The Debt That Doesn’t Show Up in a Court Filing

Picture it: your car needs gas to get to work tomorrow. Your bank account is three days from payday and you’ve already stretched it as far as it goes. You see an ad. An actor on your phone looks directly at you and says they’ve been there too. They downloaded an app, got $50 instantly, and made it through. No credit check. No interest. Free money. Just $1.99 a month.

You download it. You hand over access to your bank account. You agree to the monthly charge. And then the app tells you the most you can get right now is $20.

You’ve been in worse spots. Twenty dollars is still twenty dollars. You request it. Then a new screen appears: you can have the money in two to three days, or you can pay $4 to get it in two hours. You need it now. You pay the $4. You got $16 in real value out of a product that advertised $50, free, instant. The app just charged you $5.99 in total fees to access $16. That is a 37% effective fee rate, and the company called it “free money.”

Now try to leave. You open the app and find the cancel button. It doesn’t work. You fill out the webform. You get a message saying your cancellation is being processed. Three weeks later you see another $1.99 charge on your bank statement. The form silently rejected your request because your email had a capital letter where FloatMe’s system had a lowercase one, and nobody told you. You email support. They send you a scripted message asking why you’re having trouble with the app and suggesting you try the webform.

One consumer sent FloatMe three cancellation emails, received confirmation responses each time, and was still charged monthly. Another downloaded the app specifically because they needed $50 for an emergency, discovered the $20 cap, cancelled immediately, and then spent months trying to stop the recurring $1.99 charge from a service they never used. A disabled person on Social Security wrote to FloatMe directly: the company had enrolled them, taken their money, and then told them their income wasn’t real income. They had been paying for the right to be told they didn’t qualify.

These are not edge cases. They are the product. FloatMe built its revenue model on the gap between what it promised and what it delivered, then built a second revenue stream on the difficulty of escaping the first one. The consumers who lost the most were the ones who could afford it least: gig workers, veterans, people on disability, people on Social Security retirement, people living on $20 at a time.

The Deception Architecture: Every Layer of the Lie

FloatMe’s fraud was not accidental or the result of loose ad copy. It was layered across every touchpoint: social media, the website, the app store listings, the enrollment flow, and post-enrollment customer service. Here is how each layer worked.

• Social Media Ads (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube), active since at least 2019: Ads featured actors describing emergencies, downloading the app, and immediately receiving a $50 advance with “no hidden fees” and “no interest.” One actor scripted line: “I got $50 instantly and was able to get gas and go about my day.” Another: “Sign up for the membership and get $50, free money.” The $1.99/month fee appeared only in small font at the bottom of the screen at the end of the video.
• Website (www.floatme.com): Claimed consumers could get “Floats up to $50 between paydays” for “$1.99/month” with “No Hidden Fees, No Interest, No Credit Check.” FloatMe removed the specific “up to $50” language from the website only after learning of the FTC investigation.
• App Store Listings (Apple App Store and Google Play): Featured screenshots showing “Cash advance up to $50” and “Money in minutes.” The screen-by-screen walkthrough shown in these listings deliberately skipped the two screens that reveal the $4 instant-transfer fee.
• Enrollment Flow (in-app): After downloading, users saw a carousel advertising “Instant cash advances” of “up to $50.” The subscription confirmation screen said users could “Instantly Float up to $50” for “$1.99/mo” and cancel “anytime for any reason by contacting support.”
• The $50 cap was a deliberate business decision. Internal documents show FloatMe initially considered offering $50 at enrollment. Co-founder Sanchez told co-founder Cleary in a message that FloatMe needed to abandon that plan due to “cash constraints,” and set the enrollment cap at $20. The advertising never changed.
• The “automatic increase” was a fabrication. When users complained about the $20 cap, FloatMe told them their limit would increase “automatically” via “the Float system” as the company “got to know them better.” In reality, increases were granted manually, only on explicit request, only after at least five months of subscription, nine consecutive on-time repayments, and average paychecks of at least $600. Even then, FloatMe’s director of operations instructed agents to deny increases for new users “even if they have a ton of income.”
• The $4 instant-transfer fee was hidden until after signup. FloatMe revealed the fee only after users had already connected their bank accounts and agreed to the monthly subscription. The company did not add any mention of the fee to its website until after the FTC investigation began, and even then buried it below multiple links urging users to leave the page and download the app.

