A company with the words “Clean Earth” in its name let toxic waste containing lead, cadmium, and chromium leak onto a gravel lot in a Kentucky community…. and then brazenly kept an emergency response plan so outdated it listed an employee who had already quit.
The Setup: A “Clean” Name Covering a Dirty Operation
AES Asset Acquisition Corporation operates in Calvert City, Kentucky under the trade name Clean Earth of Calvert City. The company holds a permit from the Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection, issued January 5, 2020, authorizing it to treat and store hazardous waste from outside facilities. In plain terms: other companies pay Clean Earth to take their toxic garbage and handle it safely. That is the entire business model.
On November 29 and 30, 2022, EPA Region 4 and the Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection conducted a compliance inspection at the facility. What they found reads like a checklist of everything a hazardous waste handler is legally required to do — systematically not done. The inspection report was emailed to Clean Earth on February 10, 2023.
The waste involved is serious. The document repeatedly references EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers D001 through D010 — materials classified as hazardous because they are ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic. D005 is barium. D006 is cadmium. D007 is chromium. D008 is lead. D010 is selenium. These are the heavy metals that don’t break down, accumulate in human tissue, and cause everything from kidney failure to cancer to developmental damage in children.
They Were Overflowing Before Anyone Even Showed Up
The permit caps Clean Earth’s container storage capacity at 322,520 gallons. Inspectors found 401,520 gallons of hazardous waste on-site. That is an overage of 79,000 gallons — more than enough to fill a regulation Olympic swimming pool by a wide margin. The excess waste was found sitting outside the permitted storage buildings, on gravel and paved areas, next to non-hazardous waste tanks where it had no business being.
Twelve individual containers were found stored outside the permitted container storage areas surrounding Buildings 2 and 3. More containers of consolidated liquid hazardous waste sat in the parking area. Additional containers were staged beside tanks not approved for hazardous materials. This was not a single misplaced drum — it was systematic overflow throughout the entire facility.
Permitted Storage Capacity vs. Actual Waste on Site (Gallons)
The Full Catalog of Failures: Nothing Was Done Right
The EPA did not find one or two problems. Inspectors documented violations spanning every major category of the facility’s permit obligations. The breadth of the non-compliance suggests these were operational norms, not isolated accidents.
Open Containers. Leaking Waste. Gravel Lots.
Inspectors found one roll-off container storing hazardous waste outside in the central accumulation area covered by a ripped tarp — meaning it was effectively open to the environment. Hazardous waste containing lead, cadmium, chromium, barium, and selenium had already leaked from at least one roll-off container onto the gravel area outside the building. This was documented. No cleanup had occurred.
Seven separate roll-off containers stored hazardous waste with no accumulation start date marked. One container was stored without any label at all — not even the words “Hazardous Waste.” The containers were packed so tightly together that there was insufficient aisle space for emergency personnel or fire equipment to move through them in an emergency situation. If something had ignited, first responders would have faced an obstacle course of unlabeled toxic material.
The Container Conditions Were Genuinely Dangerous
In Building 2, inspectors found a container holding hazardous waste that was severely dented. The permit explicitly requires the company to transfer waste from damaged containers immediately. It had not done so. Another stack of containers was visibly leaning — a toppling stack of hazardous waste containers in an enclosed building. A third container had corrosive waste covering its exterior, not properly contained, in direct violation of the permit’s requirement to minimize the possibility of any unplanned release.
The secondary containment system for the Tank Farm — the physical barrier designed to catch any spill from the six large storage tanks — was found without the required impervious coating. The coating exists specifically to prevent hazardous waste from seeping through concrete into the soil and groundwater. Without it, the containment system does not contain.
The Company Skipped Inspections on Weekends and Holidays
The permit requires daily inspections of the Tank Farm. Inspectors determined Clean Earth was not conducting inspections on weekends and holidays. The inspection logs that did exist were missing the time of inspection, the inspector’s name, their signature, and their initials. The logs were, in functional terms, useless for regulatory purposes.
Two incoming shipments of hazardous waste — documented with specific manifest numbers — had sat at the facility without being unloaded into the permitted storage areas. Container UHWM 014043969JJK was received November 4, 2022. Container UHWM 014048998JJK was received November 15, 2022. The permit requires unloading within 24 hours. Neither had been moved.
Violation Count by Category (From EPA Inspection)
The Emergency Plan Nobody Knew About and Nobody Could Use
Every facility handling hazardous waste at this scale is required by federal law to maintain a Contingency Plan — a document that tells first responders what chemicals are on-site, where the emergency equipment is, who to call, and how to respond to a fire, explosion, or toxic release. Clean Earth’s Contingency Plan was, in multiple documented ways, non-functional.
They Listed a Ghost as Emergency Coordinator
The plan still listed an employee who no longer worked for the company as the emergency coordinator, complete with their contact information. If Calvert City firefighters had responded to a tank fire at 1689 Shar Cal Road and called that number, they would have reached someone with no authority, no knowledge of current site conditions, and no ability to help them. This is not a clerical oversight — this is the kind of failure that gets people killed.
