Corporate Accountability Project | EvilCorporations.com
SAP SE · FCPA Violation · 2013–2018
SAP Bribed Government Officials on Two Continents for Five Years to Lock In Public Contracts
The German software giant paid over $103 million in illicit profits by corrupting officials across South Africa and Indonesia, then falsified its books to hide the evidence.
Critical Severity
TL;DR
Between 2013 and 2018, SAP SE, one of the world’s largest enterprise software companies, ran coordinated bribery schemes in South Africa and Indonesia, paying cash, luxury goods, and political contributions to government officials who controlled public contracts. The company’s own employees coordinated bribes over text messages, routed payments through shell intermediaries falsely booked as “sales commissions,” and then deleted incriminating language from emails before filing the doctored records with the SEC. SAP raked in over $103 million in profits from these corrupt contracts.
This was not a rogue employee or a one-time lapse. It was a five-year, multi-country bribery machine, run by multiple SAP subsidiaries, sustained by deliberate falsification of financial records, and covered up in real time. The public servants who were bribed were supposed to deliver clean water, electricity, and government services to millions of ordinary people. SAP corrupted those officials to capture that public money for itself.
Demand that your lawmakers strengthen FCPA enforcement and corporate criminal liability. No fine, however large, is adequate if no executive goes to prison.
$103M+
Illicit profits obtained from bribery schemes
5 Years
Duration of coordinated bribery (2013 to 2018)
2 Countries
South Africa and Indonesia targeted simultaneously
6+
Intermediary shell companies used as bribe conduits
$215,800
Single bribe paid to South Africa water dept. official
14.9%
Maximum commission rate used to conceal bribe payments
Core Allegations
Core Allegations: What SAP Did
Bribery, falsification, and conspiracy
| 01 | Between 2013 and 2018, SAP knowingly conspired to pay bribes to foreign government officials in South Africa and Indonesia in order to obtain and retain lucrative public software contracts. | High |
| 02 | SAP paid these bribes through at least six third-party intermediary companies, deliberately masking the payments by falsely recording them as “sales commissions” in its books and SEC filings. | High |
| 03 | In South Africa, SAP employees coordinated bribe amounts and delivery methods via text messages with officials from the City of Johannesburg, the Department of Water and Sanitation, the City of Tshwane, Eskom, and the Gauteng Gambling Board. | High |
| 04 | In Indonesia, SAP employees and consultants coordinated cash bribes for officials at the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, discussing amounts ranging from 50 million to 70 million Indonesian Rupiah per official. One SAP employee was told to “bring an empty envelope” for the cash handoff. | High |
| 05 | SAP employees also bribed Indonesian government officials with a U.S. shopping spree, purchasing handbags, keychains, novelties, a luxury watch, and other items on a $10,000 budget, then sent photos of the purchases to co-conspirators in Indonesia via text messages sent from the United States. | High |
| 06 | SAP’s 2015-2016 contract with the City of Johannesburg more than quintupled SAP’s revenue from previous contracts with that entity, a direct result of bribe payments delivered through an intermediary in August 2016. | Med |
| 07 | After a bribe was paid to a South Africa Department of Water and Sanitation official, an SAP employee deleted the confirming phrase “your payment has gone” from an intermediary’s email before forwarding it for internal processing, actively destroying evidence. | High |
| 08 | Executives at SAP Africa and SAP South Africa falsely certified the operating effectiveness of internal financial controls on January 27, 2016 and January 19, 2017, certifications that were then incorporated into SAP’s SEC filings, submitting false statements to U.S. securities regulators. | High |
Profit Over People: Revenue Prioritized Over Ethics
How SAP treated bribery as a business strategy
| 01 | SAP obtained more than $103 million in profits directly from the bribery schemes described in the criminal information. This figure was the net gain SAP retained after the bribes themselves were paid out. | High |
| 02 | SAP deliberately structured bribe payments to stay at the maximum allowable third-party commission rate of 14.9 percent, the highest level permitted without triggering higher-level internal approvals, engineering the corruption to evade its own controls. | High |
| 03 | To secure the Department of Water and Sanitation contract, SAP engaged two separate intermediaries simultaneously, each receiving commissions at the 14.9 percent ceiling, doubling the payout while technically staying within approval thresholds. | High |
