship strain and breakdowns as the financial pressure from the fraud created conflict. The stress of debt and deception rippled through households, affecting children and extended family members. | medium |
| 01 | The defendants’ targeting of student loan borrowers disproportionately harmed young adults, first-generation college students, and communities with limited intergenerational wealth. The scheme exploited those who pursued education as a path to economic mobility. | high |
| 02 | Victims who recommended the defendants’ services to friends and family members inadvertently spread the fraud through their social networks. This created rifts and blame within communities as people discovered they had unknowingly harmed their loved ones. | medium |
| 03 | The fraud extracted significant sums from local economies that could have supported community businesses, housing, or civic participation. Money flowed out of neighborhoods and into corporate bank accounts controlled by the defendants. | medium |
| 04 | The widespread nature of student debt relief fraud has made borrowers skeptical of all assistance programs, including legitimate ones. This erosion of trust makes it harder for honest organizations to help those in need. | medium |
| 05 | Communities of color and women borrowers face disproportionate student debt burdens and were therefore more vulnerable to the defendants’ predatory targeting. The scheme amplified existing racial and gender wealth disparities. | high |
| 06 | Local government agencies saw increased demand for social services as victims of the fraud needed emergency assistance with food, housing, and healthcare. The corporate theft created public costs borne by taxpayers. | medium |
| 01 | Marco Manzi settled with a partially suspended judgment, paying only a fraction of the $7.4 million in documented consumer harm. The suspension mechanism allows the settling defendant to potentially avoid full accountability for the damage he caused. | high |
| 02 | The stipulated order allows judgment suspension based on the truthfulness of financial statements the defendant submitted. This creates an incentive for defendants to hide assets since the burden falls on the FTC to prove misrepresentation. | high |
| 03 | The defendants face no criminal charges despite allegedly defrauding thousands of vulnerable consumers. The purely civil enforcement action means no possibility of prison time for the individuals who orchestrated the scheme. | high |
| 04 | The permanent injunction bans the defendants from debt relief services and telemarketing, but allows Marco Manzi to work in insurance sales if he maintains proper licensing. This carve-out permits continued consumer-facing work despite proven fraudulent conduct. | medium |
| 05 | The order requires the defendants to cooperate with the FTC and provide information, but lacks meaningful enforcement mechanisms if they fail to comply fully. The compliance monitoring depends largely on self-reporting by the same actors who perpetrated the fraud. | medium |
| 06 | The receivership has only 365 days to wind up operations and liquidate assets, a tight timeline that may result in fire-sale prices for company property. This compressed schedule could reduce the funds available for consumer restitution. | medium |
| 07 | The settlement includes no admission of wrongdoing by Marco Manzi beyond jurisdictional facts. This allows the settling defendant to avoid reputational consequences that might come from acknowledging the fraudulent conduct. | medium |
| 08 | Nothing in the order prevents the individual defendants from starting new businesses in other industries or under different names. The narrow scope of the ban creates opportunities for these same actors to commit fraud in different contexts. | high |
| 01 | The defendants extracted millions of dollars from working-class borrowers struggling with student debt and transferred that wealth to corporate owners and principals. This represents a direct upward transfer of resources from vulnerable individuals to affluent corporate operators. | high |
| 02 | Student loan borrowers typically come from families without significant intergenerational wealth, making them particularly vulnerable to financial fraud. The defendants targeted people who pursued higher education specifically because they lacked family resources. | high |
| 03 | Marco Manzi maintained holdings in investment accounts with Robinhood Markets that the court ordered liquidated as part of the settlement. The existence of these investment accounts demonstrates how the principals converted consumer losses into personal wealth accumulation. | high |
| 04 | The scheme drained resources from individuals who would have spent that money on necessities or local businesses, concentrating wealth in corporate entities that could deploy legal and financial strategies to shield assets. This exemplifies how fraud accelerates wealth inequality. | medium |
| 05 | Victims lost not only the fees they paid but also the opportunity cost of pursuing legitimate relief programs during the time they trusted the defendants. This compounding harm widens the wealth gap as struggling borrowers fall further behind. | medium |
| 06 | The partially suspended judgment means taxpayers and future fraud victims will bear costs the defendants should have paid. When fraudsters shield assets successfully, the public absorbs the loss while corporate wrongdoers preserve their wealth. | medium |
| 01 | The permanent injunction bans Intercontinental Solutions, Express Enrollment, and all named defendants from ever selling debt relief services or engaging in telemarketing again. This total industry ban recognizes that these actors cannot be trusted in any consumer-facing financial services role. | high |
| 02 | The court-ordered receivership will liquidate both corporate defendants and distribute recovered assets to victims, but many consumers will never be made whole. The $7.4 million judgment vastly exceeds what the receiver is likely to collect from the defunct companies. | high |
| 03 | The settlement demonstrates that student loan debt relief fraud is lucrative enough to justify the risk of eventual enforcement action. The defendants operated for years and extracted millions before facing consequences, suggesting that deterrence remains inadequate. | high |
| 04 | The case exposes how the student debt crisis creates opportunities for corporate predation. As long as millions of Americans struggle under crushing educational debt, fraudsters will emerge to exploit that desperation for profit. | high |
| 05 | The order requires extensive compliance reporting and monitoring for 20 years, acknowledging the high risk that these defendants would reoffend without ongoing oversight. This lengthy supervision period reflects the court’s recognition that the defendants cannot be trusted. | medium |
