A Deadly Chemical, a Legal Obligation, and a Company That Chose to Look Away

Anhydrous ammonia is a colorless gas with a suffocating odor. It is used in industrial refrigeration plants, including in food processing facilities like the one Custom Foods of America operates in Knoxville, Tennessee. At the right concentration in the air, it can ignite. At any concentration above roughly 300 parts per million, it causes severe respiratory damage. A large-scale release can kill people within minutes. The federal government knows this. That is precisely why it built an entire regulatory framework around facilities that store it.

The EPA’s Risk Management Program, codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 under the Clean Air Act’s Section 112(r), exists for one reason: to prevent catastrophic accidental chemical releases and to minimize the consequences of releases when they do happen. Any facility storing a regulated hazardous substance above a defined threshold quantity is legally required to develop a formal accident-prevention program, submit a Risk Management Plan to the EPA, conduct regular compliance audits, document equipment testing, coordinate annually with local emergency responders, and maintain equipment in accordance with recognized engineering standards. These are baseline minimums. They are the floor, not the ceiling.

Custom Foods of America stores 39,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia at its Knoxville facility. The regulatory threshold that triggers the full Risk Management Program is 10,000 pounds. Custom Foods stores nearly four times that amount. The facility operates what is classified as an RMProgram Level 3 covered process, the highest tier of regulatory oversight, requiring the most robust prevention and planning requirements. The company knew this. It had registered a Risk Management Plan with the EPA. It had developed a prevention program. On paper, it was compliant. The reality the EPA inspectors found on July 18, 2023 told a very different story.

What the EPA found was not a company that had suffered an unexpected equipment failure or a sudden downturn in resources. What the inspection revealed was a pattern of deferred maintenance, skipped audits, and ignored legal obligations that stretched back years. The company had expanded its ammonia refrigeration system between 2018 and 2020, increasing the scale and complexity of a system that was already heavily regulated, and then continued to skip the annual emergency response coordination activities they were legally required to perform. Workers inside that facility, and residents in the surrounding Knoxville neighborhood, had no way of knowing their safety net had been quietly removed.

The Non-Financial Ledger: The Human Cost They Did Not Put in the Settlement

There is a version of this story that the EPA’s legal documents tell cleanly and without emotion: a company violated four specific regulations, the government assessed a penalty, and the matter was resolved. The number on that resolution is $135,279. That number is real. What it cannot account for is the weight that workers inside 3600 Pleasant Ridge Road carried every single day they showed up to a job they needed, in a facility where the risks around them were quietly growing while the systems meant to catch those risks were being left to rot.

Think about what faded and peeling labels on ammonia piping actually mean at the human level. Those labels exist so that a worker, a maintenance technician, a contractor, or an emergency responder can look at a pipe and immediately know: what substance is inside it, what physical state it is in, whether the pressure is high or low, where the flow is going, and what that pipe is for. When those labels degrade to the point where they can no longer display all five required elements of identifying information, the person standing next to that pipe is operating with incomplete knowledge about a substance that can cause permanent lung damage or death. The EPA documented this condition on ammonia piping connected to two Low Temperature Recirculated Liquid tanks, on piping on top of the “New” and “Old” sides of the facility roof. That is not one bad label. That is a systemic failure to maintain the basic informational infrastructure that keeps workers alive.

The missing eyewash and safety shower inside the Ammonia Machinery Room is a detail that deserves to sit with you for a moment. Federal safety standards under ANSI/IIAR 2 (2014), Section 6.7.1 require a minimum of two eyewash/safety shower units for each machinery room: one inside, one outside. The logic is straightforward. If an ammonia exposure event happens inside the machinery room, the affected person needs to be able to decontaminate immediately, before they can walk to an exterior unit. Ammonia causes severe chemical burns on contact with skin and eyes. Seconds matter. Custom Foods had a unit outside the door. Inside the room where the machinery lives, where a release would most likely occur, there was nothing. Every worker who stepped inside that room and every maintenance technician who worked on that equipment did so without the minimum decontamination equipment the law required to be present.