| 04 | SAP paid one South African intermediary more than 9 million South African rand (over $900,000 in 2013 and 2014 dollars) for no substantive work, falsely booking the payments as “commissions” despite the intermediary providing no deliverables. | High |
| 05 | Multiple SAP intermediaries used as bribe conduits were owned or controlled by individuals closely affiliated with South African government officials, creating a direct financial pipeline between SAP and the officials whose decisions SAP was purchasing. | High |
Regulatory Failures: How Oversight Broke Down
Internal controls weaponized against accountability
| 01 | SAP conducted only “limited due diligence” on Intermediary 2 during its onboarding in 2015. A subsequent internal review in 2017 revealed the intermediary had no financial statements, had filed no employee tax returns, and showed no signs of activity at its claimed business address. SAP used this shell entity anyway. | High |
| 02 | SAP falsified its books and records by labeling bribe payments as “sales commissions” and “similar expenses,” and these falsifications were subsequently incorporated into SAP’s consolidated financial statements filed with the SEC. | High |
| 03 | After the DWS bribe was paid, an SAP employee and the director of the bribe conduit company discussed destroying documents associated with the transaction and fabricating an explanation for the payment, demonstrating active obstruction of any future investigation. | High |
| 04 | The bribery schemes reached at least five South African state-owned entities and government agencies (City of Johannesburg, Department of Water and Sanitation, City of Tshwane, Eskom, and entities linked to the Gauteng Gambling Board), representing a systemic failure of SAP’s compliance structure across an entire region. | Med |
Community Impact: Who Actually Got Hurt
The public institutions SAP corrupted exist to serve ordinary people
| 01 | The City of Johannesburg, whose official SAP bribed, is responsible for delivering electricity, waste and sanitation services to millions of Johannesburg residents. SAP corrupted the procurement process for a city that serves its most vulnerable constituents. | High |
| 02 | The Department of Water and Sanitation, whose executive SAP bribed with a $215,800 payment, is responsible for protecting the delivery of safe water across South Africa. SAP’s corruption penetrated the institution responsible for clean water access for millions of South Africans. | High |
| 03 | Eskom, the South African state-owned electricity company, was also targeted by SAP’s bribery scheme through intermediaries. Eskom is the sole supplier of electricity to much of South Africa; corruption in its procurement directly affects public energy infrastructure. | Med |
| 04 | In Indonesia, SAP bribed officials at the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and a state telecommunications accessibility agency, corrupting institutions responsible for coastal community welfare and digital access for underserved populations. | Med |
Corporate Accountability Failures
What happens, and what doesn’t, when corporations break the law
| 01 | The criminal information charges SAP the company, not any named individual executive. Despite the document showing that named company employees (identified by number) approved, directed, and participated in bribery schemes over multiple years, no individual criminal charges are visible in this filing. | High |
| 02 | SAP’s internal compliance system was structurally designed in a way that allowed employees to structure bribe payments just below the approval threshold, effectively using the compliance framework as a tool to conceal misconduct rather than prevent it. | High |
| 03 | The false certifications submitted by SAP executives to the SEC were incorporated into public filings, meaning investors and the public were given materially false information about the company’s financial controls for at least two fiscal years. | High |
Timeline of Events
2013
SAP begins South Africa bribery conspiracy. SAP South Africa pays over 9 million South African rand to Intermediary 3, falsely booked as “commissions,” funneled to entities controlled by a Gauteng government official.
2013–2017
South Africa bribery scheme operates across at least five government entities: City of Johannesburg, Department of Water and Sanitation, City of Tshwane, Eskom, and Gauteng-linked entities.
Aug 1, 2016
SAP Employee 2 and City of Johannesburg Official 1 exchange text messages coordinating a bribe payment. The official asks whether SAP should wire the money or pay cash. SAP routes approximately 2.2 million South African rand ($155,555) to Intermediary 1, falsely recorded as a “Sales Commission.”
Aug 29, 2016
SAP Employee 2 receives email confirming “your payment has gone,” then deletes that phrase before forwarding the email internally, destroying evidence of the bribe.
Nov 29, 2016
SAP pays approximately 3 million South African rand ($215,800) in bribe to Department of Water and Sanitation Official 1, routed through two intermediaries to conceal the payment’s nature. Conspirators subsequently discuss destroying documentation.
