What Was Actually Lost When the Numbers Were Fake

When a company’s CEO and CFO fabricate revenue numbers, the first thing most people want to know is how much money changed hands. That number matters. But there is a second register of damage that never shows up in a court filing, and it is the one that follows people home.

Near Intelligence built its pitch around data. Not just any data: movement data. The company claimed to track 1.6 billion unique device IDs and 70 million points of interest across 44 countries. It sold insight into how human beings move through the world. And the executives running it decided that the company they had built was not impressive enough on its own, so they faked its growth.

Think about what that means for the people who bought stock when Near went public on Nasdaq in March 2023. Some of them were institutional funds. Many were individual investors, the kind of people who read earnings press releases and analyst presentations and believed what those documents said. They were told Near posted $59.7 million in full-year revenue for 2022, up 32% year over year. They were told quarterly revenue was $15.5 million in Q1 2023, up 10%. They were told the company had a clear, growing relationship with its largest customer, MobileFuse, which accounted for roughly 30% of annual revenue. Every one of those statements was materially false.

When Near’s board finally announced in October 2023 that its financial statements going back to 2020 should not be relied upon, and that the CEO and CFO had been placed on administrative leave pending a fraud investigation, it was already over. There was no recovering from that kind of announcement in a company with no real revenue base to stand on. The stock went to zero. The company filed for bankruptcy on December 8, 2023. Its assets were liquidated. It ceased to exist.

The employees who worked at Near and held stock or restricted stock units they had been promised as part of their compensation watched their equity evaporate. Analysts who covered the stock, investors who trusted the SEC filings, anyone who participated in the stock and warrant offerings that happened after the SPAC merger closed — they were all operating on fraudulent information. They never had a fair chance to make an informed decision, because Mathews and Agarwal made sure they never would.

The rental property in Laguna Beach, California adds its own particular quality of contempt to all of it. Mathews invoiced his own company for $132,000 in January 2023, then $60,000 in June, then $120,000 in September, labeling the payments as “professional services.” The property owners, whose names appeared on those invoices, had never seen or authorized them. The money went straight to Mathews’ landlord. Near’s compensation committee had never approved these payments. When Near’s audit committee finally asked for itemization of executive expenses in September 2023, the house of cards collapsed. Mathews later admitted in an arbitration filing that yes, Near’s payments to those property owners were in fact his rent. He wrote it himself.

Nobody built a crime this calculated by accident. The scheme was discussed in emails as early as December 2020. It was structured so that MobileFuse would transmit cash back to Near immediately after receiving Near’s wire, keeping the round-trip window as tight as one day. It relied on fake invoices, manipulated vendor bills, a foreign currency exchange account that obscured the true payee, and two false letters signed for Near’s auditors. Harlan restricted knowledge of the transactions within MobileFuse to a single finance employee, and when a Near employee accidentally sent a fake invoice to someone outside the loop, Harlan threatened to shut the whole arrangement down and told Mathews: “Now I have to explain to a random employee why we are spending so much with Near.” Mathews texted back that it was a system-generated message. An accident. Nothing to worry about.

That is the ledger that does not fit in a damages table: the calculation behind every deception, the deliberate architecture of each cover story, the people who showed up to work every day at a company that existed, in part, as a prop.

They Said the Quiet Part Out Loud: Verbatim From the Court Record

The defendants’ own words confirm the scheme. The SEC complaint quotes emails, text messages, and documents throughout. These are not interpretations. These are the actual words.

“Whatever portion of $yyy,yyy is MFX [expenses MobileFuse owes Near for actual data], [MobileFuse] pays Near this amount. Near then pays [MobileFuse] 90% of $yyy,yyy. Whatever portion of $yyy,yyy is nonMFX, [MobileFuse] pays Near this amount.” — Kenneth Harlan, CEO of MobileFuse, email to Rahul Agarwal (cc: Anil Mathews), December 14, 2020. SEC Complaint, Para. 47.

