How Aipu and Fidefx Used Shell Companies to Execute a $4.6M Digital Heist!

Aipu Limited Accused of $3.6M Pig Butchering Fraud Targeting U.S. Investors
Corporate Misconduct Accountability Project

Aipu Limited Accused of $3.6M Pig Butchering Fraud Targeting U.S. Investors

CFTC alleges UK shell companies operated by Chinese nationals and U.S. money mule defrauded 32+ victims through romance scam turned fake commodity trading platform, misappropriating millions offshore.

CRITICAL SEVERITY
TL;DR

Aipu Limited and Fidefx Investments Limited operated a fraudulent commodity trading scheme that stole at least $3.6 million from more than 32 U.S. customers. The scam began with solicitors building trust via messaging apps, convincing victims to fund trading accounts that displayed fake profits. All customer funds were immediately misappropriated and wired to non-trading accounts in China and Malaysia, with no actual trading ever occurring.

If you were contacted by someone offering insider trading tips and directed to Aipu or Fidefx websites, you may be a victim of this scheme.

$3.6M+
Minimum amount misappropriated from victims
32+
Customers defrauded across the United States
$400K+
Single victim loss from Hawaii (cryptocurrency)
10-30%
Promised profit per trade (all fabricated)
30%
Fake tax or fee demanded before withdrawal

