Apple and Goldman Sachs fined $89M for Apple Card dispute failures
Tens of thousands of Apple Card users had transaction disputes ignored, were wrongly reported to credit bureaus, and were misled about interest-free financing—all while Apple and Goldman raced to launch.
Apple and Goldman Sachs launched the Apple Card in August 2019 under intense time pressure, including a $25 million penalty for each 90-day delay. Regulators found that Goldman failed to send tens of thousands of consumer transaction disputes to investigators, wrongly reported disputed charges as delinquent to credit bureaus, and both companies misled customers into believing Apple device purchases would automatically enroll in interest-free financing when they did not. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ordered the companies to pay over $89 million in penalties and consumer redress.
Check your credit report. If you were an Apple Card user who disputed a charge between 2019 and 2021, you may be owed money.
The Allegations: A Breakdown
| 01 | Apple designed a dispute system that required consumers to complete an additional form after submitting their initial dispute. When tens of thousands of consumers did not complete that second form, Apple never sent their disputes to Goldman for investigation, and neither company followed up or investigated the claims. | high |
| 02 | Goldman reported disputed charges as delinquent to credit bureaus before investigating or resolving the disputes, damaging consumers’ credit scores and potentially affecting their ability to get loans, housing, or jobs. | high |
| 03 | Apple’s advertisements and checkout process misled consumers to expect that purchases of Apple devices with Apple Card would automatically enroll in interest-free monthly installments (ACMI). In reality, consumers had to manually opt in during checkout, and thousands were charged interest when they believed they would not be. | high |
| 04 | Apple’s own website and app hid the ACMI financing option entirely if consumers used a browser other than Safari or used Safari in private mode, or if they did not select a phone carrier during iPhone checkout. This materially interfered with consumers’ ability to understand their financing options. | high |
| 05 | Apple customer service representatives told some consumers that iPhone purchases with Apple Card would automatically enroll in ACMI, reinforcing the false expectation created by advertising. | medium |
| 06 | Until at least August 2020, Apple and Goldman required consumers who failed to enroll in ACMI to return their devices and repurchase them in order to access interest-free financing, an onerous and unnecessary burden. | medium |
| 07 | Apple and Goldman introduced Apple Card on August 20, 2019, despite internal board presentations on August 16, 2019, acknowledging that the dispute system was not fully ready and citing ‘tight timelines’ as a concern. | high |
| 08 | The rushed launch was driven by a contractual clause giving Apple the right to claim $25 million in liquidated damages for every 90-day delay caused by Goldman, creating extreme pressure to go live before compliance systems were ready. | high |
| 01 | Federal law (the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z) requires credit card issuers to send written acknowledgment of billing disputes within 30 days and to resolve them within 90 days. Goldman violated both requirements for tens of thousands of Apple Card disputes. | high |
| 02 | The same regulations prohibit creditors from reporting disputed amounts as delinquent to credit bureaus before completing an investigation. Goldman made adverse credit reports on disputed charges anyway, harming consumers’ creditworthiness. | high |
| 03 | Messages sent through Apple’s dispute system could qualify as formal ‘Billing Error Notices’ under federal law from August 2019 through at least July 31, 2021, because the Apple Card Customer Agreement and monthly statements told consumers they could contact Goldman ‘using Messages.’ Yet Apple and Goldman treated these messages as informal and often ignored them. | high |
| 04 | The CFPB found that Apple engaged in unfair acts or practices by failing to send transaction disputes to Goldman, violating sections 1031 and 1036 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act. | high |
| 05 | The CFPB found that Apple engaged in deceptive acts or practices by making material misrepresentations that consumers’ Apple device purchases would be automatically enrolled in ACMI, violating sections 1031 and 1036 of the CFPA. | high |
| 06 | The CFPB found that Apple engaged in abusive acts or practices by materially interfering with consumers’ ability to understand ACMI enrollment requirements, violating sections 1031 and 1036 of the CFPA. | high |
| 07 | Apple is classified as a ‘service provider’ under the CFPA because it provided material services to Goldman in designing, operating, and maintaining Apple Card, making it directly subject to CFPB enforcement even though Goldman extended the actual credit. | medium |
| 08 | The consent order notes that Apple and Goldman’s agreement incentivized speed over compliance by imposing massive financial penalties for delay, a structural flaw that regulators did not prevent before launch. | medium |
| 01 | Apple and Goldman rushed Apple Card to market on August 20, 2019, despite knowing just days earlier that the dispute resolution system was incomplete, because missing the launch deadline could cost Goldman $25 million every 90 days. | high |