The corroded piping documented by EPA inspectors is perhaps the most structurally alarming finding in the entire document. The EPA did not find corrosion at one location. They found it throughout the Ammonia Machinery Room itself. They found it on the High-Pressure Receiver. They found it on one of the Low Temperature Recirculated Liquid tanks. They found it on piping tagged V3 and V4 at the Condensers. They found it on the New side of the roof at tags CL1, CL2, P1, P2, P3, S1, S2, S3, and RF1. And they found what they specifically described as heavy corrosion on ammonia piping and supports on the Old side of the roof at tags BC1, BC2, BC4B, FF1, FF2, AU33, and AU35. Federal engineering standards under ANSI/IIAR 6 (2019), Section 11.1.1 require that any observed pitting, surface damage, or general corrosion on metal piping be further evaluated through formal assessment procedures. Custom Foods could not demonstrate that this evaluation had been conducted. The corrosion was present. The required response to the corrosion was absent.

Then there is the timing of the compliance audit. Custom Foods of America’s last compliance audit on file before the EPA inspection was completed in 2016. The law requires one at least every three years. The EPA inspection took place on July 18, 2023. That is a gap of seven years. Buried inside the EPA’s findings is a fact that deserves far more attention than a bureaucratic note in a legal document: the company completed a new compliance audit on July 12, 2023, exactly six days before the EPA arrived, one week after the facility received notification that inspectors were coming. Seven years of non-compliance, and a sudden scramble to get paperwork in order the moment a regulator appeared on the horizon. The question of what that 2023 audit found, and what the seven years of missed audits failed to catch or deliberately allowed to continue, remains unanswered in the public record.

The workers at this facility were not given the choice to opt out of these risks. They needed jobs. They showed up. They trusted, as workers must, that the safety systems around them were being maintained and that the people responsible for those systems were doing their jobs. The evidence in this consent agreement tells us that trust was misplaced for years. The $135,279 penalty Custom Foods agreed to pay does not compensate the worker who spent years next to corroded ammonia piping that was never formally evaluated. It does not compensate the person whose closest decontamination station was on the wrong side of a door. It does not give back the seven years during which first responders in Knoxville were never briefed on what they would face if something went wrong at 3600 Pleasant Ridge Road.

The Compliance Gap: Seven Years of Skipped Oversight

Legal Receipts: What the Federal Documents Actually Say

Every passage below comes directly from the EPA Consent Agreement and Final Order, Docket No. CAA-04-2025-0300(b), filed May 14, 2025. These are not interpretations. These are the government’s own words.

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 14(b): Ammonia Quantity on Site “Respondent has on-site for use, 39,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 16(a): Faded and Peeling Safety Labels “Faded and peeling labels that, as a result, no longer displayed all five elements of identifying information on ammonia piping connected to the two Low Temperature Recirculated Liquid tanks, and on ammonia piping on top of the ‘New’ and ‘Old’ side of the facility’s roof. Section 5.14.5 of American National Standards Institute/International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ANSI/IIAR) 2 (2014) states ‘All piping mains, headers and branches shall be identified with the following information: 1. “AMMONIA;” 2. Physical state of the ammonia; 3. Relative pressure level of ammonia, being low or high as applicable; 4. Pipe service, which shall be permitted to be abbreviated; and 5. Direction of flow.'”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 16(b): Widespread Corrosion on Ammonia Piping “Corrosion on ammonia piping inside the Ammonia Machinery Room (AMR). Additionally, corrosion was observed on ammonia piping connected to the High-Pressure Receiver, one of the Low Temperature Recirculated Liquid tanks, and on ammonia piping tagged ‘V3’ and ‘V4’ by the Condensers. Also, corrosion was observed on ammonia piping on the ‘New’ side of the roof near or at tags ‘CL1’, ‘CL2’, ‘P1’, ‘P2’, ‘P3’, ‘S1’, ‘S2’, ‘S3’, and ‘RF1.’ Lastly, heavy corrosion was observed on ammonia piping and supports on the ‘Old’ side of the roof near or at tags ‘BC1’, ‘BC2’, ‘BC4B’, ‘FF1’, ‘FF2’, ‘AU33’, and ‘AU35.'”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 16(c): Breached Insulation and Frost Buildup “Ammonia piping with breached/damaged insulation in the AMR. Additionally, ammonia piping with breached/damaged insulation, as well as uninsulated piping with frost buildup on the ‘Old’ side of the roof, was observed. Section 5.10.1 of ANSI/IIAR 2 (2014) states, ‘piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange shall be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup.'”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 16(d): Missing Eyewash/Safety Shower Inside Machinery Room “A single eyewash/safety shower outside the AMR and did not identify an eyewash/safety shower inside the AMR. Section 6.7.1 of ANSI/IIAR 2 (2014) states, ‘Each machinery room shall have access to a minimum of two eyewash/safety shower units, one located inside the machinery room and one located outside of the machinery room.'”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 17: No Documented Equipment Testing “At the time of the inspection, the Respondent had records confirming that it was conducting inspections on its process equipment. However, the Respondent could not demonstrate that testing was being conducted on process equipment.”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 18: Seven-Year Compliance Audit Gap “At the time of the inspection, the most recent historical Compliance Audit was completed in 2016. After the 2016 Compliance Audit, Respondent could not demonstrate that it had evaluated compliance with the provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D, until July 12, 2023, which was 6 days before the inspection and a week after the facility was notified of the inspection.”