The Allegations: A Breakdown

⚠️
Core Allegations
What they did · 8 points
01 Defendants operated a common enterprise fraud scheme from February 2023 to present, fraudulently soliciting and misappropriating at least $3.6 million from not less than 32 customers. Most victims were located in the United States and were not eligible contract participants. high
02 Solicitors contacted customers via WeChat, WhatsApp, and Line, claiming to have inside information allowing 10% to 30% profits per trade on gold-dollar pairs and other commodity interests. These solicitors built trust over weeks or months before steering victims to the fraudulent platforms. high
03 The websites for Aipu and Fidefx falsely claimed to be fully regulated global forex and commodity brokers licensed by the fictitious Vanuatu Financial Control. No such regulatory entity exists, and neither company was ever registered with any legitimate financial authority. high
04 After customers deposited funds, they received access to fake online account statements showing profitable trading activity. These statements were completely false. No trading accounts existed, no trading took place, and the FX6 trading platform was a fabrication. high
05 Defendants immediately misappropriated all customer assets by transferring them to offshore accounts in China, Malaysia, and elsewhere controlled by persons with no connection to commodity trading. None of these accounts were held at CFTC-registered entities. high
06 When customers attempted to withdraw funds, defendants falsely told them they must first pay an additional tax or fee as large as 30% of their purported account balance. This was the final attempt to extract more money before cutting off all contact. high
07 Qian Bai incorporated Aipu in the UK in March 2023, registered the website through a U.S. company, and communicated directly with customers as customer service. He knowingly omitted material facts including that customer assets would be misappropriated and no trading would occur. high
08 Lan Bai, residing in Tulsa, Oklahoma, accepted customer funds into her personal U.S. bank accounts with wire notations explicitly referencing Aipu and Fidefx. She then immediately misappropriated these funds by wiring them to third-party scheme entities offshore, never to trading accounts. high
⚖️
Corporate Accountability Failures
Designed to evade justice · 6 points
01 Defendants structured the scheme across multiple jurisdictions to frustrate accountability. The masterminds reside in China, shell companies are registered in the UK, websites are hosted through U.S. companies, and money is laundered through a U.S. accomplice to China and Malaysia. high
02 Neither Aipu nor Fidefx ever registered with the CFTC in any capacity, making their solicitation and acceptance of U.S. customer funds for commodity trading unlawful. They also were never registered with the UK Financial Conduct Authority despite UK incorporation. medium
03 Qian Bai and Chao Li, as sole directors of Aipu and Fidefx respectively, controlled all operations including fraudulent website content, customer communications, and the misappropriation of funds. They knew no trading accounts existed and no commodity trading occurred. high
04 Lan Bai opened and used at least five bank accounts in her name to accept customer funds during the scheme. She never rejected any customer deposit, never questioned why strangers were wiring her money, and retained a portion of the stolen funds for personal benefit. high
05 The defendants operated as a common enterprise with shared purpose of defrauding customers, common control, shared customers and assets, identical fraudulent solicitations, and coordinated funneling of customer assets through common financial accounts to common offshore entities. high
06 Customer digital assets intended for Aipu trading accounts were actually transferred to digital wallet addresses associated with Fidefx, demonstrating defendants commingled customer assets among themselves to conceal the fraud and misappropriation. medium
💰
Profit Over People
The mechanics of theft · 6 points
01 Defendants operated in a Ponzi-like fashion by using funds from later victims to pay small early withdrawals to earlier victims. This created the illusion of legitimate trading and encouraged victims to deposit additional funds before being shut out entirely. high
02 Defendants introduced a fake VIP program to encourage victims to deposit even more money. Qian Bai sent emails claiming customers who reached certain deposit levels would receive rewards, but completing the promotion only meant more funds would be stolen. medium
03 One victim wired $125,000 to an assistant of a solicitor and $18,500 directly to Lan Bai, with the latter funds eventually forwarded to the solicitor but never deposited to any trading account. The victim was told the deadline to fulfill VIP requirements had passed and the solicitor cut off all contact. high
04 Customer Z was convinced to transfer over $400,000 in cryptocurrency after a solicitor claimed to have insider knowledge of exact timing when gold prices would spike. The solicitor even deposited $580,000 into the victim’s fake account to help meet VIP requirements, deepening the illusion before disappearing. high
05 Lan Bai accepted at least six Zelle transfers from U.S. customers with payment memos explicitly stating Aipu deposit, Aipu Lan Bai, and similar references. She also accepted one transfer noting Fidefx. Each time, she misappropriated the funds by wiring them offshore instead of to any trading entity. high
06 Defendants directed customers to transfer fiat currency and digital assets through a series of bank accounts and private digital wallets affiliated with defendants. None of these accounts were held at or controlled by a CFTC-registered futures commission merchant or retail foreign currency dealer. medium
🏘️
Community Impact
Victims across America · 7 points
01 The majority of the at least 32 defrauded customers were located in the United States during the scheme, with identified victims in Hawaii, Indiana, Washington, and other states. Most if not all were non-eligible contract participants under federal law. high
02 Customer A from Hawaii described being contacted in July 2023 through the Line messaging app by someone using the name Lillian. After weeks of conversation, Lillian persuaded the victim to sign up for Aipu and Crypto.com accounts, claiming she would co-invest and provide trading signals. medium
03 Customer A transferred 117.26 ETH, equivalent to over $400,000, between August and October 2023. The victim’s fake account balance grew to $915,000 including over $273,000 in purported rewards. When attempting to withdraw, Aipu and Qian Bai gave fraudulent excuses until the victim lost everything. high
04 Customer Z from Indiana was contacted on WeChat by a solicitor identified as Arlene who provided step-by-step instructions to set up crypto accounts and the Aipu trading account. The victim suspected Arlene was an insider of Aipu based on her advance knowledge of price movements and her deposits into his account. medium
05 Customer Z sent money directly to Lan Bai pursuant to directions from Arlene. After Chase Bank and three crypto sites blocked transfers to Hong Kong, the victim wired money twice to the solicitor’s friends and associates hoping to fulfill VIP requirements and unfreeze the account, losing all funds. high
06 Customer L, a resident of Pierce County, Washington, was directed by solicitors to forward digital assets to Aipu’s digital wallet address. Analysis revealed the sending wallet address was actually associated with Fidefx, not Aipu, demonstrating the common enterprise structure of the fraud. medium
07 The pig butchering scam model is uniquely cruel because it weaponizes trust built through weeks or months of online friendship. Victims were left not only financially devastated but also psychologically traumatized by the manipulation and betrayal of someone they believed cared about them. high
Exploiting Delay
Prolonging the deception · 5 points
01 Solicitors spent weeks or months building relationships with victims through everyday conversation before ever mentioning trading or investment opportunities. This extended grooming period built deep trust that was then exploited for financial gain. medium
02 Defendants initially allowed customers to withdraw small amounts of their assets to create proof that trading was legitimate. These early withdrawals were funded by assets from later victims in Ponzi fashion, delaying the moment when victims would realize the entire operation was fraudulent. high
03 When Customer A attempted to withdraw assets, Aipu and Qian Bai gave various fraudulent excuses as to why withdrawal could not take place. This stalling tactic prolonged the scheme and potentially allowed defendants to solicit and misappropriate funds from additional victims. medium
04 Defendants introduced time-limited VIP promotions with 80-day validity periods and extension fees of $20,000 for 10 additional working days. These artificial deadlines created urgency and pressure on victims to deposit more funds quickly without adequate due diligence. medium
05 The Aipu website remained operational from at least March 2023 until late April or early May 2024. During this period, defendants continuously accepted new customer funds while earlier victims were being denied withdrawals, demonstrating the ongoing and systematic nature of the fraud. high
📌
The Bottom Line
A system designed to steal · 5 points
01 The CFTC alleges defendants violated core anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations by cheating or defrauding customers, making false statements, and willfully deceiving customers regarding commodity interest contracts and the disposition of customer assets. high
02 Defendants knowingly or recklessly omitted material facts from customers including that all customer assets would be misappropriated, no commodity trading would occur on their behalf, customers had no actual trading accounts, and the online account statements were completely false. high
03 Each defendant is alleged to have acted within the scope of employment or agency with the corporate defendants, making the companies liable as principals. Qian Bai and Lan Bai controlled Aipu and knowingly induced its violations. Chao Li controlled Fidefx and knowingly induced its violations. high
04 The CFTC seeks permanent injunction against all defendants prohibiting future violations, trading bans, registration bans, full restitution to all victims, disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties for each violation, and a complete accounting of all customer funds received during the scheme. high
05 Unless restrained and enjoined by the court, defendants are likely to continue engaging in the fraudulent acts and practices alleged in the complaint and similar schemes, causing additional harm to unsuspecting victims seeking legitimate commodity trading opportunities. high

