They Rigged the Rate Your Retirement Depended On
UBS, RBS, and a cartel of global banks secretly conspired for six years to manipulate Euribor β the benchmark interest rate underpinning trillions of dollars in financial contracts. One of their victims: the retirement fund for California’s schoolteachers.
While California’s schoolteachers paid into their retirement fund every single paycheck, a cartel of the world’s largest banks was secretly manipulating the interest rate that determined what that fund was actually worth.
The Rate That Ran Everything β And Was For Sale
Euribor β the Euro Interbank Offered Rate β sounds like financial jargon, but its function is simple: it is the daily measurement of what major European banks charge each other to lend money. That one number flows into a vast web of financial products. Mortgages, pension fund derivatives, corporate loans, currency contracts β trillions of dollars in value tracked it.
The system was designed to be trustworthy. A select group of panel banks each submitted their honest observations of lending rates. Thomson Reuters discarded the extreme outliers and averaged the middle. The banks signed a code of conduct requiring them to submit independently, without coordination, and without submitting false quotes.
Every single one of those rules was broken. Systematically. For six years.
β Fourth Amended Complaint, Sullivan v. UBS AG
A Conspiracy With a Dress Code
This was not a shadowy back-room hack. The conspiracy operated in the open culture of global finance. Traders picked up the phone. They met at conferences. They coordinated at dinners. And when they were done manipulating billion-dollar benchmarks, they sent each other chat messages keeping score.
The banks also manipulated Euribor indirectly: they borrowed and lent Euros to each other at rates deliberately set above or below the true market, which distorted the submissions of banks not even in on the scheme. They called it doing business. The court called it price-fixing. The people who lost money called it theft.
On top of the banks themselves, the conspiracy pulled in interdealer brokers β including ICAP PLC and ICAP Europe Limited β who transmitted false bids and offers across the market to create the illusion that prices were moving organically. The entire system of price discovery was poisoned at the source.
The Non-Financial Ledger: Who Actually Paid for This
There is a version of this story that lives entirely in spreadsheets. Basis points. Notional values. Derivative pricing formulas. That version lets the banks off easy, because it makes the harm sound abstract. It was not abstract. There were people on the other side of every single one of those rigged trades.
The California State Teachers’ Retirement System β CalSTRS β manages the retirement savings of hundreds of thousands of public school teachers across California. These are people who chose a life of low pay and high stress because they believed in the promise that a secure retirement waited at the end. CalSTRS entered into hundreds of foreign exchange forwards with UBS and transacted in interest rate swaps with RBS, directly in the United States. Every one of those deals was priced using a Euribor formula that UBS and RBS were secretly manipulating to benefit themselves.
When Euribor moved in the direction the banks had engineered, CalSTRS paid more than it should have. When the pricing formula kicked in, the number that fed into it was a lie. The teachers did not know. The fund managers trusted the market. The market was fixed.
The Betrayal Behind the Code of Conduct
The banks had signed a code of conduct. It required them to submit independent, competitive rates β no coordination, no false quotes. They signed it. They agreed to it. They violated it continuously for six years, across multiple institutions, through multiple channels, using phones and chat messages and industry dinners as their operational infrastructure.
The complaint describes bank management as active architects of the fraud. Executives did not simply look away. They restructured trading desks specifically to make Euribor manipulation easier and more profitable. They designed lax compliance systems that guaranteed nothing would be caught. And when regulators eventually started circling, management hid evidence. This was not rogue traders acting alone. The institution itself was the weapon.
The FPA β Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust β was also a direct victim. It entered FX forwards with UBS in February 2011, near the very end of the conspiracy window. The fund “paid more for and/or received less Euros” because of the manipulation. For an investment fund, that is not just a bad trade. It is the result of a counterparty who knew the game was rigged, sat across the table anyway, and took the money.
The People Who Never Made the Complaint
The named plaintiffs in this case are funds and institutions sophisticated enough to eventually understand what happened to them and wealthy enough to hire legal teams to fight back for over a decade. The vast majority of people harmed by Euribor manipulation were not. Pension fund beneficiaries β teachers, city workers, nurses whose unions had pension funds exposed to Euribor-based derivatives β had no idea. They just noticed, eventually, that their retirement accounts were not performing quite as projected, and they assumed it was “the market.” The market was a cartel.
