Chemical accident prevention | Montana
EPA alleged that the Laurel refinery relied on decades-old release analysis, maintained inaccurate process information, used weak hazard reviews and reported two injury-linked accidents late.
What the agreement says
- EPA identified nine alleged violations of federal chemical accident prevention rules after a September 2022 inspection of CHS’s Laurel refinery.
- A worst-case flammable-release map indicated that it was last revised in 1969, while related calculations used chemical quantities from 1996 to 1998.
- EPA also alleged that process drawings did not match equipment in the field and that some hydrofluoric acid piping lacked visible, unique labels.
- Two releases, in 2018 and 2022, were reported after the six-month deadline, according to the agreement. Each involved an employee or contractor injury.
- CHS agreed to a $240,000 civil penalty, waived its right to contest the alleged violations and committed to complete a pipe-labeling program.
- CHS admitted jurisdiction but neither admitted nor denied EPA’s factual allegations. The supplied record contains the consent agreement, not the subsequent final order.
The allegations describe weaknesses across the prevention system, from defining which equipment was covered to documenting accidents after they happened.
A worst-case flammable-release map at CHS’s Laurel, Montana, refinery indicated it had last been revised in 1969. The calculations accompanying it relied on chemical quantities from 1996 to 1998, even though the refinery’s current maximum intended inventory figures were different, EPA alleged.
The federal rule required the offsite consequence analysis to be reviewed and updated at least once every five years. The dated analysis became one of nine alleged violations listed in a consent agreement between CHS and EPA Region 8.
The refinery handles regulated substances above federal thresholds, including flammable mixtures, propane, butane, isobutane and hydrofluoric acid. That makes the facility subject to Program 3 prevention requirements under EPA’s Risk Management Plan rules, which are intended to detect and prevent accidental releases or minimize their effects.
The prevention system depends on an accurate chain of information
A refinery risk-management program is not one document. It is a sequence: define the equipment and chemicals covered, maintain accurate process information, analyze specific hazards, connect safeguards to those hazards, correct audit findings and report qualifying accidents. EPA’s allegations touched each stage of that sequence.
- Define the processIdentify connected equipment that can contain regulated substances.
- Keep records currentMatch diagrams, inventories and release analyses to actual conditions.
- Analyze hazardsName specific failure scenarios and evaluate their possible effects.
- Verify safeguardsConnect controls to identified hazards and document completed fixes.
- Report accidentsAdd qualifying releases to the federal accident history on time.
Nine alleged failures, from the flare to the accident history
EPA representatives inspected the refinery from September 12 to 16, 2022. The consent agreement groups what they observed into nine alleged violations.
The entire flare system was left outside the covered process
EPA said a process-flow diagram showed connections and proximity to other covered processes, as well as the flare’s ability to contain regulated substances. Inspectors observed the flare operating.
The worst-case release analysis was not current
The supplied documentation used quantities from 1996 to 1998 that differed from current maximum intended inventory calculations. The related map indicated a last revision in 1969.
Process drawings did not match field equipment
EPA identified inconsistencies involving a valve off an acid-transfer pump and a flange on top of the hydrofluoric acid rapid-dump vessel.
Some pipes lacked visible, unique labels
The agreement identifies piping toward the rapid-dump system and lines running toward Butane sphere 97. It also says the same pipe rack was not highlighted as an HF-designated area in a training video shown to people entering the facility.
Hazard descriptions were too generic
Two recent analyses used a broad list of more than 40 typical causes of loss of containment and generic safeguards. EPA said that approach did not connect particular hazards with the controls intended to reduce them.
Not every identified hazard was risk-ranked
Although the analyses contained a qualitative risk matrix, EPA said some hazards were not ranked, preventing the refinery from determining whether its safeguards met an established minimum risk standard.
An unfinished audit item was marked complete
A 2021 compliance-audit action item was marked complete on September 6, 2022. EPA alleged that it was still incomplete when inspectors arrived later that month.
Hot-work permits did not document completed precautions
The permits listed fire-prevention and protection requirements but did not document that those measures had been implemented before hot work was allowed to begin.