Timeline of Events

March 2023
Qian Bai incorporates Aipu Limited in the United Kingdom as sole director.
March 2023
Qian Bai registers the Aipu website www.aipufx.com through U.S. company GoDaddy using an address in Hong Kong.
July 2023
Customer A from Hawaii is contacted via Line messaging app by solicitor using name Lillian, beginning the grooming process.
August 2023
Customer A begins transferring cryptocurrency to Aipu, eventually sending 117.26 ETH worth over $400,000 through October 2023.
September 2023
Customer Z from Indiana wires $125,000 to an assistant of solicitor Arlene and $18,500 directly to Lan Bai’s personal bank account.
October 2023
Fidefx Investments Limited website www.fidefxltd.com begins operating as mirror image of Aipu site.
November 2023
Chao Li incorporates Fidefx Investments Limited in the United Kingdom as sole director using same correspondence address as Qian Bai.
February 2024
Customer C sends Zelle transfer of $100 to Lan Bai’s JPMC account with notation Fidefx.
April-May 2024
Aipu website stops operating, though Fidefx website continues soliciting customers.
September 27, 2024
CFTC files enforcement complaint in U.S. District Court for Western District of Washington against all defendants.

Direct Quotes from the Legal Record

QUOTE 1 False regulatory claims on websites allegations
“A regulated broker, holding licences [sic] from the Vanuatu Financial Control (VFC), [Aipu Limited/FIL] is authorised to offer financial services across Europe, Far East, Asia and America. Committed to upholding strictest regulatory standards, we ensure total transparency and guarantee the privacy and security of your account with the most sophisticated safety protocols.”

💡 Both Aipu and Fidefx websites made identical false claims about being regulated by a fictitious entity to create an illusion of legitimacy and safety.

QUOTE 2 No trading occurred despite promises allegations
“These account statements are false. Neither Aipu nor FIL have any trading accounts in the United States to which customer funds are sent. Upon information and belief, there are no trading accounts at Aipu or FIL to which customer assets are sent, and no trading takes place on behalf of customers at either Aipu or FIL.”

💡 The CFTC explicitly alleges that all trading activity shown to customers was fabricated and no actual commodity trading ever took place.

QUOTE 3 Immediate misappropriation of all funds profit
“Rather than using these assets to trade commodity interests on behalf of customers, Defendants immediately misappropriate customers’ assets by transferring them offshore to non-trading accounts controlled by persons in the PRC, Malaysia, and elsewhere.”

💡 Customer funds were stolen the moment they were received, with no intention of ever using them for the promised trading activity.

QUOTE 4 Fraudulent VIP promotion to extract more money profit
“Hello, this is an anniversary activity picture (sic) launched by our company to give back to new and old users. The activity is valid for 80 days after you make a reservation. Once you make a reservation, you need to complete the reservation level before you can withdraw the reward funds. If the reservation is not completed, there will be a penalty of 3% of the deposit amount.”