Inside the Machine: How the Fix Actually Worked
The mechanics of the conspiracy were layered and deliberate. At the most direct level, traders at one bank called traders at another bank and told them which way to push their Euribor submissions on specific days β days when the banks’ derivatives positions were set to be priced or settled. A submission pushed even a fraction of a basis point in the right direction on the right day could translate into millions of dollars of profit.
Beyond targeted day-by-day manipulation, the banks also ran a long-term skew campaign: systematically biasing Euribor submissions over months and years to benefit their overall derivative book positions. This was not a one-time fraud. It was a continuous market distortion maintained across the entire six-year conspiracy window.
The Broker Network: Laundering False Signals Through Middlemen
The banks also pulled in the brokers. ICAP PLC and ICAP Europe Limited served as interdealer brokers β market intermediaries whose job is to relay pricing information between institutions. The conspiracy used them to transmit false bids and offers to the broader market, creating the appearance that prices were moving organically based on genuine supply and demand. In reality, those price signals were manufactured. Other market participants made decisions based on data that was deliberately fraudulent.
Management Didn’t Just Allow This. Management Built It.
The complaint’s most damning allegation does not involve a single trader or a single bad call. It describes a structural corporate decision: bank executives physically reorganized their money markets and interest rate derivatives trading desks to place Euribor submitters in proximity to derivatives traders. The people who submitted the rates that determined the value of the trades sat next to the people whose bonuses depended on those rates moving the right way. This was not an accident. It was architecture.
Compliance departments were deliberately left toothless. The complaint describes “lax compliance standards that failed to detect any misconduct.” When regulators eventually started asking questions, management hid the evidence. The institution at every level β structural, operational, legal β worked to protect and extend the fraud.
Legal Receipts: In Their Own Words
These are direct quotations and factual findings from the court record. They speak for themselves.
“rbs and ubs are going to do everything to put [Euribor] to the . . . sk[y]”
β Chat message from Philippe Moryoussef, RBS trader, November 2007; cited in Sullivan v. UBS AG, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 2025. This single message gave the court enough to infer a conspiracy between RBS and UBS.“The banks’ Euribor-based derivatives traders requested that the banks manipulate their Euribor submissions, both by targeting specific days when the traders’ derivatives positions were going to be priced, benchmarked, and/or settled based on Euribor and by skewing Euribor over the long run to benefit the banks’ Euribor-based derivatives positions.”
β Fourth Amended Complaint, Sullivan v. UBS AG, as recited by the Second Circuit, 2025“The management of the defendant banks facilitated this Euribor rigging by (1) making structural changes to their money markets and interest rate derivatives trading desks to create an environment where benchmark manipulation . . . was encouraged; (2) implementing lax compliance standards that failed to detect any misconduct; and (3) hiding evidence of wrongdoing from government regulators.”
β Fourth Amended Complaint, Sullivan v. UBS AG, as recited by the Second Circuit, 2025“[A] Euribor submitter at SociΓ©tΓ© GΓ©nΓ©rale sent chat messages wherein he ‘explained how he anticipated UBS'[s] requests when he prepared his Euribor submissions,’ supporting an inference that ‘collusive communications between UBS and SociΓ©tΓ© GΓ©nΓ©rale not only occurred, but occurred with enough frequency that [the submitter] could anticipate UBS'[s] needs.'”
β Second Circuit opinion, Sullivan v. UBS AG, August 22, 2025. The fraud was so routine that bank employees could predict each other’s manipulation requests in advance.“Moryoussef ‘identif[ied] UBS as one of his “friends” who “had not been there” to make the agreed upon false Euribor submission,’ suggesting that Moryoussef had conspired with individuals at UBS in the past.”
β Second Circuit opinion citing a 2006 email from Moryoussef expressing anger that UBS failed to follow through on its manipulation commitment. The word “friends” here means co-conspirators.“CalSTRS alleged that during the month of June 2010 β when it entered into an FX forward with UBS β Defendants ‘were engaged in an upward manipulation of Euribor,’ which ‘artificially increased the amount of Euro required for CalSTRS to fulfill its obligations to . . . UBS’ under the FX forward, thus injuring CalSTRS.”