Alleged Facts — Paragraph 19: No Emergency Response Coordination Since 2016 “The Respondent expanded its ammonia refrigeration system between 2018 and 2020 but, at the time of the inspection, could not demonstrate that it had performed any annual emergency response coordination activities with local responders since 2016.”

Alleged Violations — Paragraph 21: Four Distinct Federal Violations “Based on the EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), when, at the time of the inspection, it: (a) Failed to ensure, and document, that equipment complies with RAGAGEP, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2); (b) Failed to document testing on process equipment, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d); (c) Failed to certify that the Respondent has evaluated compliance with the provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D (i.e. conducted a compliance audit), at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D, are adequate and are being followed, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a); and (d) Failed to coordinate response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations at least annually, and more frequently, if necessary, to address changes and to document such coordination with local authorities, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.93(a)-(c).”

Terms of Payment — Paragraph 26: The Penalty Figure “Respondent agrees to a civil penalty in the amount of $135,279 (‘Assessed Penalty’), to be paid within thirty (30) calendar days after the Effective Date of this CAFO.”

Effect of CAFO — Paragraph 35: The Penalty Ceiling “Full payment of the civil penalty, as provided in Section VII (Terms of Payment), shall satisfy the requirements of this CAFO; but, shall not in any case affect the right of EPA or the United States to pursue appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief or criminal sanctions for any violations of law.”

Governing Law — Paragraph 6: Each Day a Separate Violation “Each day a violation continues may constitute a separate violation. Civil penalties under Section 113(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d), may be assessed by an administrative order.”

Societal Impact Mapping: The Ripple That Goes Beyond One Facility

Environmental Degradation

Anhydrous ammonia is classified under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act as an extremely hazardous substance. The entire architecture of the Risk Management Program was designed around the recognition that a large accidental release of substances like ammonia poses an acute and immediate threat to the surrounding environment. The document states the purpose of Section 112(r) plainly: “to prevent the accidental release of extremely hazardous substances and to minimize the consequences of such releases.” Custom Foods of America operates its facility in Knoxville, Tennessee, a city of nearly 200,000 people. The 3600 Pleasant Ridge Road address places the facility in a residential and commercial corridor where a large-scale ammonia release would not be contained to the industrial campus.

The EPA’s findings of heavy corrosion on piping and supports on the roof of the facility, combined with the complete absence of documented equipment testing, represent direct structural risk to the environment. Corrosion of the kind described at tags BC1, BC2, BC4B, FF1, FF2, AU33, and AU35 on the Old side of the roof indicates metal degradation that, if left unaddressed, leads to containment failure. The facility was not conducting the testing required to determine how far that corrosion had progressed or how much structural integrity remained in the affected piping. Breached and damaged pipe insulation adds a compounding variable: uninsulated ammonia piping is subject to thermal stress and condensation that accelerates degradation. The EPA documented frost buildup on uninsulated pipe on the Old roof, which is a visible indicator of thermal breach and a precursor condition to more serious equipment failure.

The seven-year gap in emergency response coordination with local authorities is an environmental protection failure as much as it is a safety planning failure. When the ammonia refrigeration system was expanded between 2018 and 2020, the potential scale of a release event increased. The hazard footprint grew. Local emergency response teams, who would be responsible for containing any release and protecting the surrounding environment including soil, waterways, and air quality corridors, were never briefed on the updated system configuration. Knoxville’s emergency infrastructure was managing a risk it did not fully know existed.

Public Health

Anhydrous ammonia is acutely toxic at concentrations workers and nearby residents could encounter during an accidental release. At concentrations above 300 ppm it causes immediate respiratory irritation. At 1,700 ppm, one-hour exposure is dangerous to life. At concentrations above 5,000 ppm, exposure is rapidly fatal. A facility storing 39,000 pounds of the substance, with documented corrosion on containment piping and no completed formal equipment testing, presents a non-hypothetical public health exposure risk. The question is not whether a corrosion-compromised pipe can fail. The question is when.

