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Lottery.com Couldn’t Make Payroll Yet Somehow Posted $70 Million in Revenue the Next Year

The Lottery Was Rigged From the Start

The People Who Got Left Holding the Ticket

Imagine you’re a retail investor in 2021. You’re not a hedge fund. You’re not a banker. You’re someone who got excited reading about a company that was digitizing the lottery, posting 87% quarter-over-quarter revenue growth, and promising to reach $71 million in annual revenue. The press releases sounded credible. The CEO was quoted in them. The numbers were audited. The company was listed on Nasdaq. You bought shares.

What you didn’t know — what you couldn’t have known — was that those numbers were almost entirely invented. The 87% growth? Built on a transaction where Lottery.com’s executives sent a USB drive full of junk data to a random address in Eastern Europe and called it a $9 million sale. The $71 million revenue target? The executives knew it was unreachable through actual ticket sales. They were planning to fake the rest of it before the year was even half over.

The market cap of Lottery.com peaked at over $400 million after the SPAC merger. That $400 million didn’t materialize from thin air. It came from people who read the press releases and the SEC filings and the earnings calls and believed what they were told. Every dollar of that valuation that evaporated when the fraud came to light was a dollar that someone — a retail investor, a pension fund, a person who thought they were making a reasonable bet on a publicly-traded company — lost permanently.

Then there are the employees. The company’s workers had nothing to do with this scheme. They showed up every day and tried to sell lottery tickets online. The executives who were looting the company’s credibility were simultaneously collecting $500,000 annual salaries — double what they’d been paid before the merger agreement was signed — and positioning themselves to collect millions in “earnout” shares if they could keep the stock price artificially elevated. When the board finally discovered the fraud in July 2022, the company furloughed nearly all of its employees and ceased core operations within weeks. People lost their jobs because the people above them were too busy executing escrow round-trips to build an actual business.

There is also a specific kind of betrayal baked into this particular fraud that goes beyond the money. These executives didn’t just lie to strangers. They lied to their own auditors while signing documents attesting to the truth of statements they knew were false. They lied to their own board of directors, hiding a $30 million line of credit from the outside directors who were supposed to be providing oversight. DiMatteo, who was the chairman of the board, used his position to prevent the very people responsible for catching fraud from learning it existed. The internal controls that are supposed to protect investors were not bypassed by sophisticated outside hackers. They were dismantled by the people whose job it was to maintain them.

The self-deleting messages are the detail that should keep you up at night. These are executives of a publicly-traded company, with legal obligations to shareholders, communicating on a platform they deliberately set to erase their conversations so there would be no record. Every day they woke up and chose to continue the fraud. Every day they chose the app that deleted the evidence. That is a conscious, deliberate decision to operate outside accountability. It is the behavior of people who knew exactly what they were doing and exactly how wrong it was.

Visual 1: Fraud Timeline — From Near-Insolvency to SEC Complaint Sept 2020 Lottery.com can’t make payroll. Revenue near zero. ~2 months Nov 2020 Komissarov meets DiMatteo/Clemenson. Fraud scheme devised. ~1 month Dec 29, 2020 $9M escrow round-trip executed. Fake revenue booked. ~9 months Oct 29, 2021 Trident-Lottery merger closes. Company goes public on Nasdaq. ~2 months Dec 30, 2021 Secret $30M line of credit obtained to fake Company E “payment.” ~7 months July 2022 Board discovers fraud. Execs fired/resign. Operations cease Aug 2022. ~3.5 years Jan 22, 2026 SEC files federal complaint. Case No. 1:26-cv-603 (S.D.N.Y.)

What They Said, What It Proves

The following quotes are drawn verbatim from the SEC’s federal complaint, Case No. 1:26-cv-603, filed January 22, 2026 in the Southern District of New York. Nothing has been paraphrased or invented.

