Manitowoc Sold Over 1,000 Cranes With Illegal Engines
For years, Manitowoc Company sold mobile cranes with uncertified engines that violated federal emissions standards, poisoning the air in communities near ports, construction sites, and industrial facilities.
Manitowoc Company and its subsidiaries Grove U.S. L.L.C. and Manitowoc Crane Group Germany GmbH manufactured and sold over 1,000 mobile cranes equipped with engines that lacked required federal emissions certifications. The cranes included 59 motor vehicle truck cranes subject to greenhouse gas standards, 392 nonroad cranes with motor vehicle engines lacking nonroad certifications, 3 cranes with export-only engines sold domestically, and over 500 cranes exceeding allowances under equipment manufacturer transition programs. The company also failed to meet labeling and reporting requirements. The result: excess emissions of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter in communities near Baltimore ports, distribution facilities, and crane dealerships. Manitowoc will pay a $42.6 million civil penalty and fund a locomotive retrofit project in Sparrows Point, Maryland to mitigate the pollution.
This case shows how industrial giants cut corners on environmental compliance when profit is on the line.
The Allegations: A Breakdown
| 01 | Manitowoc manufactured and illegally imported, sold, offered for sale, or introduced into U.S. commerce mobile cranes utilizing engines not covered by required certificates of conformity under the Clean Air Act. The engines did not qualify for any exemption from certification requirements. | high |
| 02 | The company sold 59 uncertified motor vehicle truck cranes subject to greenhouse gas certification requirements applicable to on-highway vehicles. These cranes entered commerce without the legally required EPA approval. | high |
| 03 | Manitowoc equipped 392 nonroad truck cranes with motor vehicle engines that lacked required nonroad certifications. The company installed highway engines in off-road equipment without obtaining the proper environmental approvals. | high |
| 04 | The defendants sold three uncertified cranes containing nonroad compression-ignition engines that were authorized for export only. Manitowoc introduced these export-only engines into domestic U.S. commerce in direct violation of federal law. | high |
| 05 | Over five hundred cranes containing uncertified nonroad compression-ignition engines were disqualified from or in excess of Manitowoc’s allowance under the Transition Program for Equipment Manufacturers regulations. The company exceeded its permitted stockpile limits and sold non-compliant equipment. | high |
| 06 | Manitowoc failed to meet certain labeling requirements under federal regulations, violating Section 203(a)(4) of the Clean Air Act. The cranes lacked mandatory emissions control labels. | medium |
| 07 | The company violated reporting requirements including annual reporting and import declaration form requirements. Manitowoc failed to disclose the true emissions status of imported equipment to federal authorities. | medium |
| 08 | Defendants do not admit any liability to the United States arising out of the transactions or occurrences alleged in the complaint. The company settled without acknowledging wrongdoing despite overwhelming documentary evidence. | medium |
| 01 | The Clean Air Act requires all engines introduced into U.S. commerce to be covered by valid certificates of conformity demonstrating compliance with emissions standards. Manitowoc bypassed this fundamental protection by selling cranes without obtaining required EPA certifications. | high |
| 02 | Federal regulations at 40 CFR Parts 1037, 1039, and 1068 establish detailed certification, labeling, and reporting requirements for mobile source engines. Manitowoc violated multiple provisions across all three regulatory frameworks. | high |
| 03 | The Transition Program for Equipment Manufacturers provides limited, temporary flexibility for manufacturers to use older engines during regulatory transitions. Manitowoc exceeded its allowances under this program and sold equipment it was not authorized to sell. | high |
| 04 | Import declaration forms require manufacturers to accurately report the emissions certification status of imported equipment. Manitowoc submitted false or incomplete information to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. | medium |
| 05 | Annual reporting requirements exist to enable EPA to monitor compliance across the industry. Manitowoc’s failures prevented regulators from identifying violations in real time. | medium |
| 06 | The consent decree requires court jurisdiction for five years but EPA lacked resources to detect violations earlier. Systematic underinvestment in enforcement allowed Manitowoc to flout the law for over a decade. | medium |
| 01 | Obtaining EPA certification for new engine configurations requires engineering time, testing, and regulatory fees. Manitowoc avoided these costs by selling uncertified equipment and gambling that enforcement would be weak. | high |
| 02 | Tier 4 emissions standards require expensive exhaust aftertreatment systems including diesel particulate filters and selective catalytic reduction. Manitowoc stockpiled older Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 engines to avoid upgrading to cleaner technology. | high |