| 02 | The partnership agreement structured incentives to prioritize speed and market capture over consumer protection, with Apple able to extract huge penalties if Goldman caused delays. | high |
| 03 | Apple’s advertisements emphasized the ‘ease and simplicity’ of Apple Card and ACMI enrollment, using phrases like ‘easily apply right at checkout’ and ‘no additional application,’ while the actual enrollment process required manual opt-in steps that thousands of consumers missed. | high |
| 04 | Thousands of consumers complained that they were charged interest on Apple device purchases they believed would be enrolled in interest-free financing, meaning they paid more than they expected while Apple and Goldman profited from the interest. | high |
| 05 | Consumers submitted tens of thousands of complaints related to ACMI enrollment failures, yet Apple and Goldman continued the misleading marketing and enrollment practices for months. | medium |
| 06 | The companies’ cost-benefit analysis appears to have concluded that the revenue from a fast launch and the interest income from confused consumers outweighed the eventual regulatory penalties. | medium |
| 07 | The consent order allows Apple to pay a $25 million civil penalty without admitting or denying wrongdoing, a standard settlement clause that shields companies from downstream liability and lets them treat fines as a routine cost of doing business. | medium |
| 08 | For consumers harmed by adverse credit reports or unexpected interest charges, the financial and emotional toll—damaged credit scores, higher borrowing costs, stress—far exceeded any inconvenience to the corporations, yet the companies faced no criminal liability. | high |
| 01 | Consumers who were incorrectly reported to credit bureaus for failing to pay disputed charges saw their credit scores drop, which can mean higher interest rates on mortgages, auto loans, and credit cards—costs that compound over years. | high |
| 02 | Consumers who expected interest-free financing but were charged interest paid more for their Apple devices than they planned, reducing their disposable income and potentially forcing them into debt. | high |
| 03 | Consumers who submitted disputes that were never investigated did not receive credits for disputed transactions for extended periods, leaving them liable for charges they contested—in some cases for unauthorized transactions. | high |
| 04 | The CFPB consent order requires Goldman and Apple to provide consumer redress, but the total compensation amount is unspecified and may not fully restore consumers to the financial position they would have been in absent the misconduct. | medium |
| 05 | Damaged credit scores can affect consumers’ ability to rent apartments, secure employment (some employers check credit), and access emergency credit, creating long-term economic instability that extends beyond the direct financial loss. | high |
| 06 | The consent order was filed in October 2024, more than five years after Apple Card launched, meaning some consumers have lived with the economic consequences—bad credit, higher loan costs, denied applications—for years while waiting for accountability. | medium |
| 01 | The consent order allows both Apple and Goldman to resolve the matter without admitting or denying the findings of fact or conclusions of law, a standard legal clause that prevents the order from being used as evidence in private lawsuits and shields executives from personal liability. | high |
| 02 | No individual executives or board members at Apple or Goldman have been charged, fined, or held personally accountable for the systemic failures, despite internal warnings that the dispute system was incomplete at launch. | high |
| 03 | The $25 million civil penalty imposed on Apple represents a tiny fraction of Apple’s quarterly revenue, raising questions about whether the fine is large enough to deter future misconduct or is simply absorbed as a routine cost of doing business. | high |
| 04 | The consent order notes that the Bureau may use the practices described in future enforcement actions to establish a pattern or practice of violations, but does not impose structural reforms such as independent compliance monitors or mandatory executive certifications. | medium |
| 05 | The partnership structure between Apple (which designed the user interface and marketing) and Goldman (which extended credit and handled compliance) created ambiguity about who was responsible for ensuring consumer protections, and both companies appear to have exploited that ambiguity. | high |
| 06 | The consent order requires Apple to establish policies and procedures to ensure compliance and to test systems before material changes, but these are prospective requirements that do nothing to hold the company accountable for past harms. | medium |
| 07 | The order’s five-year term means Apple could be subject to further penalties if violations recur, but history shows that repeat offenses by major financial institutions are common and often result in new settlements rather than escalating sanctions. | medium |
| 08 | Consumers must rely on the CFPB to distribute redress, with no transparency about how much each harmed consumer will receive or when, leaving victims in the dark about whether they will be made whole. | medium |
