WeBull Paid 400 Influencers to Feed Lies to 5.9 Million People
The trading app didn’t just bend the rules. It built an entire shadow advertising machine, kept no records, supervised nothing, and left millions of retail investors completely in the dark about their own rights.
For two and a half years, WeBull Financial allowed 5.9 million retail customers to open brokerage accounts without ever receiving the disclosure document that federal law requires every broker-dealer to hand over, a document specifically designed to tell everyday investors exactly what rights they hold and what risks they face.
The Machine WeBull Built to Sell You a Lie
WeBull didn’t stumble into this. The company built an affiliate marketing infrastructure through a connected marketing company, recruited more than 400 paid influencers, handed each one a unique referral link, and sent them a welcome email packed with “helpful promotional resources.” Those resources became the raw material for social media posts that reached real people making real financial decisions.
The payment model made the problem worse. WeBull paid influencers a flat fee for every new customer who opened an account using their unique link, and the company placed no cap on how much an influencer could earn. That structure created a direct financial incentive to say whatever it took to get someone to click. The more dramatic the claim, the more signups, the more money. WeBull designed that system and operated it for four full years.
The result: more than 400,000 new accounts opened through those referral links between January 2019 and December 2022. Each one of those accounts represents a real person who found WeBull through a paid promotional post that the company never reviewed, never approved, and never archived.
Nobody Was Watching. That Was The Plan.
FINRA rules are clear: any communication that reaches more than 25 retail investors in a 30-day window is a “retail communication” and must be reviewed and approved by a qualified principal before it goes live. WeBull knew this. Its own written supervisory procedures, the internal rulebook every registered firm is required to maintain, simply did not address influencer content at all. There was no review process because WeBull never wrote one.
The firm also failed to submit influencer content about options trading to FINRA’s Advertising Regulation Department before use, as explicitly required by rule. Options trading carries serious risk, and regulators require extra scrutiny for any promotional material about it. WeBull bypassed that requirement entirely, allowing influencers to post options trading hype with zero regulatory oversight.
Records of the posts were never kept. The firm maintained no copies of influencer content, no log of when posts went live, and no documentation of who approved what. When FINRA came looking, there was nothing to find. Either WeBull understood exactly what it was doing, or it was so indifferent to the rules that the outcome was the same.
Timeline of WeBull’s Documented Violations
All date ranges sourced directly from FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801, signed May 8, 2025.
The Non-Financial Ledger: What the Fine Doesn’t Cover
The $1.6 million fine ($1.6 million, roughly equivalent to what a median American household earns across 24 years of full-time work) sounds like accountability. It is the opposite. It is a transaction. WeBull writes a check, regulators close a file, and the 5.9 million people who were denied critical disclosures receive nothing. Not an apology, not a correction, not a refund. The settlement explicitly states that WeBull accepted the findings “without admitting or denying them.” That is not accountability. That is a receipt for the cost of getting caught.
Think about who WeBull recruited as customers. The influencer marketing model specifically targeted people who follow finance content creators on social media, a demographic that skews younger, often financially inexperienced, and actively seeking guidance about how to start investing. These are people who did not grow up with a family financial advisor. They trusted the person on their screen because that person seemed to know something they did not. WeBull designed a system that weaponized that trust, paying influencers to speak with the authority of experience while saying things that were factually reckless.
One influencer told viewers that if a stock “skyrockets to quadruple the price,” they would see the company “making lots of money and not losing money.” Another told followers that putting $100 into an options contract, making $10 on it, meant they were “on your way to being a millionaire.” These are not aggressive opinions. They are fabrications. Options trading carries risk that wipes out accounts. Margin trading carries risk that leaves people owing money they do not have. WeBull’s influencers promoted both without a single required risk disclosure, and WeBull’s internal system never caught it because WeBull never built a system to catch it.
The Form CRS failure compounds this betrayal at scale. Form CRS exists precisely for the person who does not know what questions to ask. It is the document that tells you, before you hand over your money, what the firm charges, what conflicts of interest exist, and whether the firm or its people have disciplinary history. WeBull published it on its website and apparently considered the job done. It did not deliver it to the actual human beings opening accounts, for over two years, across 5.9 million accounts. WeBull states in the settlement that it “was unaware of these prior delivery and recordkeeping errors until FINRA brought them to the firm’s attention.” A firm that processed millions of new account openings without ever confirming it was handing investors their basic rights document did not make an oversight. It made a choice about what to prioritize, and investors were not it.
Legal Receipts: The Quotes That Bury Them
“Once this actual stock skyrockets to quadruple the price you are going to see this company actually making lots of money and not losing money.” — An influencer paid by WeBull’s affiliate, speaking in a video posted on a social media platform. FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801, p. 3.
“If you make a day trade today on [Company A] options, [Company A] calls and you put 100 into [a Company A] options contract and you sell for 110 and you make 10 … great job … you’re on your way to being a profitable day trader you’re on your way to being a millionaire.” — An influencer paid by WeBull’s affiliate, in a video about options trading. FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801, p. 3. No risk disclosure accompanied this statement.
“From June 30, 2020 to December 2022, Webull Financial failed to deliver its Form CRS to approximately 5.9 million retail customers… The firm was unaware of these prior delivery and recordkeeping errors until FINRA brought them to the firm’s attention.” — FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801, p. 7. WeBull processed millions of accounts and never confirmed it was giving investors the document they were legally owed.