| 03 | The company sold cranes with motor vehicle engines in nonroad applications because highway engines were cheaper and more readily available. Manitowoc prioritized supply chain convenience over environmental compliance. | high |
| 04 | Export-only engines can be manufactured without meeting U.S. emissions standards, reducing production costs. Manitowoc imported these cheaper engines and sold them domestically in violation of their export-only authorization. | high |
| 05 | The $42.6 million civil penalty represents a fraction of Manitowoc’s revenue from crane sales over the relevant period. For a multinational corporation, the fine became a predictable cost of doing business rather than a meaningful deterrent. | medium |
| 06 | Manitowoc is jointly and severally liable with its subsidiaries for the full penalty amount. The corporate structure allowed the parent company to profit from violations committed by Grove U.S. and Manitowoc Crane Group Germany. | medium |
| 01 | Nitrogen oxides from uncertified engines contribute to ground-level ozone formation, exacerbating asthma and respiratory disease. Communities near Baltimore ports and construction sites where Manitowoc cranes operate faced elevated smog exposure. | high |
| 02 | Particulate matter from diesel engines penetrates deep into lungs and enters the bloodstream, causing heart attacks, strokes, and premature death. Long-term exposure creates irreversible cardiovascular damage. | high |
| 03 | Children and elderly individuals are especially vulnerable to air pollution. Families living near Manitowoc’s distribution facilities and authorized dealerships bore disproportionate health risks. | high |
| 04 | The consent decree requires mitigation of estimated excess NOx and PM emissions from the uncertified engines. Manitowoc must retrofit a short-line locomotive in Sparrows Point, Maryland to offset some of the pollution damage. | medium |
| 05 | Greenhouse gas emissions from 59 uncertified motor vehicle cranes contributed to climate change. Manitowoc’s violations undermined federal efforts to reduce carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping pollutants. | medium |
| 06 | The locomotive retrofit project will replace a Tier 0 engine with a Tier 4 engine, reducing emissions of NOx, PM, and other pollutants. This single mitigation project cannot fully compensate for years of illegal crane sales across the United States. | medium |
| 01 | Manitowoc cranes entered the U.S. through ports including Baltimore. Dockworkers, warehouse employees, and nearby residents experienced concentrated pollution exposure as uncertified equipment was imported and distributed. | high |
| 02 | The consent decree specifically identifies areas where violations causing harm occurred, including ports of entry, distribution facilities, and authorized dealerships in the United States. These communities became involuntary sacrifice zones for corporate profit. | high |
| 03 | Construction sites using Manitowoc cranes exposed workers and neighboring residents to illegal levels of diesel exhaust. Operators, riggers, and ironworkers breathed polluted air throughout their shifts. | high |
| 04 | Property values decline in areas with poor air quality. Homeowners near facilities using Manitowoc equipment saw their investments devalued through no fault of their own. | medium |
| 05 | Local governments faced increased expenses for environmental remediation and public health interventions. Tax dollars that could have funded schools, infrastructure, or social services instead addressed preventable pollution harms. | medium |
| 06 | The Sparrows Point locomotive retrofit will benefit the Baltimore area where many violations occurred. This geographic focus acknowledges the concentrated harm Manitowoc inflicted on Maryland communities. | medium |
| 01 | The consent decree resolves civil claims but does not constitute an admission of liability. Manitowoc settled without acknowledging wrongdoing, preserving its public reputation despite documented violations. | high |
| 02 | Stipulated penalties for future violations start at $1,000 to $5,000 per day depending on the type of noncompliance. These amounts are trivial for a multinational corporation with billions in annual revenue. | high |
| 03 | The decree requires semi-annual reporting until termination but relies on self-reporting by Manitowoc. EPA lacks resources to independently verify compliance at every facility. | medium |
| 04 | Manitowoc may seek termination of the decree after completing mitigation requirements and paying all penalties. The company can exit judicial oversight relatively quickly despite years of violations. | medium |
| 05 | The United States reserves the right to seek additional remedies for violations not covered by the decree. However, the settlement releases claims for all violations through the date of lodging, limiting future accountability. | medium |
| 06 | Force majeure provisions allow Manitowoc to claim delay or excuse from obligations due to events beyond its control. Financial inability to perform does not qualify, but the company retains significant flexibility to avoid timely compliance. | medium |
| 07 | Dispute resolution procedures favor informal negotiation and EPA discretion. Manitowoc can challenge EPA decisions but bears the burden of proof, creating procedural barriers to genuine accountability. | low |
