“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors observed a one-liter container accumulating hazardous waste hydranal in a SAA. The container was not marked with an indication of the hazards of the contents.”

💡 Workers had no warning they were handling flammable and corrosive chemicals, creating immediate risk of burns, fire, or other injuries.

“Although the metal cover is designed to close the manway opening by attaching to it using four bolts, inspectors observed that the cover was affixed to the manway opening using only one bolt and a rope, which was tied from one of two handles on the cover to the railing on top of Tank S-20.”

💡 This makeshift closure on a 10,000-gallon hazardous waste tank allowed continuous release of toxic vapors containing o-cresol and barium.

“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors noted that the Respondent was not conducting annual visual inspections of the fixed roof and its closure devices on hazardous waste Tank S-20.”

💡 Annual inspections are specifically designed to detect defects before they cause releases, and failure to conduct them represents systematic neglect.

“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors noted that the Respondent’s employees were not performing daily inspections of the top of hazardous waste Tank S-20. The inspectors observed pooled liquids and debris in the secondary containment area, which obscured a portion of the secondary containment system so that the construction materials were not visible for inspection.”

💡 Daily inspections exist to quickly identify leaks, corrosion, or containment failures before they escalate into environmental disasters.

“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors observed liquid material and windblown debris which appeared to have been collecting on the floor of the secondary containment of hazardous waste storage Tank S-20 for more than 24 hours.”

💡 The 24-hour removal requirement prevents hazardous waste from seeping into soil and contaminating groundwater that supplies drinking water.

“In this report, the engineer stated that ‘surface concrete cracks in the secondary containment walls at various locations were found, but none were through-wall cracks’, and recommended that hairline cracks be patched with concrete or that sealant be applied to the entire wall inside and out.”

💡 Even surface cracks violate requirements that containment systems be free of cracks or gaps, and represent structural degradation that increases risk of future failures.

“The Respondent generates hazardous waste containing o-cresol and barium from the resin manufacturing process. This hazardous waste is identified with the EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers D005 and D023; it has an average volatile organic concentration of at least 500 parts per million by weight at the point of origination; and it has a maximum organic vapor pressure below 76.6 kPa.”

💡 This technical description confirms the waste stored in the improperly sealed tank contains highly toxic substances that readily evaporate and can cause serious health effects.

“Having found that settlement is consistent with the provisions and objectives of the Act and applicable regulations, the Parties have agreed to settle this action pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.18 and consent to the entry of this CAFO without the Respondent’s admission of violation or adjudication of any issues of law or fact herein.”

💡 This standard settlement language allows corporations to pay fines without formally admitting they broke the law, limiting accountability and public transparency.

“By executing this CAFO, the Respondent certifies to the best of its knowledge that the Facility is currently in compliance with all relevant requirements of the authorized State program found in the NCSWML and the NCHWMR, and the Act and its implementing regulations, and that all violations alleged herein, which are neither admitted nor denied, have been corrected at the Facility.”

💡 This vague certification provides no specific detail about corrective actions taken and allows the company to claim compliance while neither admitting nor denying the violations occurred.

“On March 23, 2023, the EPA along with the NCDEQ conducted a RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection (CEI) at the Respondent’s Facility. The EPA’s findings from the CEI were documented in a Report transmitted to the Respondent via email on July 18, 2023.”

💡 The nearly four-month delay between inspection and report transmission, followed by over a year to final settlement, allowed the facility to continue operations while violations remained unaddressed.

“The Respondent owns and operates a chemical manufacturing facility that manufactures thermosetting resins, powdered resins, and formaldehyde solutions. Products manufactured at the Facility service the particle board, protective coatings, and laminate industries.”

💡 Formaldehyde is a known toxic and irritant substance, making proper hazardous waste management at this facility especially critical for worker and community safety.

“Although the EPA has granted the State authority to enforce its own hazardous waste program, the EPA retains jurisdiction and authority to initiate an independent enforcement action pursuant to Section 3008(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a).”

💡 This dual authority structure can create confusion and gaps in oversight where both federal and state agencies assume the other is monitoring compliance.

“The Respondent consents to the payment of a civil penalty, which was calculated in accordance with the Act, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-THOUSAND DOLLARS ($130,000.00), which is to be paid within 30 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO.”

💡 This penalty amounts to roughly $6,500 per violation for a company that operated with serious safety failures for nearly two decades, raising questions about whether such modest fines deter future misconduct.

“The Respondent is Bakelite Chemicals, LLC, a limited liability corporation doing business in Northampton County, North Carolina. This proceeding pertains to the Respondent’s facility located at 200 Ampac Road, Conway, North Carolina (Facility).”

💡 Conway is a small rural community with limited resources to monitor or challenge industrial polluters, making residents especially vulnerable to corporate misconduct.

“Pursuant to 15A N.C.A.C. 13A .0107(a) [40 C.F.R. § 262.17(a)(2)], which incorporates 15A N.C.A.C. 13A .0110(u) [40 C.F.R. § 265.1085(c)(2)(iii)(A)] and is a condition of the LQG Permit Exemption, a generator controlling air pollutant emissions from a tank using Tank Level 1 controls shall equip the tank with a fixed roof designed so that each opening in the fixed roof, and any manifold system associated with the fixed roof shall be equipped with a closure device designed to operate such that when the closure device is secured in the closed position there are no visible cracks, holes, gaps or other open spaces in the closure device or between the perimeter of the opening and the closure device.”

💡 This technical regulation explains why the improperly closed manway was so dangerous: it was specifically designed to prevent toxic vapors from escaping, and Bakelite’s failure violated conditions that allow temporary hazardous waste storage without a full permit.