• This email predates any public company filings. It shows the scheme was architected at the executive level more than a year before the first round-trip payment occurred in May 2021.
• The formula Harlan laid out explicitly separates the “real” amount MobileFuse owed for actual data services from the inflated total. The remainder was a pass-through designed to pump Near’s reported revenue.
• Mathews was copied, establishing his awareness of the scheme’s mechanics from the planning stage.

“See attached the first monthly invoice per our discussion. You will be receiving one such invoice every month from us. I will be sharing with you the calculation for a counter invoice on a month basis post which you can raise the invoice on Near…” — Rahul Agarwal, CFO of Near, email to Kenneth Harlan (bcc: Anil Mathews), May 20, 2021. SEC Complaint, Para. 55.

• This is Agarwal confirming the launch of the actual round-trip transactions. The phrase “counter invoice” is the operational word: MobileFuse would generate a slightly smaller invoice back to Near, with the difference representing the real amount owed for data access.
• Mathews was blind-copied, consistent with a pattern of maintaining plausible distance while staying informed.

“…allow your [Near’s] revenue to be higher.” — Kenneth Harlan, CEO of MobileFuse, email reply to Rahul Agarwal, May 20, 2021. SEC Complaint, Para. 56.

• This is Harlan stating the purpose of the scheme in four words. There is no ambiguity. The invoicing process existed to make Near’s revenue number larger, not to reflect real commercial activity.

“We’re getting funded today. I’ll do my absolute best to get this turned around by EOD.” — MobileFuse Finance Employee, email to Rahul Agarwal, July 27, 2021. SEC Complaint, Para. 75.

• “Getting funded” refers to receiving Near’s outbound wire. “Turned around by EOD” means MobileFuse will send Near’s larger payment back the same day. The word “turn around” recurs across multiple emails as the standard operational term for the fraud.

“They need MobileFuse to juice their revenue and they know us best.” — Kenneth Harlan, CEO of MobileFuse, text message to MobileFuse’s co-majority owner, February 23, 2022. SEC Complaint, Para. 79.

• This text was sent while Near was actively pursuing its SPAC merger with KludeIn. It establishes that Near’s need to inflate revenue was understood by Harlan as a purpose of the relationship, not a byproduct.
• The phrase “know us best” indicates the relationship was specifically valued because MobileFuse was a trusted co-conspirator, not just a commercial partner.

“Guys, I’m really annoyed by this email for so many reasons. … Why would this be sent to anyone but [MobileFuse Finance Employee] or myself? … Sorry to do this but I’m giving you notice that if this isn’t resolved in the next few days, I’ll just terminate. This [sic] so unprofessional and not executed well. Now I have to explain to a random employee on why we are spending so much with Near.” — Kenneth Harlan, CEO of MobileFuse, email to Anil Mathews and Rahul Agarwal, April 1, 2023. SEC Complaint, Para. 85.

• This was Harlan’s reaction when a Near employee accidentally sent a fake $1.5 million invoice to a MobileFuse employee who did not know about the scheme. Harlan’s anger reveals how tightly he was controlling access to the fraud within his own company.
• “Now I have to explain to a random employee why we are spending so much with Near” is an admission that the payments to Near were not commercially justified and that exposure to ordinary employees posed a direct threat of discovery.

“Let us make sure no one from Near other than Anil and I contact MF [MobileFuse].” — Rahul Agarwal, CFO of Near, email to Near’s director of finance, April 5, 2023. SEC Complaint, Para. 88.

• Four days after the accidental leak scare, Agarwal formally restricted all contact with MobileFuse to himself and Mathews. This is a direct, documented step to prevent any Near employee from learning about the scheme by stumbling into it.

“Can you please transfer US $162,000 to the attached account urgently. Put my full name as reference. Rahul will be able to tell you the exact line item this goes under.” — Anil Mathews, CEO of Near, email to Near’s finance department, on or about June 11, 2022. SEC Complaint, Para. 172.

• This is Mathews directing a wire transfer for his personal rent, telling the finance team to label it under a line item that Agarwal would designate. It confirms both executives were involved in disguising the personal expense as a business cost.
• The wire instructions went to the property owner, not to any vendor providing services to Near.