| 01 | Apple marketed Apple Card with advertisements emphasizing ‘ease and simplicity,’ including in-app messages to iPhone users stating ‘purchase a new iPhone from Apple with interest-free monthly payments,’ creating a perception of automatic enrollment that did not match reality. | high |
| 02 | Apple Card was widely hailed in the press as a sleek, consumer-friendly product integrated into Apple’s ecosystem, a narrative that obscured the systemic compliance failures happening behind the scenes. | medium |
| 03 | The consent order’s ‘no admission of wrongdoing’ clause allows both companies to publicly claim they resolved the matter cooperatively without acknowledging that they harmed consumers, preserving their reputations while avoiding accountability. | high |
| 04 | Apple’s brand identity as a champion of user experience and design excellence stands in stark contrast to the CFPB’s findings that the company materially interfered with consumers’ understanding of financing options by hiding the ACMI option in certain browsers and checkout flows. | high |
| 05 | Goldman Sachs, a global financial powerhouse, marketed its entry into consumer credit as a sophisticated, technology-forward initiative, but the consent order reveals that basic consumer protection processes—timely dispute acknowledgments and resolutions—were incomplete at launch. | high |
| 06 | Both companies issued standard public relations statements referencing commitments to integrity and customer service, but the consent order shows that internal board presentations acknowledged system readiness concerns just days before launch, suggesting public messaging diverged from internal reality. | medium |
| 01 | Apple Card launched in August 2019, and the CFPB consent order was not filed until October 2024—more than five years later—during which time consumers lived with the consequences of adverse credit reports and unresolved disputes. | high |
| 02 | The consent order notes that Apple introduced the problematic ‘forms feature’ in June 2020 and that the issues persisted through at least July 31, 2021, meaning the companies continued practices that harmed consumers for over a year after the feature launched. | high |
| 03 | Regulatory investigations require months or years to build cases, during which the offending companies continue to generate revenue from the practices under scrutiny. Apple and Goldman profited from Apple Card for years before facing penalties. | high |
| 04 | The consent order’s prospective compliance requirements take effect after the order date, meaning consumers harmed between 2019 and 2024 have no guarantee that the redress process will fully compensate them for years of financial harm and stress. | medium |
| 05 | The order requires Apple to submit a compliance report one year after the effective date and allows the CFPB to request additional reports within 14 days, but these are monitoring mechanisms that do nothing to accelerate justice for past victims. | medium |
| 06 | Until at least August 2020, consumers who failed to enroll in ACMI had to return and repurchase their devices to access interest-free financing, a delay tactic that imposed logistical and financial burdens on consumers while benefiting the companies by deferring resolution. | medium |
| 01 | The Apple Card case is a textbook example of how the pressure to launch quickly and capture market share can lead corporations to cut corners on consumer protection, with real people paying the price in damaged credit and unexpected debt. | high |
| 02 | Contractual incentives matter. The $25 million per-delay penalty clause created a structural bias toward speed over compliance, showing how profit-maximization frameworks can systematically undermine consumer rights. | high |
| 03 | Regulatory enforcement, even when successful, is slow. Five years elapsed between launch and the consent order, during which consumers suffered financial harm. Faster, more aggressive enforcement is needed to deter misconduct in real time. | high |
| 04 | Settlement clauses that allow companies to resolve enforcement actions without admitting wrongdoing shield corporations from accountability and send a message that penalties are just another cost of doing business, not a deterrent. | high |
| 05 | The partnership structure between Apple and Goldman created ambiguity about responsibility, and both companies appear to have exploited that ambiguity. Clear legal accountability for each party in co-branded financial products is essential. | medium |
| 06 | Consumers have limited recourse. They must wait for regulators to act, hope for redress, and often cannot sue effectively because of arbitration clauses and no-admission settlements. Structural reforms are needed to give consumers more power. | high |
| 07 | This case adds to a growing body of evidence that in late-stage capitalism, where quarterly earnings and market dominance dominate corporate strategy, consumer protection is often an afterthought unless regulators impose penalties large enough to change behavior. | high |
| 08 | Check your credit report. If you were an Apple Card user between 2019 and 2021 and disputed a transaction or expected interest-free financing, you may be entitled to compensation. Contact the CFPB or a consumer rights attorney. | medium |
Timeline of Events
Direct Quotes from the Legal Record
“Apple and Goldman’s agreement incentivized an earlier introduction of Apple Card by giving Apple the right to seek $25 million in liquidated damages for each 90-day delay caused by Goldman.”