Jan 27, 2016 & Jan 19, 2017
SAP Africa and SAP South Africa executives falsely certify the effectiveness of internal financial controls, certifications later incorporated into SAP’s SEC filings.
2015–2018
Indonesia bribery conspiracy runs in parallel. SAP Indonesia bribes officials at the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) and the telecommunications accessibility agency (BP3TI).
June 2018
SAP Employee 6, while in the United States, pays for a shopping spree for an Indonesian BP3TI official and a family member, purchasing handbags, a luxury watch, keychains, and novelties on a $10,000 budget. Photos of purchases are texted to co-conspirators in Indonesia.
Jan 10, 2024
U.S. Department of Justice files criminal information against SAP SE in the Eastern District of Virginia, charging two counts of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and to falsify books and records.
Direct Quotes from the Legal Record
QUOTE 1
City of Johannesburg official negotiates cash vs. wire transfer
Core Allegations
“[s]hould give [SAP Employee 2] the bank account or you’ll give me cash.”
This text message from a City of Johannesburg official, sent less than an hour after SAP employees signaled a bribe was coming, demonstrates that both sides of this transaction understood exactly what was happening. A government official entrusted with services for millions of people was negotiating the mechanics of a kickback.
QUOTE 2
Bribe confirmed via email, then evidence destroyed
Core Allegations
“[y]our payment has gone.”
This phrase, sent by the Managing Director of Intermediary 1 to confirm a bribe payment, was subsequently deleted by SAP Employee 2 before the email was forwarded for internal processing. The deletion is documented in the criminal information as an overt act of evidence destruction within the conspiracy.
QUOTE 3
Indonesian official requests cash delivered by envelope
Indonesia Conspiracy
“[b]ring [an] empty envelope”
SAP Employee 5 received this instruction from Indonesian Consultant 1 when coordinating a cash bribe for a Ministry of Maritime Affairs official. The meeting to deliver the cash was arranged in the lobby of the ministry building itself. Public infrastructure procurement reduced to an envelope of cash.
QUOTE 4
SAP conspired to pay money to foreign officials for five years
Core Allegations
“SAP, through certain of its agents, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with others to (i) offer and pay money and other things of value to foreign officials in South Africa and Indonesia to secure improper advantages in order to obtain and retain business.”
This is the DOJ’s framing of SAP’s conduct in its own words. “Knowingly and willfully” is the operative phrase. This was not an accident, not negligence, and not the isolated act of a bad actor. SAP conspired, systematically and over years, to corrupt public officials in two countries.
QUOTE 5
Bribe to water official routed through multiple entities to conceal it
Regulatory Failures
“SAP routed its bribe payment through Intermediary 2, which then passed the payment through another entity in an attempt to conceal the nature of the payment.”
This describes the bribe to the South Africa Department of Water and Sanitation official. SAP did not just pay a bribe; it engineered a two-layer laundering structure to hide what the money was. A senior official responsible for safe water access for South Africans received $215,800 in corrupted funds passed through two corporate shells.
QUOTE 6
Conspirators planned to destroy documents after bribe was paid
Accountability Failures
“The two individuals discussed the importance of destroying any documents associated with the transaction, and the need to fabricate an explanation for the payment.”
After the DWS bribe was paid, an SAP employee and the bribe conduit’s director explicitly discussed evidence destruction and fabricating a cover story. This is not corporate negligence. This is obstruction of justice, planned in real time, between a SAP employee and the company’s chosen intermediary.
QUOTE 7
Intermediary had no real business activity
Regulatory Failures
“Intermediary 2 had no financial statements (audited or unaudited), had not filed any returns for employee tax purposes, and found no signs of activity at Intermediary 2’s claimed business address.”
SAP’s own 2017 internal review found that the company it used to route a $215,800 bribe to a government official was a ghost company. No records, no employees, no real address. SAP knew or should have known this before it ever sent the money. It used the shell anyway.
QUOTE 8
SAP obtained $103 million in profits from corrupt schemes
Profit Over People
“From the schemes and conduct described herein, SAP obtained profits totaling $103,396,765.”