The $50 That Never Existed: A Cap Set by “Cash Constraints”

The advertised $50 figure was not a real offer. Internal records prove FloatMe chose the $20 enrollment cap as a cost-saving measure and kept the $50 advertising running anyway.

• Decision to cap at $20: Defendant Sanchez explicitly told Defendant Cleary in an internal message that FloatMe needed to abandon plans to give a $50 cash advance at enrollment, citing “cash constraints.” The advertising was not updated to reflect this decision.
• Scope of the deception: FloatMe never disclosed the $20 enrollment cap in its ads, website homepage, app store listings, or during enrollment. The first time a consumer learned about it was after signing up, connecting their bank account, and agreeing to the monthly fee.
• Scale of the gap between promise and reality: In the most recent quarter referenced in the FTC complaint, less than 5% of paying subscribers received a Float greater than $20. Only one half of one percent received the advertised $50.
• The “automatic increase” lie: FloatMe told subscribers their limit would rise automatically through “the Float system” or an “algorithm.” A FloatMe supervisor explicitly described these statements to consumers as “a lie” in an internal communication. A separate internal document admitted that even though FloatMe’s “official stance is that support can’t increase float limits,” support does increase limits for some users who ask. The company said one thing publicly and did another privately.
• The hidden criteria for manual increases: Increases were granted only if a subscriber had been paying for at least five months, had made nine consecutive on-time repayments, and had averaged at least $600 across their last three paychecks. FloatMe’s director of operations told agents to deny increases for newly joined users “even if they have a ton of income.” None of these criteria were disclosed to consumers.
• FloatMe’s partial retreat: After learning of the FTC investigation, FloatMe removed the specific “up to $50” language from its website. It continued promoting “up to $50” inside the app without interruption.

Disabled, Veteran, and Working-Class: You Can Pay, But You Can’t Float

FloatMe’s discrimination against public-assistance recipients is not just a civil wrong. It is a federal crime under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which explicitly prohibits credit discrimination on the basis that income derives from public assistance. FloatMe knew this policy existed, buried it in an FAQ page, and kept charging affected users anyway.

• Who was blocked: Consumers whose income derived entirely or partially from Social Security retirement benefits, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), military benefits, unemployment benefits, gig work, commissioned work, tipped work, and pensions were categorically disqualified from receiving any cash advance. FloatMe did not count this income at all when assessing eligibility.
• Scale: Internal FloatMe records show “tens of thousands” of paying consumers were blocked from ever requesting a cash advance due to this policy. They were enrolled, charged monthly fees, and told nothing about their ineligibility until after they tried to use the service they paid for.
• Where the policy was hidden: FloatMe’s blanket exclusion of public-assistance income was not mentioned in its advertisements, its website homepage, its app store listings, or anywhere in the enrollment process. It was placed in the FAQ section of the website, which consumers are not required to visit to sign up.
• The ECOA violation: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(2), forbids a creditor from discriminating against an applicant “because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program.” FloatMe denied advances and charged fees to this exact population. The FTC charged this as Count VIII of the complaint.
• No countervailing benefit: The FTC specifically noted that “charging consumers a membership fee to obtain cash advances while categorically prohibiting them from receiving cash advances based on a policy of excluding public assistance income has no countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.”

The Door That Was Built to Stay Shut: FloatMe’s Cancellation Trap

FloatMe’s cancellation system was not broken. It was built this way. Co-founder Joshua Sanchez said so in writing. The three paths offered to consumers were each separately designed to fail.

