“The Facility last certified its operating procedures on June 16, 2021. As such, the Facility is overdue to certify that its operating procedures are current and accurate.”

💡 The company failed to meet a basic annual safety requirement, leaving workers and the community exposed to outdated procedures for over a year

“On April 1, 2022, the alarm in the chlorine storage room alarmed and chlorine concentrations inside the room reached 28 parts per million. The Facility conducted an incident inspection, which found that the release was caused by a leaking vacuum regulator. Moreover, the chlorine room exhaust fan louvers did not operate as intended, allowing chlorine vapor to accumulate in the storage room.”

💡 Multiple safety system failures combined to create hazardous conditions, demonstrating the real-world consequences of inadequate maintenance

“The incident inspection report does not contain a table or other tracking system to identify when these report recommendations were resolved. The Facility did produce an open work order (#4371) for the exhaust fan louvers, which indicated that the part had not yet been received. In the meantime, the Facility is leaving the louvers propped open.”

💡 Even after discovering serious equipment failures, the company failed to systematically track repairs, leaving critical safety equipment in a makeshift temporary fix

“The inspection team reviewed management of change (MOC) No. 20171219-002. The MOC did not include documentation addressing the impact of the change on safety and health.”

💡 Required safety reviews were skipped entirely, meaning new hazards could be introduced without anyone evaluating the risks

“Facility personnel indicated that the Facility is not currently auditing its RMP program every three years to verify that its RMP procedures are adequate and are being followed. As such, the Facility did not have any compliance audit reports in its files and has not developed a tracking system to document compliance audit findings and its corrective actions.”

💡 The company admitted it completely abandoned a core regulatory requirement designed to catch and fix safety problems before accidents occur

“Inspectors observed twelve (12) one-ton (2000-lb) capacity chlorine cylinders in the Facility’s chlorine storage room (arranged in two rows of six cylinders), for a maximum capacity of 24,000 pounds (lbs) of chlorine. The Facility’s Maximum Intended Inventory section of the Process Safety Information confirmed 24,000 lbs maximum quantity. The Facility’s 2019 RMP registration indicates that it has a maximum capacity of 20,000 lbs of chlorine.”

💡 The company understated its dangerous chemical inventory by 4,000 lbs, potentially reducing regulatory scrutiny and misleading emergency responders

“The MOC No. 20171219-002 included an action to draft a new procedure, but the action resolution was not tracked, and no additional information was provided. The inspection team and Facility representatives were not able to determine what procedure, if any, was developed as a result of this MOC.”

💡 Management of change processes are worthless if required follow-up actions disappear without documentation or implementation

“Having found that settlement is consistent with the provisions and objectives of the Act and applicable regulations, the Parties have agreed to settle this action pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.18 and consent to the entry of this CAFO without Respondent’s admission of violation or any adjudication of any issues of law or fact herein.”

💡 The company pays a penalty but admits no wrongdoing, a common pattern that allows corporations to avoid public acknowledgment of misconduct

“The EPA and the United States Department of Justice jointly determined that this matter, although it involves alleged violations that occurred more than one year before the initiation of this proceeding, is appropriate for an administrative penalty assessment.”

💡 The enforcement timeline reveals significant delays between violations and consequences, reducing deterrent effect

“by executing this CAFO, certifies to the best of its knowledge that Respondent is currently in compliance with all relevant requirements of the Act and its implementing regulations, and that all violations alleged herein, which are neither admitted nor denied, have been corrected”

💡 The company claims all problems are fixed while simultaneously refusing to admit the problems existed, a contradiction that undermines accountability

“Section 112(r) of the Act 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), addresses the prevention of release of substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3), and other extremely hazardous substances. The purpose of this section is to prevent the accidental release of extremely hazardous substances and to minimize the consequences of such releases.”

💡 The foundational purpose of the law is to prevent exactly the kind of chlorine leak that occurred at this facility

“The SEP advances at least one of the objectives of the CAA Section 112(r), Prevention of Accidental Releases, and the implementing regulations contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 68 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, by helping to reduce risks to the public associated with potential chemical accidents by better equipping the City of Hopkinsville Fire Department and the Pembroke Volunteer Fire Department to respond to such accidents.”

💡 The settlement tacitly admits local emergency responders were inadequately equipped to handle the chemical risks this facility posed to the community