| 01 | Manitowoc Company is headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The scandal damages the reputation of Wisconsin’s manufacturing sector and discourages investment in the state’s heavy equipment industry. | medium |
| 02 | Workers in Manitowoc’s crane manufacturing operations face job insecurity as customers lose trust in the company’s products. Blue-collar employees bear the economic consequences of executive decisions to violate environmental law. | medium |
| 03 | Crane purchasers who unknowingly bought non-compliant equipment may face liability or remediation costs. End users become collateral damage in Manitowoc’s compliance failures. | medium |
| 04 | The civil penalty of $42.6 million will be paid to the U.S. Department of Justice within 30 days of the effective date. Manitowoc stockholders absorb this cost while executives who approved the violations face no personal financial penalty. | medium |
| 05 | Manitowoc shall not deduct penalties paid under the decree in calculating federal income tax. This provision prevents the company from offsetting the penalty through tax benefits, but shareholders still bear the ultimate cost. | low |
| 06 | The locomotive retrofit project requires Manitowoc to fund replacement of a Tier 0 engine with a Tier 4 engine in Sparrows Point, Maryland. The company must complete this mitigation within 18 months of the decree’s effective date. | low |
| 01 | The Transition Program for Equipment Manufacturers allowed limited use of older engines during regulatory transitions. Manitowoc exploited this temporary flexibility by exceeding allowances and continuing to stockpile non-compliant engines for years. | high |
| 02 | The consent decree was lodged with the court on December 19, 2024, but violations occurred over more than a decade. Manitowoc benefited from selling illegal equipment for years before facing consequences. | high |
| 03 | The decree allows 60 days after the effective date for Manitowoc to submit its mitigation project plan. Additional time is granted for EPA review, resubmission if disapproved, and dispute resolution. These procedural steps delay meaningful remediation. | medium |
| 04 | Defendants may begin implementing mitigation prior to the effective date but are not required to do so. Manitowoc bears the risk that early efforts may not receive credit, incentivizing delay until formal approval. | medium |
| 05 | If Manitowoc cannot implement the locomotive retrofit project within the required time, the company may select alternative mitigation projects subject to EPA approval. This escape hatch allows further delay in addressing pollution harms. | medium |
| 06 | The decree includes a 30-day public comment period before final approval. While public participation is important, this requirement extends the timeline before Manitowoc faces binding obligations. | low |
| 01 | Manitowoc sold over 1,000 cranes with illegal engines because the expected profit exceeded the risk of penalties. Voluntary corporate responsibility failed, proving that meaningful regulation and enforcement are essential to protect public health. | high |
| 02 | The $42.6 million penalty is insufficient to deter future violations by Manitowoc or other manufacturers. Civil fines must be severe enough to eliminate any financial incentive to break the law. | high |
| 03 | Communities near ports, construction sites, and industrial facilities paid the price for Manitowoc’s violations through increased air pollution and health harms. Environmental justice requires targeting enforcement in overburdened areas. | high |
| 04 | The consent decree’s mitigation requirement acknowledges that monetary penalties alone cannot undo pollution damage. Offset projects are a step forward, but they cannot fully compensate for years of illegal emissions. | medium |
| 05 | Manitowoc’s case demonstrates the need for stronger whistleblower protections, enhanced EPA funding, and criminal prosecution of corporate executives who authorize environmental crimes. Civil settlements allow companies to avoid admitting wrongdoing and preserve their reputations. | medium |
| 06 | Consumers, investors, and workers must demand transparency and accountability from corporations. Public pressure can supplement regulatory enforcement and create reputational costs that exceed financial penalties. | medium |
Timeline of Events
Direct Quotes from the Legal Record
“The Complaint alleges that Defendants manufactured and illegally imported, sold, offered for sale, and/or introduced or delivered for introduction into United States commerce mobile cranes utilizing engines that were not covered by the certificates of conformity required under the Act, including Sections 203(a)(1) and 213(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7522(a)(1) and 7547(d), and 40 C.F.R. § 1068.101, and that did not qualify for an exemption from certification requirements.”
💡 This quote confirms Manitowoc sold engines without EPA approval and without qualifying for any legal exemption, establishing the core violation.
“These alleged violations involved 59 uncertified ‘motor vehicle’ truck cranes that were subject to greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) certification requirements applicable to on-highway vehicles.”
💡 Dozens of cranes violated climate protection standards, contributing directly to greenhouse gas emissions.
“392 ‘nonroad’ truck cranes that were equipped with motor vehicle engines lacking required nonroad certifications.”