β Second Circuit opinion, Sullivan v. UBS AG, 2025. This is the direct financial injury to the teachers’ retirement fund, stated plainly.Societal Impact: Who Bears the Weight
Economic Inequality: The Market Was a Lie Sold to the Many, Profitable to the Few
Interest rate benchmarks like Euribor function as the foundation of economic trust. Pension funds, municipalities, universities, and ordinary individuals who hold savings products tied to interest rates all assume, at the most basic level, that the rate they are quoted reflects actual market conditions. That assumption was false from June 2005 through March 2011 β not because of a market failure, but because of a deliberate criminal decision by some of the most powerful financial institutions on earth.
CalSTRS manages retirement assets for California’s public school educators. When CalSTRS entered into interest rate swaps with RBS and FX forwards with UBS, it was using a tool designed to manage risk for its beneficiaries. The manipulation of Euribor turned those risk-management tools into instruments of extraction. The banks held information CalSTRS did not have: they knew what the rate was going to be because they were setting it. Every transaction was, therefore, structurally unfair. The banks brought a loaded deck; the teachers’ fund brought money.
This is the definition of economic inequality written in financial architecture. The institutions with the most resources and the most power chose to use both to systematically extract value from counterparties who had no way to know the game was rigged. The people who ultimately feel that extraction are the teachers in California classrooms, whose pension returns were quietly diminished so that bank traders could post better numbers and earn bigger bonuses.
The broader Euribor market touched an enormous range of financial products. Derivatives tied to Euribor were held by pension funds, government entities, corporate treasuries, and individual investors across Europe and the United States. Each of those parties entered transactions trusting a benchmark that had been captured. The wealth transfer enabled by six years of manipulation was systemic, directional, and entirely one-sided: from anyone who held a Euribor-based contract at a disadvantageous position, to the banks who had rigged which direction “disadvantageous” would fall.
Public Health: The Invisible Cost of Pillaged Pension Funds
Pension fund losses do not show up as public health crises on their own. They arrive slowly, in the form of reduced retirement security for public sector workers who spent their careers in hospitals, schools, and government offices. When pension funds lose money to financial fraud, the downstream effects include retirees who cannot afford adequate healthcare, who stay in the workforce longer than their bodies allow, and who depend more heavily on public assistance programs already under strain.
CalSTRS covers hundreds of thousands of California educators. A sustained reduction in that fund’s performance β caused, in part, by counterparties who secretly manipulated the pricing benchmarks in every transaction β translates into years of reduced retirement income for the teachers involved. Financial security in retirement is directly tied to health outcomes. Retirees facing financial stress experience worse physical and mental health. The harm does not stop at the brokerage statement.
The Cost of a Life: Putting Numbers to the Betrayal
Over those six years, UBS and RBS directly traded Euribor-based derivatives with CalSTRS and FPA in the United States. CalSTRS entered hundreds of FX forwards with UBS and interest rate swaps with RBS. Every one of those contracts was priced using a rate the banks were manipulating.
The banks structured their trading desks, corrupted their compliance processes, hid evidence from regulators, and coordinated with brokers β all to extract maximum value from a market they had turned into a private casino where only they knew the table was tilted.
A Decade of Fighting to Be Heard
The lawsuit was first filed in 2013 β two years after the European Commission raided banks’ offices for suspected rate manipulation on October 19, 2011. That raid was the first moment when the people being harmed even had a clue something was wrong. The conspiracy had been running for six full years by then.
The district court initially threw out the entire case, ruling it lacked jurisdiction over the foreign banks. It took until August 22, 2025 β twelve years after the lawsuit was filed β for an appeals court to partially restore it. The Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claims against UBS and RBS, reinstated the state-law claims, and sent the case back for further proceedings.
The RICO racketeering claims were dismissed on a procedural technicality: the plaintiffs could not tie specific false Euribor submissions to specific transactions with sufficient precision. Not because the fraud did not happen. Because proving it, in court, to the required legal standard, is extraordinarily difficult when the fraudulent conduct spans six years and thousands of individual communications, and the institution holding the evidence is the defendant.
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