“Komissarov said that an acquaintance, identified as ‘M.I.’, had $9 million in escrow and would allow Komissarov to borrow it for 30 days. Komissarov outlined how the money could be loaned to Company A, which would enter into a phony purchase agreement with Lottery and then transfer the borrowed money to Lottery as payment. Lottery would record the transaction, hold the money in escrow at year-end to create the appearance of having an additional $9 million in cash/assets, and then return the money to M.I. in January 2021.”
  • This quote proves that the $9 million “revenue” transaction was planned as a fraud from the first moment it was discussed. It was never a genuine sale. Komissarov knew no real goods or services would change hands; the entire design was to park borrowed money in an account at year-end so auditors would see it.
  • The quote establishes Komissarov as the architect. He identified the lender, described the mechanics, and provided the playbook. The Lottery executives were following his instructions.
“On December 27, 2020, the Law Firm’s principal emailed a ‘draft escrow disbursement request’ even though, at the time, Lottery had no money in the escrow account. The disbursement request, which Komissarov drafted or was involved in drafting, was for $9 million to be transferred from Lottery to M.I. The following day, prior to Lottery being credited with any money, Clemenson signed the instructions. In effect, before the round-trip transfer of money had begun, Lottery agreed to return the money.”
  • Clemenson signed the instructions to return money that Lottery had not yet received. This is the definition of a predetermined, circular transaction: the exit was planned before the entry occurred. This document alone dismantles any defense that the transaction was a good-faith business deal that went wrong.
  • The date matters: December 27, 2020. The company signed a contract to return $9 million before they had one dollar of it. Anyone who reviews this sequence cannot argue the transaction had legitimate commercial intent.
“‘Vlad’ was actually Komissarov. Because he was the CEO of Trident and was engaging in a scam to inflate Lottery’s financial results and perceived value, Komissarov sought to conceal his identity by adopting a pseudonym. As ‘Vlad,’ Komissarov participated in Zoom calls and other communications to facilitate agreements for the Czech Company to acquire the Mexican entities and then to ‘sell’ those entities to Lottery at the inflated price.”
  • The CEO of a publicly-traded SPAC created a fake identity to conduct transactions that he knew were fraudulent. He participated in video calls under a false name. His co-conspirators knew who “Vlad” really was. The Mexican attorney hired to represent both sides of the deal did not.
  • This level of premeditation — taking on an alias, conducting Zoom meetings in character — shows this was an organized criminal enterprise, built step by step, with participants who understood the stakes and chose concealment anyway.
“In a phone call with Clemenson and Dickinson recorded by the FBI, Komissarov acknowledged ‘if Trident and me specifically knew about [the Company A-Mexico transactions], then, then I’m in deep, deep, deep, deep water.'”
  • This is a confession of consciousness of guilt, captured on a recorded call that Komissarov did not know the FBI had. He is explicitly saying that his personal knowledge of the fake transactions would be catastrophic for him legally. That is an admission that he knew the transactions were wrong at the time they were executed.
  • The FBI’s involvement, reflected in the existence of this recording, indicates this matter was also under criminal investigation parallel to the SEC’s civil action. The complaint does not specify criminal charges, but the FBI does not tape phone calls in purely civil matters.
“DiMatteo, Clemenson, and Dickinson did not inform Lottery’s outside directors, Chief Legal Officer, or auditor about the line of credit. Instead, they intentionally concealed its existence to create the appearance that Lottery had received $30 million from Company E as payment for the transaction of September 30, 2021.”
  • Every oversight mechanism a public company has — an outside board, a chief legal officer, an independent auditor — was deliberately kept in the dark. The executives systematically bypassed the gatekeepers whose job it was to catch exactly this kind of fraud.
  • The $30 million line of credit cost Lottery a $300,000 origination fee plus monthly interest. The company paid money to lie about having money. The only people who benefited were the executives collecting bonuses and salary while the share price held up.
“Lottery booked the entire amount as revenue for Q4 FY 2021” — on a $17.1 million invoice for goods the company knew it had never provided and money the counterparty did not have.
Visual 2: Relationship Map — How the $9M Round-Trip Was Structured M.I. (Lender) $9M escrow source Loans $9M Law Firm (MA) Escrow administrator Credits $9M Company A Fake “customer” — no funds “Pays” $9M (Statement of Work for worthless data) Lottery.com Books $9M as revenue Returns $9M as “acquisition payment” Czech Company Middleman (“Vlad”/Komissarov) Wires $8.95M Company B (Las Vegas) Returns funds to M.I. Money returns to original lender — circle complete Mexican Entities Real value ~$1M; reported $10.5M Investors / Public Deceived by false filings

What Investors Were Told Versus What Was True

These are the specific claims made to investors in press releases and SEC filings, placed directly against the documented facts from the complaint.