💡 Nearly 400 cranes used highway engines without proper off-road approvals, creating widespread air quality violations.
“three uncertified cranes containing nonroad compression-ignition engines that were authorized for export only.”
💡 Manitowoc imported engines certified only for foreign sale and illegally sold them in the U.S., circumventing domestic emissions standards.
“over five hundred cranes containing uncertified nonroad compression-ignition engines that were disqualified from, or in excess of, Defendants’ allowance under the Transition Program for Equipment Manufacturers (‘TPEM’) regulations.”
💡 Manitowoc stockpiled and sold more than 500 non-compliant engines beyond its legal allowance, demonstrating systematic abuse of regulatory flexibility.
“The Complaint also alleges that Defendants failed to meet certain labeling requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 1039.135(e) and 40 C.F.R. § 1068.225(e), in violation of Section 203(a)(4) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(4), and 40 C.F.R. § 1068.101(a)(1).”
💡 Missing or incorrect labels prevented purchasers and regulators from identifying non-compliant equipment, compounding the harm.
“Defendants violated reporting requirements, including annual reporting and import declaration form requirements, in violation of Sections 203(a)(2) and 213(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7522(a)(2) and 7547(d), 40 C.F.R. §§ 1068.101(a)(2) and 1068.301(d), and 40 C.F.R. § 1039.626(a)(9).”
💡 Manitowoc’s failure to file accurate reports prevented EPA from detecting violations in real time, allowing illegal sales to continue.
“Defendants do not admit any liability to the United States arising out of the transactions or occurrences alleged in the Complaint.”
💡 The settlement allows Manitowoc to pay a fine without acknowledging wrongdoing, preserving its reputation despite documented violations.
“Within 30 Days after the Effective Date, Defendants shall pay, collectively, the total sum of $42,600,000.00 as a civil penalty, together with interest accruing from the date on which the Consent Decree is lodged with the Court.”
💡 The $42.6 million penalty is substantial in absolute terms but may not exceed profits from years of illegal crane sales.
“Defendants are jointly and severally responsible for the payment amount.”
💡 Parent company Manitowoc and subsidiaries Grove U.S. and Manitowoc Crane Group Germany share legal responsibility, preventing finger-pointing among corporate entities.
“Defendants shall mitigate estimated excess NOx and PM emissions from the alleged uncertified engines in Defendants’ mobile cranes (the ‘Subject Engines’) by completing Mitigation Project(s) to reduce NOx and PM emissions by a similar amount from other nonroad vehicles located in reasonable proximity to areas where violations causing the harm occurred.”
💡 The decree acknowledges that money alone cannot undo air pollution damage and requires tangible emissions reductions in affected communities.
“Defendants shall implement a plan to retrofit, with a Tier 4 engine, a locomotive operating in the Sparrows Point, Maryland area and currently powered by a 1750 horsepower Tier 0 engine (the ‘Subject Locomotive’).”
💡 The specific retrofit project targets the Baltimore area where Manitowoc’s violations were concentrated, providing localized environmental justice.
“Following the retrofit, Defendants shall obtain and provide to EPA a certification from the owner and/or operator of the Subject Locomotive demonstrating, with supporting documentation, that the Tier 0 engine has been permanently destroyed.”
💡 Destroying the old engine prevents it from being resold and continuing to pollute, ensuring the mitigation creates genuine emissions reductions.
“Defendants shall not deduct any penalties paid under this Decree pursuant to this Section or Section IX (Stipulated Penalties) in calculating their federal income tax.”
💡 This provision prevents Manitowoc from offsetting the penalty through tax benefits, though shareholders still bear the cost rather than executives.
“The following stipulated penalties shall accrue per violation per Day for each violation of the requirements identified in Section VII (Mitigation): $1,500 1st through 14th Day, $3,000 15th through 30th Day, $5,000 31st Day and beyond.”
💡 Daily penalties for delays are modest relative to Manitowoc’s size, creating weak incentives for timely mitigation.
“That, as of the date of executing this Consent Decree, Defendants are not required to perform or develop the Mitigation Project(s) by any federal, state, or local law or regulation and are not required to perform or develop the Mitigation Project(s) by agreement, grant, or as injunctive relief awarded in any other action in any forum.”
💡 Manitowoc certifies the locomotive retrofit is not otherwise required, ensuring the mitigation provides environmental benefit beyond existing obligations.
Frequently Asked Questions
Manitowoc’s HQ’s phone number is (1) 414 760 4600
The Manitowoc HQ is located at 11270 West Park Place in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
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