• The original process: When FloatMe launched, cancellation required emailing customer support. In 2020, Defendant Cleary acknowledged internally that FloatMe had only “2 people actively handling customer support” for a platform of 40,000 users who could only cancel through that same support team. Delays were structurally guaranteed.
• The strategy: Sanchez documented that FloatMe “maintained strong user retention by only allowing cancellation via support tickets.” When two additional cancellation paths were introduced, he described them as “more automated” but confirmed they would “still feature some friction.” He stated directly that the new processes “make it difficult for someone to quit.”
• In-app cancellation path: The cancel button in the app routinely did not work. Consumers reported the path as “faulty” for years. Chronic technical issues prevented cancellation from completing. FloatMe was aware of these complaints and did not fix them.
• Webform path: After submitting the webform, consumers received a message saying their request was being “automatically processed.” In reality, FloatMe silently rejected the request if the consumer had an outstanding cash advance balance, or if their email address did not match FloatMe’s records exactly, including capitalization. No rejection notice was sent. FloatMe continued debiting the account. In January 2022, a FloatMe employee wrote that the webform was causing consumers “to get charged for months without knowing.”
• Customer support path: In nearly every case, support agents did not process the cancellation request. They deployed a prewritten script FloatMe internally called the “Cancel Prevention macro,” which asked users to describe their problems with the app. Other agents told users to try the webform instead, even when the user had already explained they contacted support because the webform or in-app path had failed.
• Post-cancellation charges: FloatMe charged consumers after confirmed cancellations. One consumer received confirmation responses to three separate cancellation emails and was still billed monthly. Multiple consumers reported their memberships appearing to “reactivate” after cancellation, generating new charges with no new consent from the user.

In Their Own Words: The Internal Communications FloatMe Didn’t Want You to See

The following quotes come directly from the FTC complaint, sourced from FloatMe’s own internal records, communications between its founders, and communications between its supervisors and employees. These are not accusations. They are admissions.

“Float Limits are set automatically by the Float system” and “Float limits cannot normally be changed by our support team.”
— FloatMe customer support scripted response to users asking why their advance limit hadn’t increased

• This statement is directly contradicted by FloatMe’s own internal documents. Increases were manual, required an explicit request, and were governed by strict hidden criteria. The company used automation language to deflect consumer complaints about a policy it chose to keep secret.
• A FloatMe supervisor described these statements to consumers as “a lie” in a separate internal communication cited by the FTC in the same complaint.

“The issue was us running two instances while fundraising, while pushing out to members without fixing shit.”
— Co-founder Ryan Cleary, internal communication, on why consumers were being double- and triple-charged

• Cleary admitted directly that double-billing consumers was a known consequence of prioritizing fundraising over operational accuracy. He and Sanchez were aware of the problem and continued the practice.
• This establishes that the unauthorized billing was not a bug discovered after the fact. The founders were informed, acknowledged the harm, and chose not to fix it while they pursued investor capital.

“I could tell no one cared to solve the issue… I got the sense no one thinks it’s a big deal… because it’s $2.”
— FloatMe supervisor, internal communication, on being unable to get billing issues resolved internally

• This quote documents leadership’s decision to tolerate systematic unauthorized billing because the per-charge amount was small. The company’s internal culture treated the theft of $2 per consumer as inconsequential, even as the same supervisor later documented that the “#1 complaint from consumers is being charged so many times.”
• The logic of “it’s only $2” collapses when multiplied across tens of thousands of consumers and months of unauthorized charges. The FTC is pursuing full monetary relief.

“[FloatMe] maintained strong user retention by only allowing cancellation via support tickets… [the new processes are] more automated [but] still feature some friction… [they] of course make[] it difficult for [consumers] to quit.”
— Co-founder Joshua Sanchez, internal documents, describing the cancellation system design

• Sanchez explicitly framed a broken cancellation process as a feature of user retention strategy, not a technical problem. He described “friction” as intentional design, not failure.
• This is direct evidence that the dark patterns used against consumers seeking to cancel were planned at the co-founder level. It negates any defense that the cancellation failures were accidental or undiscovered.
• The FTC charges this conduct under Count VII of the complaint as a violation of ROSCA’s requirement to provide “simple mechanisms for stopping recurring charges,” 15 U.S.C. § 8403.

“One of the biggest issues I’ve seen [is that the webform cancellation process causes consumers] to get charged for months without knowing.”
— FloatMe employee, January 2022 internal communication

• This communication dates to January 2022, meaning FloatMe had documentation of ongoing consumer harm from its webform cancellation process at least two years before the FTC complaint was filed in December 2023.
• The harm was internally identified, reported up the chain, and not remediated. This undermines any claim that the company lacked awareness or opportunity to correct the problem.