Visual 3: Claims vs. Reality — Material Misstatements to Investors What Was Claimed The Reality 2020 Annual Revenue: $7.46M (audited, per July 2021 Form S-4) Actual 2020 revenue was ~$5.46M. $2M of the reported figure was fake revenue from the Company A escrow scam — inflated 36%. Q3 2021 Revenue: $22M-$24M range; “135%+ quarterly sequential growth” (Oct 21, 2021 press release) $30M of the Q3 figure (93% of total) came from a single fake sale of non-transferable ad credits to Company E, which had no money to pay. FY 2021 Pro Forma Revenue: $70.5M (March 31, 2022 earnings release) At least $54.1M of that figure was fabricated. Actual revenue was roughly $16.4M. Nearly 80% of all reported revenue for the year was fake. Mexican acquisition: $9.9M paid ($9.4M cash + ~$0.5M stock). Entities worth ~$10M. (Form S-4, July 6, 2021) Lottery paid $1.03M to the actual owners. The $9M “cash” was borrowed money returned to the lender. The middleman markup was fraud. Q1 2022 Cash: $50.8M. Adjusted EBITDA positive at $7.7M. (May 16, 2022 earnings) $30M of the cash was a fully drawn secret line of credit. EBITDA would have been negative without the $18.5M fake Company E invoice. “Sequential revenue growth averaged ~87% per quarter” (Aug 2, 2021 press release) Fake revenue was embedded in three consecutive quarters. Actual growth was a fraction of 87%. DiMatteo knew this when he approved the release.
Visual 4: Reported vs. Actual Revenue by Quarter (2020 Q4 – 2022 Q1) $5M $10M $15M $20M $25M $30M $35M Q4 2020 $3.5M $1.5M Q1 2021 $5.5M $3.5M Q2 2021 $9.3M $4.3M Q3 2021 $32.2M $2.2M Q4 2021 $21.5M $4.4M Q1 2022 $21.2M $2.7M Reported Revenue (per SEC filings) Estimated Actual Revenue (after removing fake transactions)

Who Gets Hurt When a Public Company Is a Lie

Public Health

The harm in this case is financial and psychological. The populations most exposed to it are specifically the ones least equipped to absorb it.

  • Retail investors who bought Lottery.com stock on Nasdaq were purchasing shares in a company whose every revenue metric was manufactured. The company’s market cap hit over $400 million. When the truth came out, it fell to roughly $10 million. That is a 97.5% wipeout of market value, affecting every person who held shares during that period.
  • The Trident SPAC had raised over $205 million from investors in its IPO. The entire purpose of that capital was to find a legitimate merger target. Instead, the CEO of the SPAC participated in fabricating the financial profile of the merger target. Shareholders who voted in favor of the merger were given materially false proxy documents to base that decision on. Shareholders who chose not to redeem their shares before the merger were effectively tricked into staying in.
  • The psychological toll of investment fraud on ordinary people is documented and severe. Victims experience shame, anxiety, and a lasting distrust of financial institutions. In this case, those victims had done everything right: they read public filings, they looked at audited numbers, they saw a Nasdaq-listed company growing at 87% per quarter. The fraud was specifically designed to pass those tests.
  • The employees of Lottery.com — people who had nothing to do with the fraud — lost their jobs when the company ceased operations in August 2022. Those workers were the casualties of their executives’ choices. The furlough was sudden and total. The company had been projecting strong growth and paying executive retention bonuses just months before it shut down.

Economic Inequality

SPAC fraud has a specific class dynamic that is worth naming clearly. The people with the most to gain were insiders with stock and earnout provisions. The people with the most to lose were the public.

