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Does McDonald’s trap its own workers with illegal agreements?

Corporate Misconduct

McDonald’s Trapped Its Own Workers. A Federal Court Just Called It Out.

McDonald’s wrote a rule into every franchise contract in America that made it illegal for its own restaurants to offer you a better job.


The Clause They Hid in Plain Sight

Established Fact Corporate Misconduct

Until McDonald’s quietly stopped the practice, every single franchise agreement it issued contained an anti-poaching clause. That clause forced every franchise owner to promise they would not hire any worker employed by any other McDonald’s franchise β€” or by McDonald’s corporate itself β€” until at least six months after that person’s last day on the job. A companion clause went further and banned franchises from even approaching another franchise’s employees with a job offer.

This was a system built to function like a wall. A McDonald’s employee in Phoenix who heard that a franchise across town was paying more could not simply apply there. The potential employer was legally bound by their franchise agreement to turn her away. Her only real option: quit, wait six months with no income, and then try again. For a minimum-wage worker living paycheck to paycheck, a six-month waiting period is functionally a lifetime.

Plaintiffs Leinani Deslandes and Stephanie Turner worked at McDonald’s franchises while these clauses were in force and were directly blocked from taking higher-paying positions at other franchise locations. They brought the lawsuit that would force a federal appeals court to examine whether McDonald’s had been running a wage-suppression operation dressed up as standard contract language.

A Cartel in a Burger Wrapper

Antitrust law exists to stop exactly this kind of coordination. The Sherman Act prohibits monopolies in product markets, but β€” crucially β€” it also prohibits monopsonies in labor markets. A monopsony is what happens when a single buyer (or a group acting together) gains enough control over a market that workers or suppliers lose real alternatives and get paid less than they would in a competitive market. McDonald’s, operating both corporate-owned restaurants and franchised locations, created a system where its own corporate restaurants and its franchisee partners all agreed: nobody poaches from anybody else.

The appeals court confirmed this makes the arrangement horizontal in nature β€” meaning it is a coordination between competing businesses, not just an internal policy. Corporate McDonald’s and its franchisees compete for the same workers in the same local labor markets. When they all sign the same no-poach pledge, they stop competing. That is the definition of a cartel, even if the product being suppressed is wages instead of the price of oil.

The Supreme Court itself, in a 2021 case called NCAA v. Alston, made clear that antitrust law applies to labor markets the same way it applies to product markets. McDonald’s could not hide behind its burger output as a justification for suppressing what it paid the people who made those burgers.

“If this clause holds down the price of labor by reducing competition for fast-food workers, that could benefit owners β€” and conceivably consumers too. But the antitrust laws prohibit monopsonies, just as they prohibit monopolies.”
β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Timeline: From No-Poach Clause to Federal Appeals Court

2017 Deslandes files suit Jun. 2018 District court dismisses per se claim 2019 Turner files related suit Jun. 2022 Dismissal with prejudice Aug. 2023 Appeals court VACATES & remands

The Non-Financial Ledger

What McDonald’s Took That Can’t Be Measured in Dollars

Human Cost

Leinani Deslandes did everything the system told her to do. She showed up, she worked, she learned. McDonald’s operates on a highly standardized training system: uniform layouts, uniform tasks, uniform procedures across every franchise in the country. Deslandes acquired skills β€” real, marketable skills β€” that had value across the entire McDonald’s system. And in a competitive labor market, those skills would have been her leverage. She could have walked into any other franchise and said: I already know how everything works here. That knowledge should have translated into a higher starting wage, or a faster promotion, or both.

But the court’s opinion explains something chilling about how McDonald’s structured wages from the beginning: workers at McDonald’s may have been paid below their actual productive value during the early part of their employment β€” effectively funding their own training through suppressed wages. The implicit deal in a fair labor market is that you accept lower pay early on, and then your wages rise once your skills are proven. The no-poach clause broke that deal. It removed the competitive pressure that would have forced wages to rise. McDonald’s captured the upside and left workers holding the loss.

The appeals court described this dynamic without softening it: the clause may have allowed franchises to “capitalize on workers’ sunk costs.” That language is clinical. Translate it into plain English: McDonald’s workers invested their own economic futures β€” in the form of below-market wages β€” to become skilled and productive employees, and then McDonald’s used contractual language to ensure those workers could never collect on that investment by finding a better offer elsewhere. The worker paid the tuition. McDonald’s kept the diploma.

“If this is what the no-poach agreement does β€” if it prevents workers from reaping the gains from skills they learned by agreeing to work at lower wages at the outset of their employment β€” then it does not promote output. It promotes profits.”
β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

There is something deeply personal in what the court reveals about how McDonald’s also limited the number of job classifications available to workers β€” meaning even internal promotion was constrained. Workers could not easily move up within a franchise, and they could not move laterally to a competitor franchise. They were boxed in on two sides simultaneously. The only exit was to quit entirely, absorb the six-month waiting period, and hope the new employer hadn’t already moved on. For someone raising a family on a fast-food wage, that exit door is not a real option. It is theater.