The Round-Trip Machine: Near’s Money, Laundered Through MobileFuse’s Books

The mechanics of the fraud were deliberate and repeatable. Near would first wire money to MobileFuse, and then MobileFuse would wire a larger sum back to Near. Near would book the return payment as revenue. The actual commercial relationship between the two companies was worth a fraction of what appeared on the invoices.

• The real amount MobileFuse owed Near for data platform access was small. In the very first round-trip in May 2021, the actual debt was approximately $64,431. Near invoiced MobileFuse for $1.25 million. The difference, nearly $1.19 million, was funded by Near itself and returned as “revenue.”
• Invoices were inflated by as much as 98% above the actual amounts owed between the companies.
• Over the scheme’s lifetime, Near sent at least $22.5 million to MobileFuse across 11 documented round-trip transactions, and received back approximately $24 million, with the small difference representing the real commercial amount.
• To obscure these payments in Near’s books, Agarwal used a Singapore-based foreign currency exchange account (over which he held signatory authority) to route five payments totaling $9.65 million in 2023, disguising MobileFuse as the true recipient.
• Agarwal also manipulated an invoice from a real Near vendor in Singapore, changing a $100,200 invoice into a $1,000,200 invoice. The metadata on the altered document bore Agarwal’s name as author. He paid the real bill on his own credit card; Near paid the fake version to cover the MobileFuse payment.
• Mathews personally approved at least two fraudulent wire transfers to MobileFuse and gave explicit written instructions to Near’s finance team to process MobileFuse’s invoices.

Every Documented Round-Trip Payment: Near’s Cash, MobileFuse’s Wire

The SEC complaint includes a transaction-by-transaction table of every round-trip payment between May 2021 and September 2023. The pattern is consistent: Near sends first, MobileFuse sends back a larger amount, Near books the return as revenue.

What Investors Were Told vs. What Was Real

Every number investors received about Near’s growth was built on the round-trip scheme. The SEC’s complaint documents the specific false statements side by side with what the actual situation was.

Who Pays When a Data Company Fakes Its Way to $1 Billion

Public Health of Financial Markets

Securities fraud at the executive level corrodes the foundation that ordinary people depend on when they invest their savings. This case produced documented, specific damage to that foundation.

• Near’s common stock was listed on Nasdaq under the ticker “NIR” following the SPAC merger. Every investor who purchased shares after March 24, 2023, did so based on financial statements that overstated revenue by at least 24.3% in every reported period.
• Near filed at least nine separate registration statements and amendments between April and July 2023, all signed by Mathews, all containing materially false revenue figures. Each filing created another class of investors who relied on fraudulent disclosures.
• The company’s stock and warrant offerings — conducted after the SPAC merger closed — raised capital from the public using the falsified figures. Investors who participated in those offerings were defrauded by the offering documents themselves.
• When Near’s board announced on October 5, 2023 that financial statements going back to 2020 should not be relied upon, every shareholder holding NIR stock was exposed to immediate and total loss. The company was liquidated by March 2024.
• MobileFuse and Harlan signed two false audit confirmation letters — one in April 2022 and one in February 2023 — attesting to the legitimacy of a combined thirteen fake invoices totaling millions of dollars. These letters were specifically provided to Near’s auditors to prevent the fraud from being caught before the SPAC merger closed.
• Mathews and Agarwal lied directly to Near’s independent auditors in signed management representation letters, certifying that there was no fraud, no irregular revenue arrangements, and no known instances of financial misconduct. Both knew those statements were false when they signed them.

Economic Inequality

SPAC mergers are pitched as democratizing access to early-stage growth companies for retail investors. This case shows exactly how that promise gets weaponized.