💡 Qian Bai sent fraudulent promotional emails designed to pressure victims into depositing additional funds under false pretenses of rewards and penalties.

QUOTE 5 Final shakedown before disappearing delay_tactics
“If customers subsequently attempt to close their account or withdraw large amounts from their trading accounts, they are falsely advised that they cannot withdraw their assets unless they first pay an additional tax or fee, which is as large as thirty percent (30%) of their purported account balance.”

💡 Defendants extracted final payments from victims by fabricating tax or fee requirements, a common pig butchering scam tactic before cutting off all contact.

QUOTE 6 Lan Bai’s knowing role as U.S. money mule accountability
“For example, in the Payment Memo section of at least six (6) Zelle transactions between Lan Bai and a U.S. customer, it is noted that the assets are transferred to Lan Bai for Aipu deposit, Aipu Lan Bai, Aipu Lan Bai #2, Aipu Lan Bai #3, Aipu Lan Bai #4, and Aipu Lan Bai #5.”

💡 Lan Bai received explicit notice through payment memos that funds were intended for Aipu commodity trading, yet she misappropriated them by wiring offshore instead of to any trading entity.

QUOTE 7 Lan Bai retained stolen funds for personal use accountability
“Lan Bai retains a portion of the customer funds wired into her personal bank accounts during the Relevant Period, and uses said funds for her personal benefit.”

💡 Lan Bai did not merely facilitate the fraud but directly profited from the stolen customer funds by keeping some for herself.

QUOTE 8 Customer testimony on solicitor’s insider claims community
“She [Arlene] showed me step-by-step how to set up different accounts, including several crypto accounts and AIPU trading account, and how to trade in AIPU. We only traded gold price (sic) through XAUUSD on AIPU. Now I suspected that she may be an insider of AIPU. First, she knows the timing when price will jump (sic). In several trades I did with her, she told me ahead of the trade at exact what time to buy (sic), and after I placed orders, there tended to be a spike in price.”

💡 Victims were manipulated with fabricated insider knowledge and precise timing predictions to create the illusion of a sophisticated, profitable trading operation.

QUOTE 9 Coordinated asset commingling across defendants accountability
“Customers are directed by Solicitors to forward digital assets to Aipu’s digital wallet address to secure purported commodity trading in customers’ trading accounts. However, an analysis of transactions purportedly between customers and Aipu reveals that the sending digital wallet address is actually associated with FIL, not Aipu.”

💡 Defendants operated as a unified fraud enterprise by sharing digital wallets and commingling customer assets between Aipu and Fidefx to conceal the misappropriation.

QUOTE 10 Systematic concealment of material facts conclusion
“Bai and Lan Bai, individually and as controlling persons of Aipu, knowingly or recklessly omit material facts from customers after accepting their assets for the purpose of trading commodity interests, including but not limited to: Defendants misappropriate all customer assets; Defendants do not trade commodity interests on behalf of customers after accepting customers’ assets; Defendants do not forward customers’ assets to any entity that trade assets on behalf of customers; customers have no trading accounts; and, the online account statements Defendants provide customers are false.”

💡 The fraud was not limited to affirmative misrepresentations but included systematic concealment of every material fact a reasonable investor would want to know.

QUOTE 11 Likely continuation without injunction conclusion
“Unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, Defendants are likely to continue to engage in the acts and practices alleged in this Complaint, and similar acts and practices, as more fully described below.”

💡 The CFTC argues that defendants pose an ongoing threat to the public and will continue defrauding victims unless the court issues a permanent injunction.

QUOTE 12 Common enterprise structure for shared liability accountability
“Defendants are joined in a common purpose of defrauding and profiting from customers, have relationships with and among each other, depend upon the participation of each other to accomplish their common purpose, utilize websites that are mirror images of one another, and are each employed by and/or associate with the Scheme Entities during the Relevant Period.”