This is not an estimate. This is the amount the DOJ specifically identified as SAP’s gain from its bribery operations. Every dollar of that $103 million came from contracts that were awarded through corruption. It is money that was taken from the public, laundered through officials who were supposed to protect the public interest.
Commentary
What exactly did SAP do wrong, in plain terms?
SAP paid bribes, plain and simple. Over five years, across South Africa and Indonesia, SAP employees coordinated cash payments, wire transfers, political contributions, and luxury shopping sprees for government officials who controlled whether SAP won public contracts. SAP then lied about it in its financial records and filed those false records with U.S. securities regulators. This is corporate bribery at scale, sustained over years, and covered up in real time.
Who were the real victims of SAP’s bribery scheme?
The direct victims are the people served by the institutions SAP corrupted. The City of Johannesburg delivers electricity, sanitation, and waste management to millions of South Africans. The Department of Water and Sanitation is responsible for safe drinking water across the country. Eskom powers South African homes and businesses. When SAP bribed officials at those institutions, it corrupted the procurement decisions that affect the quality, reliability, and cost of those services for ordinary people. Bribery does not just harm government. It degrades the infrastructure that poor and working-class communities depend on most.
How did SAP hide what it was doing?
SAP used at least six third-party intermediary companies as bribe conduits, falsely recording the payments as “sales commissions” in its books. Some intermediaries were shell companies with no employees, no financial statements, and no real business activity. SAP structured payments to stay just below the approval threshold that would have required higher-level sign-off. Employees deleted incriminating language from emails before internal forwarding. After paying a bribe, conspirators actively discussed destroying documents and fabricating explanations. SAP’s own executives then falsely certified the accuracy of internal financial controls to the SEC, submitting those false certifications in public filings.
Is SAP being held fully accountable for what it did?
The criminal information charges SAP as a company, not any named individual. The document identifies multiple SAP employees by number who approved, directed, coordinated, and participated in bribery schemes over years, including senior-level approvals. The absence of named individual charges in this filing is a serious accountability gap. A company that paid $103 million in fines can absorb that cost as a business expense. The executives and employees who made these decisions, if they face no personal criminal consequences, have little reason to believe the rules actually apply to them. Accountability without individual liability is not accountability.
Why does a German software company bribery case end up in a U.S. court?
Because SAP had securities registered on U.S. exchanges and was required to file reports with the SEC, SAP was subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a U.S. law that applies to any company issuing securities in the United States, regardless of where the bribery occurred. SAP also used U.S. communications infrastructure (interstate commerce) to coordinate the schemes. The FCPA is one of the most powerful tools the U.S. government has to pursue global corporate corruption, and this case demonstrates why that jurisdiction matters.
How did SAP structure its bribe payments to avoid internal detection?
SAP’s internal rules apparently required additional high-level approvals for third-party commission payments that exceeded a certain percentage of contract revenue. SAP exploited this by deliberately setting intermediary commissions at 14.9 percent, which was described in the criminal information as the maximum allowable rate without triggering those higher approvals. For the Department of Water and Sanitation contract, SAP hired two intermediaries simultaneously, each at the 14.9 percent ceiling. SAP’s compliance framework was turned into a ceiling that helped the company commit fraud more quietly.
How does this connect to broader patterns of corporate misconduct?
SAP’s conduct fits a well-documented pattern: a multinational corporation expanding aggressively into emerging markets, using local intermediaries to pay bribes while maintaining plausible distance, falsifying internal records to absorb the cost, and relying on the gap between corporate liability and individual liability to protect its executives. This pattern repeats across industries and geographies because the expected cost of getting caught (a fine that is less than the profit from the misconduct) is frequently less than the expected benefit. Until individual executives face prison for directing these schemes, the calculus will not change.
What can I do to prevent this from happening again?
Contact your federal representatives and demand stronger FCPA enforcement, including mandatory individual criminal charges for executives who direct or approve foreign bribery schemes. Support organizations that monitor corporate accountability and FCPA enforcement, including the Government Accountability Project and the FACT Coalition. As a consumer, investor, or employee: ask publicly whether the companies you engage with have credible, independently audited anti-corruption compliance programs. Demand that procurement reform in developing countries be a condition of international trade agreements. And share this story. Sunlight is still one of the most effective disinfectants we have.
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