  • Under the Merger Agreement, DiMatteo, Clemenson, Dickinson, Komissarov, and Trident’s other founders stood to receive millions of dollars in “earnout” shares if Lottery’s stock price reached $13 per share for 20 of any 30 consecutive trading days. The Lottery executives could collectively receive up to 6 million additional shares. The SPAC founders could receive up to 4 million additional shares. The entire fraud was engineered, in significant part, to push the stock price toward those thresholds.
  • DiMatteo, Clemenson, and Dickinson doubled their salaries — from $250,000 to $500,000 each — as part of the merger agreement signed in February 2021. They received these doubled salaries while executing a scheme to deceive the public investors who were funding the company they ran. In early 2022, even as the fraud was ongoing, the board awarded each of them retention bonuses of $227,740. DiMatteo was the chairman of the board that approved those bonuses and did not disclose the fraud to the outside directors who voted on them.
  • The SPAC structure itself creates a structural inequality: SPAC founders like Komissarov receive shares (called “founder shares”) at a fraction of the price paid by public investors and have a strong financial incentive to complete a merger regardless of the quality of the target company. Komissarov personally owned approximately 200,000 shares worth over $2 million before the merger; he also had over $1.4 million in unreimbursed expenses at risk. These were his reasons for engineering the fraud. The public investors had no comparable information about the pressure Komissarov was under to close a deal.
  • Approximately 480,000 shares of Lottery stock were sold in May 2022, generating proceeds of over $665,000, by an entity controlled by the principal of the law firm used to cycle the original $9 million loan. This is money extracted from public investors at market prices for shares that existed because of a fraud. The original 228,702 pre-merger shares had been issued to compensate insiders for participating in the scheme. They converted into 687,439 public shares after the merger and were liquidated into the market.
“At least $54 million of Lottery.com’s $70.5 million in reported 2021 revenue was fake. The executives who built those numbers were paid $500,000 salaries and received $227,740 bonuses. The employees who had nothing to do with any of it were furloughed and sent home.”

The Numbers in Human Terms

$54.1M
Minimum fake revenue booked by Lottery.com across 2021 and Q1 2022
What It Represented

Nearly 79% of Lottery.com’s entire reported 2021 revenue. The number that convinced investors, analysts, and shareholders that this was a fast-growing public company worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

What It Actually Was

A USB drive of worthless data, an invoice for advertising credits that couldn’t legally be transferred, and a loan the company gave to its own fake customer so it could “pay” for the transaction.

The Market Cap Wipeout

$400M → $10M

97.5% of investor value destroyed

Cost to Fake the Payment

$300,000

Origination fee Lottery paid on the secret $30M line of credit — plus ongoing monthly interest — to lie about having received payment

The company literally paid a bank $300,000 for the privilege of pretending it had been paid. That fee came out of the same merger proceeds that belonged to the Trident shareholders who voted yes based on fraudulent documents.
Visual 5: Anatomy — How Lottery Faked a $30M Payment Using Its Own Money As Presented to Auditors and Board Company E paid Lottery $30M for advertising credits (Q3 2021) Step 1: Sept 30, 2021 Lottery “sells” $10M ad credits for $30M to Company E Credits non-transferable. Company E has no money. Step 2: Dec 30, 2021 Dickinson secretly obtains $30M line of credit for Lottery Hidden from board, CLO, and auditor. Step 3: Early Jan 2022 Lottery transfers loan proceeds to Company E (minus fee) Lottery pays its own fake customer to fake-pay Lottery. The Result: Two Weeks Later Lottery cashes Company E’s $30M personal check. Books look like Company E paid. Auditor sees “confirmation.” Total cost to Lottery: $300K origination fee + monthly interest on $30M line. The $30M collateral was frozen and inaccessible.

Accountability, Watchlists, and What You Can Do

The SEC is seeking permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil penalties, and officer-and-director bars against all four individual defendants. Here is who is named and what you should watch for.