The plan was also missing a complete list of all emergency equipment locations, physical descriptions, and capabilities. The company had acquired both a fire truck and an emergency response truck at some point after the plan was last updated — and neither vehicle appeared anywhere in the plan. Emergency responders would not have known these assets existed. The company had also never added procedures for responding to tank spills and leakage.
Local Emergency Services Had Never Received a Copy
Federal regulations and the facility’s own permit required Clean Earth to submit a copy of its Contingency Plan to the local police department, fire department, hospital, state and local emergency response teams, and the Local Emergency Planning Committee. Inspectors determined that none of these entities had received a copy. The local fire department did not know what was inside this facility. The hospital had no advance information about what toxic exposures to prepare for. The emergency planning committee had nothing.
This is the structural betrayal at the core of hazardous waste regulation: communities near these facilities are supposed to be protected by layers of planning and disclosure. Clean Earth stripped those layers away through inaction. The people of Calvert City had no idea what was sitting on Shar Cal Road, in open containers, on an uncoated lot, with leaking drums, under a ripped tarp.
They Were Importing Hazardous Waste From Mexico Without Federal Clearance
Following the physical inspection, EPA investigators reviewed records of hazardous waste shipments subject to transboundary movement regulations. They discovered that Clean Earth had received and stored 16 separate shipments of hazardous waste from Mexico without listing the required consent number from EPA documentation on the manifests.
This requirement exists because hazardous waste crossing international borders requires explicit federal approval and tracking. Each consent number is tied to specific authorization for that specific waste. Receiving 16 shipments without that documentation means 16 loads of toxic material entered this Kentucky facility with incomplete federal oversight. The EPA had authorized shipments to this facility — but without the consent numbers on the manifests, there was no way to verify each shipment matched its authorization.
The company’s own permit incorporated this requirement under Condition III.E.1. It was not buried in obscure federal law. It was written directly into the terms under which Clean Earth was allowed to operate.
The Non-Financial Ledger: What the Penalty Doesn’t Cover
Calvert City, Kentucky is a small industrial town. It sits in Marshall County, a community that has lived alongside chemical manufacturing facilities for decades. It is home to a major chemical corridor that locals have nicknamed “Chemical Valley.” The people who live here already carry an elevated burden of industrial exposure. They are working-class families who did not choose to live next to hazardous waste facilities — they were there before the facilities arrived, or they stayed because it was home, or they had nowhere else to go.
When a company stores 79,000 gallons of overflow hazardous waste on an uncoated gravel lot, in open and leaking containers, without telling local fire or emergency services what chemicals are present, the people absorbing that risk are not shareholders. They are neighbors. They are the people who breathe the air near Shar Cal Road. They are the families whose well water draws from the same aquifer that sits below uncoated containment systems. They did not consent to be the sacrifice zone for Clean Earth’s operational shortcuts.
The hazardous waste found leaking onto that gravel lot carried classifications for lead (D008), cadmium (D006), and chromium (D007). Lead at any level causes irreversible neurological damage in children. Cadmium causes kidney damage and is a known human carcinogen. Chromium — specifically hexavalent chromium — is one of the most potent environmental carcinogens identified. These are not hypothetical risks. They are documented, peer-reviewed, well-understood consequences of exposure. The question is whether that gravel lot absorbed enough of these materials to reach the groundwater — and because Clean Earth did not maintain an impervious coating on its secondary containment, and because it let material leak onto unprotected ground, that question may not have a clean answer for years.
There is a specific cruelty to companies that choose the word “Clean” as their brand identity while operating this way. It is not accidental marketing. It is a signal to regulators, clients, and communities that this company positions itself as a responsible steward. The name “Clean Earth” is a promise. The 401,520 gallons of overflow waste, the leaking containers, the ripped tarp, the unlabeled drums, the outdated emergency plan, and the missing warning signs are what that promise was worth to the people living near 1689 Shar Cal Road.
Legal Receipts: Straight From the Document
Every quote below appears verbatim in the EPA Consent Agreement and Final Order.
“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors observed that hazardous waste (EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers D001, D005, D006, D007, D008, D010) leaked from at least one (1) roll-off container, which was marked with an indication of the hazards of the contents and had a hazardous waste label on it, onto the gravel area outside in the [central accumulation area] adjacent to Building 3.”
— EPA Consent Agreement, Finding of Fact ¶89“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors observed 401,520 gallons of hazardous waste in the [container storage areas] and areas surrounding the [container storage areas] at the Facility, including the hazardous waste identified in Paragraph 96, which exceeded the Respondent’s permitted container storage capacity of 322,520 gallons of waste.”
— EPA Consent Agreement, Finding of Fact ¶97“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors observed that the Facility’s Contingency Plan had not been updated to include the correct emergency coordinator. Inspectors observed that an employee who no longer worked for the Respondent was still listed as the emergency coordinator.”