Two qualifying releases were reported late
CHS first included the February 2018 and January 2022 releases in a January 13, 2023, resubmission. EPA alleged that both entries came after the six-month reporting deadline.
The agreement describes a safety system in which the map, equipment drawings, hazard analysis, audit records and accident history did not consistently match the refinery’s actual condition or recent events.Evidence-based synthesis of EPA’s nine allegations
Two releases injured workers or contractors, but causation is not established
The late-reporting allegation gives the agreement its clearest documented human stakes. A February 23, 2018, hydrogen release led to an employee or contractor injury and $50,000 in on-site property damage, according to EPA’s account. A January 31, 2022, release of a flammable mixture also led to an employee or contractor injury.
The agreement does not identify the injured people, describe the severity of either injury or say whether either incident caused offsite harm. It also does not establish that the other alleged risk-management failures caused either release. The chronology shows that qualifying incidents occurred and were added to the federal accident history late, not why those incidents happened.
That distinction matters. EPA’s allegations concern safeguards designed to prevent releases and control their consequences, while the supplied document stops short of drawing a causal line from a specific documentation or analysis failure to a specific injury.
The record spans decades of safety information
The sequence below tracks dates stated in the agreement. Proximity in time does not by itself establish causation.
- 1969
The flammables worst-case release map indicated this as its last revision year, according to EPA.
- 1996 to 1998
The quantities used in the worst-case release calculations came from this period and differed from current maximum intended inventory figures.
- February 23, 2018
A hydrogen release led to an employee or contractor injury and $50,000 in on-site property damage.
- January 31, 2022
A flammable-mixture release led to an employee or contractor injury.
- September 2022
An audit item was marked complete on September 6. EPA inspected from September 12 to 16 and alleged that the item remained incomplete.
- January 13, 2023
The refinery submitted the two releases in its Risk Management Plan resubmission, after the six-month deadline alleged by EPA.
- September 2026
CHS and EPA signed the consent agreement, which was filed with the EPA Region 8 hearing clerk on September 16.
CHS accepted the penalty without admitting the allegations
For purposes of the settlement, CHS admitted EPA’s jurisdiction but neither admitted nor denied the factual allegations. The company consented to a $240,000 civil penalty, waived its right to contest the alleged violations and waived an appeal of the accompanying final order.
CHS also certified that, to the best of its knowledge, every alleged violation except the pipe-labeling matter had been corrected and that it had submitted accurate documentation of those corrections. The consent agreement does not provide the supporting correction records.
For the remaining issue, CHS agreed to establish and implement a labeling scheme under its July 2026 pipe-labeling policy. The labels must allow refinery workers to identify piping and other equipment. Written certification, with supporting documents, is due within one year of the agreement’s effective date.
The settlement resolves only federal civil-penalty liability for the listed allegations after its terms are completed. It does not relieve CHS of its broader duty to comply with environmental law or restrict EPA from responding to conditions that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment.
What the supplied record leaves open
The agreement says it becomes effective on the date identified in a subsequently issued final order. That order was not included with the supplied material, so several later steps cannot be confirmed from this record.
Milestones to verify in later records
- Whether and when a final order made the agreement effective.
- Whether CHS paid the $240,000 penalty within 30 calendar days of that effective date.
- Whether the refinery completed the pipe-labeling scheme and submitted certification within one year.
- What the supporting documentation shows about correction of the other eight alleged violations.
The central issue is whether the prevention record matches the refinery
The allegations are not a finding that CHS caused an accident through any one failure. They describe a different problem: a prevention program cannot accurately evaluate risk when connected equipment is excluded, inventories and maps are stale, drawings do not match the field, hazards are described generically, audit work is marked complete prematurely or accident history arrives late.
The agreement requires one visible operational fix, a labeling system workers can use to identify refinery piping and equipment. Whether the broader corrections produced an accurate, current and verifiable safety system is not shown by the agreement itself. That answer lies in the correction records, the final order and the certification that follows.
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