💡 This contractual clause created extreme financial pressure to launch quickly, even if consumer protection systems were incomplete.
“On June 25, 2020, Respondent added a new ‘forms feature’ to the Report an Issue functionality, which asked consumers to provide additional information by completing an additional form. However, when tens of thousands of consumers did not complete the additional form, Apple failed to send the disputes to Goldman, and neither Apple nor Goldman investigated these disputes.”
💡 Tens of thousands of consumer disputes were simply ignored because of a flawed two-step process.
“Respondent’s failure to send Billing Error Notices through the Report an Issue functionality to Goldman caused substantial injuries to consumers, including to consumers who… were the subject of Adverse Reports to CRAs by Goldman concerning disputed amounts before Goldman or Respondent reviewed the Billing Error Notices at issue, which may have affected consumers’ creditworthiness.”
💡 Consumers’ credit scores were damaged for charges they had formally disputed, affecting their ability to borrow and their financial stability.
“Through representations in advertisements emphasizing the ease and simplicity of Apple Card and through representations during the ACMI enrollment process, Apple and Goldman misled consumers to expect that purchases of Apple devices would automatically be enrolled in ACMI when they were not.”
💡 Apple’s marketing promised automatic enrollment in interest-free financing, but the reality was manual opt-in, leading thousands to pay unexpected interest.
“Until at least July 2020, when consumers used a browser other than Respondent’s ‘Safari’ or used ‘Safari’ in private mode during the checkout process for purchasing Apple devices from Respondent’s website, Respondent did not display an option to enroll in ACMI.”
💡 Apple materially interfered with consumers’ ability to access interest-free financing by hiding the option based on browser choice.
“In addition, Respondent’s customer service representatives informed some consumers that iPhones purchased with an Apple Card would be automatically enrolled in ACMI.”
💡 Even Apple’s own representatives reinforced the false expectation that enrollment was automatic.
“Until at least August 2020, after consumers had already purchased Apple devices without enrolling in ACMI, Apple and Goldman required consumers to return the devices and repurchase before they could be enrolled in ACMI.”
💡 Consumers who missed enrollment had to go through a burdensome return and repurchase process, adding insult to injury.
“Consumers submitted tens of thousands of complaints related to ACMI enrollment.”
💡 The scale of consumer complaints shows this was not an isolated glitch but a systemic failure.
“By failing to send Billing Error Notices to Goldman for resolution, Apple engaged in unfair acts or practices. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B).”
💡 The CFPB made a formal legal finding that Apple’s conduct violated federal consumer protection law.
“By making material representations that reasonably misled consumers about enrollment in ACMI, Respondent engaged in deceptive acts or practices. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B).”
💡 The CFPB formally found that Apple’s marketing was deceptive under federal law.
“By materially interfering with consumers’ understanding about their enrollment in ACMI, Respondent violated the CFPA’s prohibition on abusive acts or practices. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), (d)(1), 5536(a)(1)(B).”
💡 The CFPB found that hiding the ACMI option constituted an abusive practice under federal law.
“By this Stipulation, Respondent has consented to the issuance of this Consent Order by the Bureau under sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5565, without admitting or denying any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law.”
💡 Apple settles without admitting wrongdoing, shielding itself from downstream lawsuits and preserving its public reputation.
“These injuries were not reasonably avoidable because neither Respondent nor Goldman took steps necessary to make consumers aware that, if consumers did not complete the additional form, the Billing Error Notices at issue would not be investigated.”
💡 Consumers had no way to know their disputes were being ignored, making the harm unavoidable.
“Under section 1055(c) of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c), by reason of the violations of law described in Section V of this Consent Order, Respondent must pay a civil money penalty of $25 million to the Bureau.”
💡 Apple’s $25 million penalty is the financial consequence, though critics argue it is too small to deter future misconduct.
“This Consent Order will terminate on the later of 5 years from the Effective Date or 5 years from the most recent date that the Bureau initiates an action alleging any violation of the Consent Order by Respondent if such action is initiated within 5 years of the Effective Date.”
💡 Apple will be under CFPB supervision for five years, with potential for extended monitoring if violations recur.
Frequently Asked Questions
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did a press release on this $89 million fine: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-apple-and-goldman-sachs-to-pay-over-89-million-for-apple-card-failures/
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