— EPA Consent Agreement, Finding of Fact ¶91“At the time of the CEI, the inspectors determined that a copy of the Contingency Plan and the [Quick Reference Guide] had not been submitted to the local authorities, which include the police department, fire department, hospital, State and local emergency response teams, and the Local Emergency Planning Committee.”
— EPA Consent Agreement, Finding of Fact ¶93“Following the CEI, the inspectors reviewed the EPA’s notifications of hazardous waste subject to [transboundary movement regulations]. From that review, the inspectors observed that the Respondent received and stored approximately sixteen (16) shipments of hazardous waste from Mexico, a foreign country, without listing the relevant consent number from consent documentation supplied by the EPA to the Facility for each waste listed on the manifest.”
— EPA Consent Agreement, Finding of Fact ¶109“The new secondary containment system will collect and contain releases of hazardous waste and reduce the potential for hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents to reach the soil, ground, or surface waters.”
— EPA Consent Agreement, SEP Description ¶157 (describing what the containment system will do — implicitly confirming it was not doing this before)Societal Impact Mapping
Environmental Degradation
The most direct environmental threat documented in the source material is the combination of leaking containers, an uncoated secondary containment system, and overflow waste stored on gravel. The EPA’s own description of the Supplemental Environmental Project — the infrastructure upgrade Clean Earth agreed to build — confirms what the absence of that system meant: without it, there was nothing reliably preventing hazardous waste constituents from reaching the soil, groundwater, and surface waters near the facility.
The Tank Farm’s secondary containment had no impervious coating. Federal regulations require this coating specifically because hazardous waste can penetrate uncoated surfaces and migrate into the surrounding environment. The facility held six tanks with a combined capacity tied to 15,000 gallons each. Without the coating, any release from those tanks had a direct pathway into the ground beneath them.
The gravel lot where overflow containers sat — including at least one that was actively leaking lead, cadmium, chromium, barium, and selenium-bearing waste — is now the subject of the remediation infrastructure project. The EPA specifically noted that the new concrete containment system would “eliminate the potential for the contamination to the soil, ground, and surface waters.” That language implies those contamination pathways were open before. Gravel does not stop heavy metal leachate. Gravel absorbs it.
Public Health
The specific waste codes documented in this case correspond to some of the most well-studied environmental health hazards in toxicology. Lead (D008) causes irreversible cognitive and neurological harm in children at any detectable blood level. The CDC has stated explicitly that there is no safe level of lead exposure for children. Cadmium (D006) is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer. Chromium (D007) — particularly the hexavalent form — is the chemical at the center of the Hinkley, California water contamination case and carries a documented link to lung cancer and other malignancies.
The failure to notify local police, fire, hospitals, and emergency planning committees of site conditions and chemical inventories created a concrete public health risk. If a fire had occurred at this facility — and the documents note that the facility stored ignitable waste (D001), had inadequate aisle space for fire equipment, and had containers stacked in unstable leaning configurations — first responders would have arrived without knowing what they were dealing with. The hospital treating any burn victims or responders with chemical exposure would have had no advance information about what toxins were involved. That information gap can mean the difference between appropriate treatment and catastrophic mismanagement of an acute exposure.
Calvert City sits within a community already subject to industrial chemical exposure from its regional industrial corridor. The population in this area is not a high-income, politically connected demographic with the resources to pursue independent environmental monitoring or legal action against large waste management corporations. The public health burden of corporate environmental negligence lands hardest on people least equipped to fight back — and Calvert City is exactly that kind of community.
Economic Inequality
The $227,000 penalty ($227,000 — roughly what it costs to send about 15 kids to a state university for a year) levied against Clean Earth is a rounding error for a company operating a permitted hazardous waste treatment and storage facility handling multi-million-gallon volumes of industrial waste. The penalty structure in this agreement essentially prices in the cost of non-compliance as a foreseeable business expense rather than a genuine deterrent. Companies calculating the expected value of corner-cutting can factor in fines like this and still come out ahead.
The $846,014 infrastructure project ($846,014 — roughly the cost of buying 5 median-priced homes in Marshall County, Kentucky) that Clean Earth agreed to build was framed as a “supplemental environmental project.” The company itself certified that this project was not one it had been planning before the EPA enforcement action. This means Clean Earth was running a hazardous waste facility with a gravel staging area — no concrete containment — for years, and only agreed to fix it after federal regulators caught them exceeding their storage limits by 79,000 gallons. The community absorbed the risk of that gravel lot for every day before inspectors arrived.
Communities hosting industrial waste operations are overwhelmingly lower-income and disproportionately communities of color. The economic logic is straightforward: land is cheaper where political power is weaker. The people of Calvert City did not receive a dividend when Clean Earth accepted 16 unauthorized shipments from Mexico or when it processed thousands of gallons of toxic material from off-site generators. They received the risk. The profit went elsewhere.
The “Cost of a Life” Metric
This consent agreement can be found on the EPA’s website: https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/rhc/epaadmin.nsf/Filings/1827CB12F86ECF1E85258CBB0017024A/$File/AESASS~1.PDF
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