• The SPAC structure (KludeIn I Acquisition Corporation merged with Near) placed retail investors on Nasdaq without the typical IPO due diligence gatekeeping. The inflated revenue figures were the primary financial justification for a valuation of nearly $1 billion.
• Mathews and Agarwal each received Near common stock and restricted stock units upon completion of the SPAC merger. This compensation was approved based on the false revenue figures. Ordinary shareholders provided the capital that underpinned those stock grants.
• After the merger, Mathews received a $41,331 performance-based discretionary bonus specifically linked to his role in increasing revenues and completing the SPAC merger. That bonus was paid using investor capital in a company whose revenue foundation was fake.
• Mathews used $312,000 of company funds to pay his personal rent on a luxury single-family home in Laguna Beach, California. The payments were made without board authorization and disguised as “professional services” on Near’s books. This money came directly from the company’s operating accounts, funded by investor capital.
• Mathews and Agarwal purchased a 10% interest in MobileFuse for $2 million using a Singapore-registered entity. That $2 million was then used by MobileFuse to repay personal loans made by Harlan and MobileFuse’s co-majority owner. When MobileFuse later repurchased those shares, it paid only $12,019.14 — leaving the original $2 million effectively as a gift to Harlan and his co-owner.
• Had the round-trip scheme continued as planned, Harlan and MobileFuse’s co-majority owner stood to benefit further from Near’s anticipated acquisition of MobileFuse. The entire fraud was, in part, a deal structure designed to maximize the personal payout to MobileFuse’s owners at the expense of Near’s public shareholders.
• Near employed people. Those employees held equity in the company as part of their compensation packages. When the company was liquidated, that equity was worthless. The executives who ran the fraud had already received their compensation in cash and vested stock long before the collapse.

What the Numbers Mean in Human Terms

The Case Is Active. The People Involved Still Exist. Here Is What Happens Next.

The SEC filed this complaint on January 27, 2026. The case is active in the Southern District of New York. No settlement has been announced. Here is who is implicated and who regulates what.

The Defendants

• Anil Mathews, former CEO of Near Intelligence. The SEC seeks permanent injunction, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil penalties, and a lifetime ban from serving as an officer or director of any SEC-reporting company.
• Rahul Agarwal, former CFO of Near Intelligence. The SEC seeks permanent injunction, civil penalties, and the same officer/director bar as Mathews.
• Kenneth Harlan, CEO of MobileFuse. The SEC seeks permanent injunction and civil penalties for aiding and abetting securities fraud.
• MobileFuse LLC, the company Harlan runs. The SEC seeks permanent injunction and civil penalties as a corporate defendant for aiding and abetting.

Watchlist: Who Regulates This

• SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission): Filed the complaint. The Los Angeles Regional Office is the lead. Contact: SEC.gov/tcr to report securities fraud tips. The case docket is public: Case 1:26-cv-00693, S.D.N.Y.
• DOJ (Department of Justice): SEC civil cases frequently run parallel to DOJ criminal investigations. No criminal charges have been announced in the source material. Watch the Southern District of New York’s public docket for parallel proceedings.
• FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority): Nasdaq-listed stocks fall under FINRA oversight. Investor complaints about broker conduct in connection with NIR shares can be filed at FINRA.org.
• PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board): Near’s independent auditors were deceived by false management letters and fake audit confirmation letters. If there are questions about whether auditors conducted adequate scrutiny, PCAOB is the oversight body. Contact: pcaobus.org.

What You Can Do

• If you held NIR stock: Contact a securities class action attorney. The window for private securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 is generally two years from discovery, five years from the violation. The October 2023 restatement announcement is a documented discovery trigger date.
• Organize with other retail investors: SPACs disproportionately expose retail investors to pre-merger fraud. Groups like Better Markets (bettermarkets.com) and the Council of Institutional Investors (cii.org) advocate for stronger SPAC disclosure requirements. Contact them with this case as evidence.
• Pressure for SPAC reform: The KludeIn SPAC structure allowed fraudulent revenue figures to pass through into a public company with fewer guardrails than a traditional IPO. Contact your congressional representatives through congress.gov and demand stronger SPAC due diligence requirements and mandatory pre-merger independent financial audits.
• Report related tips: If you have knowledge of similar round-trip revenue schemes at other companies, the SEC whistleblower program (sec.gov/whistleblower) offers financial awards for original information that leads to enforcement actions resulting in sanctions over $1 million.
• Mutual aid for defrauded retail investors: r/SPACs and similar investor communities have organized informal support networks for retail investors burned by SPAC fraud. Local investor protection clinics (often run by law school legal aid programs) can provide free consultations on your options.