The absence of an eyewash and safety shower unit inside the Ammonia Machinery Room is a direct occupational health failure. The ANSI/IIAR standard that requires two units per machinery room exists because the machinery room is the environment where an ammonia exposure event is most likely to occur. Workers are in proximity to pressurized ammonia systems. A valve failure, a fitting breach, or a seal degradation event in that room exposes the worker immediately and requires immediate decontamination. The unit outside the door is not a substitute. To reach it, an ammonia-exposed worker must leave the machinery room while the chemical continues to damage their eyes, skin, and respiratory tract. Every second of that transit compounds the injury.

The public health dimension extends beyond the facility walls. Custom Foods failed to conduct annual emergency coordination with local emergency planning and response organizations from 2016 through at least mid-2023. This means that Knoxville’s emergency planning infrastructure, the agencies responsible for coordinating public evacuation, shelter-in-place orders, hospital notifications, and hazmat response in the event of an ammonia release, were operating without current information about the facility’s configuration, the updated scale of its ammonia refrigeration system, or the specific emergency response procedures the facility had developed. In a community-scale chemical emergency, that seven-year information blackout could translate directly into delayed response, incorrect protective actions, and preventable civilian casualties.

Economic Inequality

Food processing facilities like the one Custom Foods of America operates in Knoxville are disproportionately staffed by workers who do not have the economic leverage to refuse unsafe conditions. These are hourly workers, often without union representation, who need the job more than they need to press their employer on whether the eyewash station is in the right place or whether the compliance audit is current. The structural economic dynamic of a food processing plant is not one where a line worker can walk into management’s office and demand to see documentation of RAGAGEP compliance or the 40 C.F.R. Part 68 testing records. They are not in that room. The information is not shared with them. The risk is borne by them.

The penalty Custom Foods agreed to pay, $135,279, is a number that sounds significant in isolation. Placed in the context of a corporation operating a large industrial food processing facility with the resources to expand its ammonia refrigeration system between 2018 and 2020, it represents the cost of doing business. The maximum civil penalty allowed under Section 113(d) of the Clean Air Act can be assessed at a per-day-per-violation rate. The EPA’s own governing law states “each day a violation continues may constitute a separate violation.” The compliance audit gap alone stretched across seven years, roughly 2,555 days. The emergency response coordination failure ran for the same duration. The final $135,279 figure represents a fraction of what the statutory framework would have permitted had the EPA chosen to pursue the maximum penalty. The decision to settle for a floor-level penalty is itself a policy choice that reflects how regulators weigh corporate compliance costs against worker safety, and that calculus tends to favor the corporation.

Communities located near industrial chemical facilities in the United States are, statistically, lower-income communities with less political influence. The regulatory gap created when a company skips its compliance audits and cuts its emergency coordination activities for seven years falls hardest on the people who live closest to the facility, people who did not choose to live next to 39,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia and who have no say in how that facility is managed. The consent agreement that resolved this matter does not include any community notification requirement, any public health monitoring obligation, or any remedial benefit for the surrounding Knoxville neighborhood. The penalty goes to the U.S. Treasury. The neighborhood got nothing.

What Now: Who Is Responsible and Where to Apply Pressure

The Consent Agreement identifies the following parties by name in the public record:

For Workers, Neighbors, and Organizers

If you work at or near this facility, you have the right to request the facility’s Risk Management Plan, which is a public document registered with the EPA. You can access RMP data through the EPA’s RMP*Info database. If you believe safety conditions at your workplace are not being maintained, you can file a confidential complaint with OSHA at 1-800-321-OSHA or online at osha.gov. OSHA protects workers from retaliation for reporting safety concerns.

For Knoxville residents: contact your Local Emergency Planning Committee through Knox County Emergency Management to ask how often they receive facility updates from industrial chemical users in your area, and what the current emergency response plan looks like for 3600 Pleasant Ridge Road.

For anyone who wants to go further: mutual aid networks and community organizing are the most direct tools available when regulatory penalties are too small to change corporate behavior. Connect with environmental justice organizations in East Tennessee. Support workers organizing for stronger workplace safety standards. Push your elected representatives to fund EPA enforcement at levels that make corporate non-compliance genuinely costly. A $135,000 fine does not change behavior. Sustained public pressure and political accountability can.