💡 The CFTC alleges all defendants operated as a unified fraudulent enterprise, making each liable for the misconduct of the others.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a pig butchering scam?
A pig butchering scam is a type of fraud where scammers build trust with victims over weeks or months through online messaging, often posing as a friend or romantic interest. Once trust is established, they convince the victim to invest in a fake trading platform. The victim is the pig being fattened up with false promises before being financially slaughtered when all their money is stolen.
How did the Aipu and Fidefx fraud scheme work?
Solicitors contacted victims via messaging apps like WhatsApp and WeChat, building trust over time before introducing them to Aipu or Fidefx websites. Victims were told they could profit from commodity trading with insider information. After depositing funds to personal bank accounts or digital wallets, victims saw fake account statements showing profits. In reality, no trading occurred and all funds were immediately wired to offshore accounts in China and Malaysia.
Who were the main defendants in this case?
The defendants are Aipu Limited and Fidefx Investments Limited, two UK shell companies, along with their sole directors Qian Bai and Chao Li who reside in China, and Lan Bai, a U.S. resident in Tulsa, Oklahoma who accepted victim funds into her personal bank accounts and wired them offshore.
How much money was stolen in this fraud?
The CFTC alleges defendants misappropriated at least $3.6 million from not less than 32 customers. Individual documented losses include over $400,000 from one Hawaii victim and $162,000 from one Indiana victim. The actual total may be higher as the investigation is ongoing.
Were the Aipu and Fidefx websites legitimate?
No. Both websites falsely claimed to be regulated by a fictitious Vanuatu Financial Control entity that does not exist. Neither Aipu nor Fidefx was ever registered with the CFTC, the UK Financial Conduct Authority, or any legitimate financial regulator. The websites were designed solely to create an illusion of legitimacy.
Did any actual commodity trading take place?
No. The CFTC alleges that no trading whatsoever occurred on behalf of customers. The account statements showing profitable trades were completely fabricated. Defendants had no trading accounts at any registered futures commission merchant or retail foreign currency dealer.
What happened to the money victims sent?
Customer funds were immediately misappropriated by wiring them to non-trading accounts controlled by persons in China, Malaysia, and elsewhere. Lan Bai played a key role by accepting funds into her U.S. bank accounts and then wiring them offshore. None of the money was used for the promised commodity trading.
What was the role of Lan Bai in the scheme?
Lan Bai, a Tulsa, Oklahoma resident, served as the U.S. money mule. She accepted customer funds through wire transfers and Zelle payments into at least five personal bank accounts, then immediately wired the funds to offshore entities. She never questioned why strangers were sending her money and retained some of the stolen funds for personal benefit.
How did victims first learn about Aipu or Fidefx?
Victims were contacted by solicitors through messaging apps like WeChat, WhatsApp, and Line. The solicitors built trust over weeks or months through friendly conversation before claiming to have insider information about commodity trading and directing victims to open accounts at Aipu or Fidefx.
What is the CFTC seeking in this case?
The CFTC is seeking permanent injunctions against all defendants, trading and registration bans, full restitution to all victims, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with pre- and post-judgment interest, civil monetary penalties for each violation, and a complete accounting of all customer funds received during the fraud.
What should I do if I think I was a victim of this scheme?
If you sent money to Aipu, Fidefx, or Lan Bai for commodity trading after being contacted by someone on a messaging app, you should immediately contact the CFTC, file a report with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov, notify your bank and any cryptocurrency exchanges involved, and consult with an attorney about your legal options.
Can the defendants be held criminally liable?
This CFTC action is a civil enforcement case seeking injunctions, restitution, and penalties. However, the same conduct could potentially form the basis for criminal charges by the Department of Justice for wire fraud, money laundering, and other offenses. The complaint does not indicate whether a parallel criminal investigation is underway.
Post ID: 455  ·  Slug: commodity-trading-scam-defrauds-investors-of-3-6-million-aipu-fidefx  ·  Original: 2024-10-25  ·  Rebuilt: 2026-03-19

This is the link to the CFTC’s order of restitution, it will download the PDF onto your computer if you click here though just an FYI: https://www.cftc.gov/media/12491/enflanbai_orderforrestitutionandcmp071425/download

💡 Explore Corporate Misconduct by Category

Corporations harm people every day — from wage theft to pollution. Learn more by exploring key areas of injustice.

Aleeia
Aleeia

I'm the creator this website. I have 6+ years of experience as an independent researcher studying corporatocracy and its detrimental effects on every single aspect of society.

For more information, please see my About page.

All posts published by this profile were either personally written by me, or I actively edited / reviewed them before publishing. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Articles: 1691