“The Facility failed to analyze and report in the RMP an additional worst-case release scenario from the second railcar that potentially affects public receptors different from those potentially affected by the worst-case release scenario that was reported in the Facility’s June 13, 2017 RMP.”

💡 Doubling the chlorine inventory without updating risk models left emergency planners and residents with dangerously outdated information about potential exposure zones.

“At the time of the Inspection, the Facility did not have a design plate on the bleach reactor and has not labeled the bleach reactor and bleach make tank… the chlorine pipeline that connects from the railcar to the process pipeline was color-coded but was unlabeled.”

💡 Unlabeled piping and missing design plates prevent workers and emergency responders from quickly identifying hazardous systems during routine operations or crises.

“Online Packaging failed to develop written operating procedures for unloading chlorine from the railcar that address the following phases: Temporary operations… Emergency shutdown… Emergency operations… Startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown.”

💡 Without written procedures, workers must improvise during the most dangerous operations, increasing the likelihood of human error that could trigger a catastrophic release.

“Online Packaging stated twice that operators only receive initial training for operating the Process. Further, EPA inspectors obtained evidence that at least one of the operators has been working with the Process for greater than three years, which would require refresher training.”

💡 Federal rules require retraining every three years because procedures and hazards change, yet management left employees to work with deadly chemicals using outdated knowledge.

“No preventive maintenance is performed on the equipment associated with the bleach manufacturing and the chlorine pipeline feeding the process. The bleach manufacturing process is 20 years old. It has been working without any problems.”

💡 Management gambled that aging equipment would continue functioning rather than invest in inspections, illustrating how profit pressures override engineering prudence.

“The worst-case release scenario models a distance to end point that has public receptors within its radius… ‘public receptor’ as ‘offsite residences, institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals), industrial, commercial, and office buildings, parks, or recreational areas inhabited or occupied by the public.'”

💡 EPA confirmed that a chlorine release would reach homes, schools, and hospitals, yet the company operated for years without completing required safety analyses.

“Personnel informed EPA inspectors that the Facility is a non-responding stationary source and that Online Packaging had not performed the annual emergency response coordination activities required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.93.”

💡 Local fire and EMS teams had no current facility information, emergency plans, or contact details, leaving them unprepared to protect 32,000 Michigan City residents in a crisis.

“Respondent admits the jurisdictional allegations in this CAFO and neither admits nor denies the factual allegations in this CAFO… Respondent certifies that it is complying fully with the CAPP.”

💡 This legal formula allows the company to claim compliance in public statements while avoiding formal admission that could be used in future litigation.

“On August 10, 2021, EPA conducted an announced inspection of the Facility… [CEO signature dated] 07/17/2024.”

💡 The company continued generating revenue from operations with known violations for nearly three years before paying a penalty, turning enforcement delay into profit.

“Based on analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the CAA… Complainant has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $88,383… The Administrator of EPA may assess a civil penalty of up to $57,617 per day of violation up to a total of $460,926.”

💡 EPA accepted less than one-fifth of the statutory cap even though inspectors documented years of violations across every major safety category.

“The maximum intended inventory was inaccurately documented as the capacity of one rail car, whereas the Facility stores up to two rail cars during the high-demand season.”

💡 Understating chemical inventories in official filings prevents regulators and the public from understanding the true scale of risk at the facility.

“The consequences of deviation were not evaluated or documented, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(v).”

💡 Understanding what happens when temperatures, pressures, or flows exceed safe limits is fundamental to preventing runaway reactions and releases.

“The relief system design and design basis and the ventilation system design information did not include design calculations, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv, v).”

💡 Without engineering calculations, there is no way to verify that safety valves and vents can actually handle worst-case pressure or vapor loads.

“The PHA did not address the hazards associated with chlorine storage and unloading from the railcar. Online Packaging failed to base the PHA on a rationale which includes the consideration of the extent of the process hazards.”

💡 Chlorine railcar operations pose the highest catastrophic risk at the site, yet management excluded them from formal hazard review.

“Personnel informed EPA inspectors that not every employee was consulted on the development of the PHA and the frequency of refresher training. Online Packaging failed to consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and development of process hazards analyses.”

💡 Frontline workers possess critical operational knowledge, and excluding them from safety planning violates both regulatory requirements and basic management prudence.