“From January 2019 through December 2022, Webull Financial did not have a registered principal review and approve all influencers’ static posts or options communications prior to posting on social media platforms. The firm also did not maintain a copy of influencers’ posts promoting the firm or records of the dates of use.” — FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801, p. 4. Four years. Zero records.
“Several influencers’ social media communications failed to clearly identify the communications as paid advertisements.” — FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801, p. 3. Audiences watching these videos had no way of knowing the person recommending WeBull was being paid to do so.
The Numbers Don’t Lie: Scale vs. Consequence
WeBull’s Reach vs. The Regulatory Penalty
Data sourced from FINRA AWC No. 2021072231801. The fine of $1,600,000 works out to roughly $0.27 per affected customer, less than the cost of a stick of gum.
Societal Impact Mapping
Economic Inequality: How the Rules Only Apply When You Get Caught
WeBull’s business model, at its core, used the financial aspirations of working-class people as a growth engine. The influencer pipeline specifically reached people who were not wealthy enough to have a financial planner, not experienced enough to know what questions to ask, and motivated enough by economic desperation or ambition to click on a video promising them a path to becoming a millionaire. That is not a coincidence. That is a market segment, and WeBull paid 400 people to cultivate it.
The 5.9 million people who were denied Form CRS were overwhelmingly retail investors, meaning everyday people putting personal savings into a brokerage app, not institutions with teams of lawyers reviewing disclosures. Form CRS is designed to level the information gap between a giant financial firm and an ordinary person. WeBull’s failure to deliver it for over two years meant those people operated blind, trusting a platform that had not given them the basic facts about its own fees, conflicts, and disciplinary history.
The penalty ratio is its own statement about economic inequality. WeBull pays $1.6 million ($1.6 million, roughly what 24 median American households earn across an entire year of full-time work). FINRA closes the case. No customer receives compensation. No account holder gets even a retroactive delivery of the Form CRS they were owed. The people who were harmed subsidize nothing in this settlement; the firm simply pays a line item and continues operating. That is the system functioning exactly as designed for companies with enough capital to absorb a fine and move on.
The Vendor Display Rule violation adds a layer of market-integrity harm that falls hardest on small traders. WeBull’s default platform showed market data from only one trading venue, rather than the national consolidated data that federal rules require. Retail investors making trades based on incomplete market data may receive worse execution prices. Institutional traders with access to better data platforms do not face this problem. WeBull maintained this deficient display from March 2020 to July 2024, a full four years after writing supervisory procedures that said they would conduct compliance reviews, which the firm never actually did.
Public Health: The Mental Health Cost of Financial Ruin
The FINRA document does not track individual financial losses, and the settlement produces no victim tally. But the conduct described points directly at a population that researchers consistently identify as high-risk for financial trauma: young, inexperienced retail investors who entered markets through social media recommendations and options trading. The influencer who told followers that turning $100 into $110 meant they were “on the way to being a millionaire” was not just bending disclosure rules. That person was setting expectations that, when the market delivered reality instead of hype, could produce real psychological damage.
Margin trading and options trading, specifically the products influencers promoted without required risk disclosures, carry the capacity for losses that exceed initial investment. An investor who follows advice without understanding that their downside is not capped to what they put in faces a qualitatively different crisis than someone who simply lost money on a stock. These outcomes, financial ruin on borrowed money, are documented drivers of acute mental health crises. WeBull’s failure to require risk disclosures on this specific content was not bureaucratic sloppiness; it was the removal of a warning label from a product that genuinely harms people.
The Cost of a Life Metric
What Now?
The People Still Running the Show
The settlement was signed on behalf of WeBull Financial LLC by its CEO (identified in the signed document). WeBull’s registered leadership and board composition are publicly searchable through FINRA’s BrokerCheck database at finra.org/brokercheck. Look them up. The AWC becomes part of WeBull’s permanent disciplinary record, which means every future regulatory review, every future partnership negotiation, and every future customer who searches BrokerCheck will find this.
Watchlist: Who Should Be Watching WeBull Right Now
- FINRA: Required to monitor whether WeBull’s revised written supervisory procedures are actually being enforced, not just written down again.
- SEC: The Form CRS failure implicates multiple Exchange Act provisions the SEC itself adopted. The SEC can independently pursue further action if WeBull’s compliance remains deficient.
- FTC: The paid-influencer-without-disclosure model implicates FTC endorsement guidelines, which require clear disclosure of material connections between promoters and brands.
- CFPB: As a financial product provider reaching millions of retail consumers, WeBull falls within CFPB’s scope. The scale of the Form CRS failure warrants attention from the bureau tasked with consumer financial protection.
- State Securities Regulators: Individual state regulators have independent authority to investigate WeBull’s conduct within their jurisdictions and may pursue separate enforcement actions.
What You Can Actually Do Right Now
If you opened a WeBull account between June 2020 and December 2022, you were legally entitled to a Form CRS that you may never have received. You can file a complaint directly with FINRA at finra.org/investors/have-problem, with the SEC at sec.gov/tcr, and with your state securities regulator. Find local investor protection groups and mutual aid networks in your city, because collective action on financial fraud, including coordinated complaints and shared legal resources, produces outcomes that individual complaints rarely do. Talk to a nonprofit legal aid organization if you believe you suffered losses from misleading influencer content. Your experience is evidence.
The source document for this investigation is attached below.
Please click on this link to see the FINRA document on the WeBull controversy: https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/fda_documents/2021072231801%20Webull%20Financial%20LLC%20CRD%20289063%20AWC%20vr%20%282025-1749342003744%29.pdf
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