Who Got Hurt and How: The Population FloatMe Targeted

Public Health

FloatMe marketed specifically to people in financial crisis, then extracted money from them through deception. The harms documented in the complaint are concentrated in populations with limited financial safety nets and high vulnerability to predatory practices.

• FloatMe explicitly targeted consumers living “paycheck to paycheck” in its advertising. These consumers were already in states of financial stress, and the product they were sold deepened that stress rather than relieving it.
• People on Social Security Disability Insurance were enrolled, charged monthly fees, and then denied the product they paid for on the grounds that SSDI is not valid income. The intersection of disability, fixed income, and predatory financial products is a documented driver of long-term financial destabilization.
• The $4 instant-transfer fee represents a 20% effective charge on the average $20 advance. For consumers in genuine emergencies, this fee structure trapped them: pay the fee or wait three days for money they needed immediately. Neither option was disclosed before enrollment.
• Veterans and military benefit recipients faced the same categorical exclusion as disability recipients. The FTC complaint documents that military income was among the excluded public-assistance categories, meaning service members living paycheck to paycheck were enrolled, charged, and denied service.
• Consumers who tried to cancel and failed continued to have money debited from bank accounts that were already under stress. Several complained that unauthorized post-cancellation charges pushed their accounts negative, generating overdraft fees on top of FloatMe’s unauthorized withdrawals.

Economic Inequality

FloatMe’s entire business model functioned as a transfer of money from the financially vulnerable to the company’s founders and investors, with the most systematic harm falling on the people with the least recourse.

• The company charged a $1.99 monthly fee for a service that, for tens of thousands of consumers, was structurally inaccessible from the moment they enrolled. This is not a fee for limited service. It is a fee for no service, collected under false pretenses.
• The gap between the advertised advance ($50) and the actual advance ($20) is not a minor discrepancy. It is a 60% reduction in value. For someone who enrolled specifically because they needed $50 for a bill or emergency, receiving $20 meant the product failed its only purpose.
• FloatMe’s cancellation traps compounded economic harm over time. Consumers who submitted multiple cancellation requests over several months and continued to be charged lost anywhere from $4 to $18 per month (at $1.99 to $4.99 depending on membership tier) in fees for a service they had affirmatively tried to leave.
• The “automatic increase” lie was designed to retain subscribers by giving them a reason to keep paying. Someone waiting for their advance limit to hit $50 would continue paying $1.99/month indefinitely. Less than 5% ever received more than $20. The promise functioned as a retention mechanism, not a feature.
• Gig workers, whose income is structurally excluded from FloatMe’s eligibility model, represent one of the fastest-growing segments of the low-wage workforce. By excluding gig income entirely, FloatMe blocked an entire class of working people from a service it marketed directly at them, while still charging them for the membership.
• The double- and triple-billing practices, documented from FloatMe’s earliest days and persisting for years, extracted additional unauthorized funds from the same population already facing the fee-for-no-service and the hidden instant-delivery charge. The cumulative harm per consumer, while small per individual charge, was sustained and systemic.

What the Numbers Mean in Plain English

From Launch to Lawsuit: How Long FloatMe Ran These Practices

Who Is Named, Who Is Liable, and Who Has Power to Change This

Eight Federal Charges: What Each One Means for Consumers

The FTC filed eight separate counts against FloatMe, Sanchez, and Cleary. Each count corresponds to a specific documented harm.