Named Defendants (per SEC Complaint)

  • Vadim Komissarov, age 53, New York, NY. Former CEO and CFO of Trident Acquisitions Corp. Architect of the scheme. Adopted alias “Vlad” to participate in fraudulent transactions. FBI recording of his self-incriminating statement is cited in the complaint.
  • Lawrence Anthony DiMatteo, age 46, Austin, TX. Co-founder and CEO of Lottery.com from 2015 through July 2022. Signed false certifications, authorized false press releases, lied to auditors, and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights when questioned by SEC staff.
  • Matthew Clemenson, age 42, San Francisco, CA. Co-founder and Chief Revenue Officer of Lottery.com through July 2022. Signed escrow instructions that predetermined the return of borrowed funds. Executed the Statement of Work for the fake Company A sale.
  • Ryan Dickinson, age 46, Irvine, CA. President, Treasurer, and CFO of Lottery.com through July 2022. Applied for the secret $30 million line of credit. Signed false audit certifications. Terminated by the board in July 2022 when the fraud was discovered.

Regulatory Watchlist

  • Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): Filed the civil complaint (Case No. 1:26-cv-603, S.D.N.Y.) on January 22, 2026. Follow updates through PACER and the SEC’s Litigation Releases. The SEC is requesting officer-and-director bars, which would permanently prevent these individuals from running public companies.
  • Department of Justice (DOJ) / FBI: The complaint cites a phone call “recorded by the FBI,” establishing active FBI involvement in this investigation parallel to the SEC action. Watch for criminal indictments; SEC civil actions and DOJ criminal prosecutions frequently proceed simultaneously in securities fraud cases of this type.
  • Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): Monitors broker-dealer conduct in connection with SPAC transactions. The Trident IPO and subsequent de-SPAC involved registered securities that traded on Nasdaq. FINRA has authority over the market participants who facilitated this offering.
  • Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB): The independent auditor that signed off on Lottery.com’s financials was deceived by a signed management representation letter containing knowingly false statements. The PCAOB investigates whether auditors took sufficient steps to detect fraud. This case raises serious questions about audit quality.
  • Nasdaq: Lottery.com’s common stock continues to trade on Nasdaq under the ticker “SEGG” as of the complaint date. Nasdaq has listing standards that include requirements for accurate financial reporting. Monitor whether delisting proceedings are initiated.

What You Can Do

  • If you held shares of Trident Acquisitions Corp. (TDAC) or Lottery.com (LTRY) between November 2020 and August 2022 and suffered losses, contact a securities fraud attorney. Class action suits in securities fraud cases can recover losses for investors who were deceived by false public filings. The SEC complaint establishes the factual record that forms the basis for private civil claims.
  • Follow the SEC’s Investor Education resources at investor.gov. SPACs (Special Purpose Acquisition Companies) carry specific risks that the SEC has documented extensively. The Komissarov-Lottery case is a textbook example of how SPAC structures can be exploited at the expense of retail investors who lack access to the due diligence that institutional investors conduct.
  • Contact your Congressional representatives and ask them to support mandatory independent auditor rotation requirements and stronger internal controls enforcement for recently-merged SPAC companies, which are statistically more likely to have accounting problems than traditional IPO companies. The House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee have jurisdiction over securities law reform.
  • Support organizations that provide free or low-cost investment fraud recovery assistance to retail investors, including the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and your state’s securities regulator. State regulators often have enforcement tools and quicker response times than federal agencies for retail investor fraud cases.
  • If you work in finance, accounting, or at a public company: the management representation letter that DiMatteo and Dickinson signed and lied on is a standard part of every public company audit. Know what it requires. Know that signing it with knowledge of fraud is a separate federal violation (Rule 13b2-2). Auditors and audit committee members who see warning signs have legal and ethical obligations to pursue them — and legal protections when they do.

The source document for this investigation is attached below.

I referenced a Bloomberg Law article to help me write this article: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/former-lottery-com-execs-get-civil-penalties-in-sec-fraud-case

Here is a press release from the Department of Justice about an executive pleading guilty to this fraud: https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-ceo-special-purpose-acquisition-company-spac-pleads-guilty-securities-fraud

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Aleeia
Aleeia

I'm Aleeia, the creator of this website.

I have 6+ years of experience as an independent researcher covering corporate misconduct, sourced from legal documents, regulatory filings, and professional legal databases.

My background includes a Supply Chain Management degree from Michigan State University's Eli Broad College of Business, and years working inside the industries I now cover.

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