| 06 | The facts alleged in the complaint establish grounds for finding the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under Section 523(a)(2)(A). This provision prevents the defendants from escaping their obligations to victims even through bankruptcy filings. | medium |
| 07 | The FTC retains jurisdiction to enforce the order and can lift the suspended portion of the judgment if it discovers hidden assets or misrepresentations in the financial statements. This ongoing threat provides some incentive for truthful disclosure, though enforcement remains challenging. | medium |
| 08 | The case illustrates how corporate structures allow individuals to profit from fraud while shielding personal assets through business entities. The defendants operated through LLCs that can be dissolved while the principals potentially preserve wealth extracted from victims. | high |
Timeline of Events
Direct Quotes from the Legal Record
“That any Person is affiliated with, endorsed or approved by, or otherwise connected to any other Person; government entity; public, non-profit, or other non-commercial program; or any other program”
💡 The defendants deliberately created the false impression they were connected to official government student loan programs to gain consumer trust
“Judgment in the amount of SEVEN MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND, FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE Dollars ($7,403,445) is entered in favor of the FTC against Settling Defendant, as monetary relief pursuant to Section 19 of the FTC Act”
💡 The court quantified over $7.4 million in documented harm to consumers from this single fraudulent operation
“Creating or causing to be created, directly or indirectly, a remotely created payment order as payment for such product or service”
💡 The defendants illegally withdrew money directly from consumer bank accounts before providing any actual debt relief services
“Making any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation to any Person to obtain or attempt to obtain information of a Consumer, including, but not limited to, credit or debit card numbers, bank account numbers and routing numbers, and consumer credit reports”
💡 The scheme involved systematically stealing sensitive financial data through deception in violation of federal privacy law
“Settling Defendant, whether directly or indirectly, is permanently restrained and enjoined from: Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any Secured or Unsecured Debt Relief Product or Service”
💡 The defendant is banned for life from the entire debt relief industry due to the severity and nature of the fraud
“Settling Defendant, whether directly or indirectly, is permanently restrained and enjoined from participating in Telemarketing and including by consulting, brokering, planning, investing, or advising others regarding Telemarketing”
💡 The ban extends beyond direct telemarketing to any involvement whatsoever in telephone sales operations
“The suspension of the judgment will be lifted as to Settling Defendant if, upon motion by the FTC, the Court finds that Settling Defendant failed to disclose any material asset, materially misstated the value of any asset, or made any other material misstatement or omission in the financial representations”
💡 The FTC can revive the full $7.4M judgment if it discovers the defendant hid assets or lied about finances
“The facts alleged in the Complaint establish all elements necessary to sustain an action by the FTC pursuant to Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), and this Order will have collateral estoppel effect for such purposes”
💡 The judgment cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, ensuring the defendant remains personally liable for the fraud
“Disclosing, using, or benefitting from customer information, including the name, address, telephone number, email address, social security number, FSA ID, other identifying information, or any data that enables access to a customer’s account (including a student loan account, credit card, bank account, or other financial account)”
💡 The defendants obtained and exploited comprehensive personal and financial data that exposed victims to ongoing identity theft risk
“The Receiver is directed to wind up the Receivership Entities and liquidate all assets within 365 days after entry of this Order”
💡 The companies must be completely dissolved and all assets sold to generate funds for victim restitution
“On August 16, 2023, on motion by the FTC, the Court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) with asset freeze, appointment of a receiver, and other equitable relief against Defendants”
💡 The court had to take emergency action because the defendants posed an immediate ongoing threat to consumers
“Individual Defendant(s) means Marco Manzi, Robert Kissinger, and Ivan Esquivel, individually, collectively, or in any combination”
💡 Three named individuals controlled and directed the fraudulent scheme, not just abstract corporate entities
“That a Consumer will save money”
💡 The defendants explicitly promised borrowers would save money when in reality the scheme cost victims money and worsened their debt situation
“Any material aspect of the nature or terms of any refund, cancellation, exchange, or repurchase policy, including the likelihood of a consumer obtaining a full or partial refund, or the circumstances in which a full or partial refund will be granted to the consumer”
💡 Victims were misled about their ability to get their money back when the promised debt relief failed to materialize
“For 20 years after entry of this Order, Settling Defendant must submit a compliance notice, sworn under penalty of perjury, within 14 days of any change”
💡 The court imposed two decades of oversight because these defendants cannot be trusted without constant monitoring
Frequently Asked Questions
More financial crimes committed by evil corporations against people with student loans can be found here: https://evilcorporations.com/category/financial-fraud/
https://evilcorporations.com/when-guaranteed-relief-leads-to-deeper-student-debt
💡 Explore Corporate Misconduct by Category
Corporations harm people every day — from wage theft to pollution. Learn more by exploring key areas of injustice.
- 💀 Product Safety Violations — When companies risk lives for profit.
- 🌿 Environmental Violations — Pollution, ecological collapse, and unchecked greed.
- 💼 Labor Exploitation — Wage theft, worker abuse, and unsafe conditions.
- 🛡️ Data Breaches & Privacy Abuses — Misuse and mishandling of personal information.
- 💵 Financial Fraud & Corruption — Lies, scams, and executive impunity.