• Count I — Deceptive Claims Regarding Cash Advances (FTC Act § 5(a)): FloatMe falsely claimed consumers could receive cash advances up to $50. The representation was false. No consumer could receive $50 at enrollment, and fewer than 5% ever did.
• Count II — Deceptive Claims Regarding Instant Cash Advances (FTC Act § 5(a)): FloatMe falsely claimed instant delivery was free and included in the subscription. In reality, instant delivery required a hidden $4 fee disclosed only after enrollment.
• Count III — Unfair Discrimination (FTC Act § 5(a), (n)): FloatMe charged subscription fees to consumers it had categorically disqualified from accessing advances due to their income source, causing substantial harm consumers could not reasonably avoid.
• Count IV — Unfair Charges Without Consent (FTC Act § 5(a), (n)): FloatMe double-, triple-, and post-cancellation-billed consumers without authorization. These charges caused harm consumers could not avoid and had no countervailing benefit.
• Count V — Failure to Disclose Material Terms (ROSCA § 4): FloatMe failed to clearly and conspicuously disclose before collecting billing information that most consumers could not access the advertised advance, and that instant delivery required an additional fee.
• Count VI — Failure to Obtain Express Informed Consent (ROSCA § 4): FloatMe charged consumers through a negative option subscription without first obtaining their express informed consent for those charges, because material terms were concealed.
• Count VII — Failure to Provide Simple Cancellation Mechanism (ROSCA § 4): FloatMe deliberately built cancellation paths with friction, silent rejections, scripts to prevent cancellations, and chronic technical failures, rather than the “simple mechanism” required by federal law.
• Count VIII — Discriminatory Financing Practices (ECOA § 701(a)(2), Regulation B): FloatMe refused to provide cash advances to consumers whose income derived from public assistance programs, in direct violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s explicit prohibition on this form of discrimination.

What to Do If You Were Harmed — and How to Make Sure This Doesn’t Keep Happening

The individuals named in this complaint held decision-making power over every practice described in this investigation. If you were a FloatMe subscriber, you have documented standing to file a complaint with the agencies below.

Named Defendants

• Joshua Sanchez — Co-Founder, Officer, Board Member, FloatMe Corp., San Antonio, TX. Directly reviewed and approved cancellation practices, advertising claims, and cash advance limit policies.
• Ryan Cleary — Co-Founder, Former Officer and Board Member, FloatMe Corp. Directly reviewed and approved cancellation practices, advertising claims, and cash advance limit policies. Based in Cleveland, OH.
• FloatMe Corp. — 110 E Houston St., San Antonio, TX 78205-2991.

Watchlist: Regulatory Bodies

• Federal Trade Commission (FTC) — The agency filing this case. File a consumer complaint at ReportFraud.ftc.gov. Your complaint contributes to the evidentiary record in ongoing enforcement actions.
• Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) — The CFPB enforces fair lending and credit product regulations. File a complaint at ConsumerFinance.gov/complaint if you were denied credit or charged unauthorized fees by a fintech app.
• Texas Office of the Attorney General — FloatMe is headquartered in San Antonio. State AGs have independent authority to pursue consumer protection violations. Complaints can be filed at texasattorneygeneral.gov.
• Apple App Store / Google Play — Both platforms have policies against apps that misrepresent their features or billing. Report FloatMe’s app listing through the platform’s review flag mechanism. Enough reports can trigger a listing review or removal.

Concrete Steps and Mutual Aid

• If you were charged after cancellation: File a dispute directly with your bank or credit union under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. You have the right to dispute unauthorized electronic debits and receive a refund. Do not accept “we can’t help with that” from your bank. Escalate to a supervisor.
• Document everything: Screenshot your subscription charge history, any cancellation confirmation emails, and any response from FloatMe support. This documentation is essential for FTC complaint filings and bank disputes.
• Share this with people who are in the same position: FloatMe targeted paycheck-to-paycheck workers, disabled people, veterans, and gig workers. These communities overlap with mutual aid networks. If you’re in one, bring this information. People who were harmed may not know they have options.
• If you receive public assistance and were denied a FloatMe advance while being charged fees: The ECOA violation in this case is specifically about you. Your experience is the evidentiary core of Count VIII. Filing with both the FTC and CFPB strengthens the federal record.
• Push your state legislature: ROSCA requires a “simple cancellation mechanism” but enforcement depends on the FTC having resources to pursue cases. State-level dark pattern legislation — which several states are currently considering — creates additional enforcement pathways. Contact your state representative and cite this case by name: FTC v. FloatMe Corp.
• For gig workers specifically: FloatMe’s exclusion of gig income from its eligibility model is a documented pattern in fintech. Worker centers and gig economy advocacy organizations are actively building legal challenges to this class of discrimination. Find your local worker center through the National Day Laborer Organizing Network or the Gig Workers Collective.