Legal Receipts: Straight From the Court’s Mouth

Primary Source
“Until recently, every McDonald’s franchise agreement contained an anti-poach clause. Each franchise operator promised not to hire any person employed by a different franchise, or by McDonald’s itself, until six months after the last date that person had worked for McDonald’s or another franchise.” β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit  |  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC (Aug. 25, 2023)
“The complaint alleges that McDonald’s operates many restaurants itself or through a subsidiary, and that it enforced the no-poach clause at those restaurants. This made the arrangement horizontal: workers at franchised outlets could not move to corporate outlets, or the reverse.” β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit  |  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC (Aug. 25, 2023)
“Maybe it just takes advantage of workers’ sunk costs and helps each business’s bottom line, without adding to output.” β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit  |  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC (Aug. 25, 2023)
“Why did the clause have a national scope, preventing a restaurant in North Dakota from hiring a worker in North Carolina, when the market for restaurant jobs is local? Why did the restriction last as long as the employment (plus six months), rather than be linked to any estimate of the time a franchise would need to recover its investments in training?” β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit  |  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC (Aug. 25, 2023)
“One problem with this approach is that it treats benefits to consumers (increased output) as justifying detriments to workers (monopsony pricing). That’s not right; it is equivalent to saying that antitrust law is unconcerned with competition in the markets for inputs.” β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit  |  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC (Aug. 25, 2023)

The Concurrence That Adds Teeth

“If the restriction cannot be justified because of its scope and duration, it is difficult to see how it can be reasonably necessary to the achievement of the procompetitive objectives of the franchise agreement.” β€” Circuit Judge Ripple, Concurring  |  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC (Aug. 25, 2023)

The Numbers That Make This Real

6 Months a blocked worker had to wait before any other McDonald’s could legally hire them
517 Quick-service restaurants within 10 miles of plaintiff Deslandes’s home β€” yet she was still blocked from the nearest ones
42–50 Quick-service restaurants within just 3 miles of her home

Nearby Employers Rendered Irrelevant by the No-Poach Clause (Deslandes Case)

0 100 200 300 400 500+ ~46 Within 3 miles (all employers) 2 McDonald’s locations BLOCKED by clause 517 Within 10 miles (all employers) No. of Restaurants Total nearby employers Employers banned from hiring her

Societal Impact Mapping

Economic Inequality: The Machine That Keeps Wages Down

Economic Impact

The workers targeted by McDonald’s no-poach system are overwhelmingly people with limited economic cushion. Fast-food workers earn wages at the bottom end of the American income scale. These are the people for whom a $1-an-hour raise is the difference between affording a car repair or riding the bus in the dark. McDonald’s, by running a coordinated national agreement that eliminated wage competition across its entire franchise network, systematically denied those raises to hundreds of thousands of people.

The court’s opinion explains that in a genuinely competitive labor market, a worker’s wages rise over time in proportion to their increasing productivity and skills. The no-poach clause severed that connection. McDonald’s workers became more skilled over time but had no market mechanism to convert that skill into higher pay. The system extracted their labor at a fixed price point, regardless of their rising value. That is the operational definition of economic extraction.

The court also highlighted a particularly corrosive detail: McDonald’s limited the number of job classifications available to workers, which delayed or blocked internal promotion. This closed off the internal path to higher wages at the same time the no-poach clause closed off the external path. Workers were squeezed from both directions simultaneously, by design, inside a system that generated billions in revenue for shareholders and franchise owners.

“In a competitive market, workers recover these investments as their wages rise over time, in response to their greater productivity. But if McDonald’s specifies a limited number of classifications of workers, that may delay promotion and frustrate workers’ ability to recoup their investments in training.”
β€” U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

The national scope of the clause matters enormously here. As the court directly asked: why did a no-poach agreement need to be national when restaurant labor markets are local? A worker in Charlotte is never going to commute to a McDonald’s in Fargo. The national reach served no business purpose related to training costs or operational consistency. Its only practical effect was to make the suppression of wages more total and more inescapable. Even in markets where McDonald’s was particularly dominant, workers could not escape to a franchise in another city.


The “Cost of a Life” Metric

To understand what this suppression means in daily life: the federal minimum wage has been frozen at $7.25 per hour since 2009. Fast-food workers in many states earn barely above that floor. A suppressed wage of even $1 to $2 per hour over a five-year career amounts to between $10,400 and $20,800 in stolen earnings per worker (roughly the cost of a year’s groceries and utilities for a family of four). Multiply that across the full McDonald’s franchise workforce, and the number becomes almost too large to print.


What Now? Who Is Accountable and Where to Push

Action

The appeals court vacated the dismissal and sent the case back for full economic analysis. The fight is alive. Here is who has power over what happens next:

On the ground, the most effective counter-force to corporate wage suppression is worker organizing. Unions at fast-food chains remain difficult but not impossible; the Fight for $15 movement proved that coordinated action forces wage increases even without formal union recognition. Local worker centers, mutual aid networks, and community legal aid organizations provide the immediate infrastructure for workers who believe they were directly harmed by the no-poach clause to connect with attorneys pursuing the ongoing litigation.

If you worked at a McDonald’s franchise and were told you could not take a job at another franchise, or were discouraged from applying elsewhere, your experience is directly relevant to this case. Document it. Find a plaintiffs’ attorney. The remand keeps the courtroom door open.


The source document for this investigation is attached below.

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Aleeia
Aleeia

I'm Aleeia, the creator of this website.

I have 6+ years of experience as an independent researcher covering corporate misconduct, sourced from legal documents, regulatory filings, and professional legal databases.

My background includes a Supply Chain Management degree from Michigan State University's Eli Broad College of Business, and years working inside the industries I now cover.

Every post on this site was either written or personally reviewed and edited by me before publication.

Learn more about my research standards and editorial process by visiting my About page

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