They Charged Students for a Scam and Called It Debt Relief
The Non-Financial Ledger: What $7 Million in Stolen Hope Actually Looks Like
Student loan debt is not an abstraction. It is the reason someone is still sharing an apartment at 32. It is the reason a person has not started a business, had a child, moved to a better city, or quit a job that is making them sick. The debt itself is bad enough. But the people who ran Intercontinental Solutions and Express Enrollment went after something specific: the moment when a borrower decided to ask for help.
Think about the precise emotional state of the person who picks up a phone call or fills out an online form asking about student loan relief. They are already behind. They have already done the math and it doesn’t work. They are not naive. They are desperate in a careful, calculated way, the way people get when they’ve been living with a problem long enough to be humiliated by it. They know they need someone to know more than they do. That is the exact vulnerability this operation was designed to exploit.
The scheme charged those people money for services that were misrepresented, framed as affiliations with government programs they had no actual connection to, described by representatives whose titles and expertise were fabricated. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act violation tells you something concrete about the depth of the exploitation: this law exists to prevent companies from using false pretenses to obtain someone’s financial account information. These defendants were not just selling a bad service. They were using lies to extract bank account numbers, routing numbers, FSA IDs, and Social Security numbers from people who thought they were signing up for help. That information, in the wrong hands, is a skeleton key to someone’s entire financial life.
The borrowers who handed over that data were not making a reckless choice. They were making a rational one inside a system deliberately designed to look legitimate. The telemarketing operation called them. A professional-sounding representative explained the program. There were forms, there were enrollment fees, there were promises of reduced payments or lowered balances. The architecture of the scam was indistinguishable, on its surface, from a real service. That is the point. That is the product they actually built.
What the court documents do not contain, because they are legal instruments rather than human ones, is the accounting of what happens next. The student who paid an upfront fee and then watched their loan balance stay exactly the same. The person who stopped making their actual federal loan payments because they believed someone else was handling it. The borrower whose FSA login credentials were in the hands of a company the FTC had to sue into receivership. Each of those outcomes lands on a real person who had less money afterward, and possibly a worse credit record, and no recourse except to try again with the actual federal programs they could have accessed for free.
The judgment figure of $7,403,445 represents consumer injury as a legal calculation. It does not include the compounded interest borrowers accrued while waiting for relief that never came. It does not include the cost of hours spent trying to undo what was done. It does not include the emotional cost of discovering you were targeted precisely because you were struggling.
Legal Receipts: What the Court Documents Actually Say
The following quotes are taken verbatim from the Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Monetary Relief, and Other Relief, Case No. 8:23-CV-01495-SB-JDEx, filed in the United States District Court, Central District of California, entered March 15, 2024.
“The Complaint charges that Defendants participated in deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, multiple provisions of the TSR, and Section 521 of the GLB Act, in connection with Defendants’ marketing and sale of student loan debt relief services.”
- This is the court’s own summary of the charge. Three separate federal laws were violated simultaneously: the FTC Act’s general prohibition on deceptive practices, multiple specific provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a section of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that makes it illegal to use false statements to obtain a consumer’s financial account information.
- The phrase “multiple provisions of the TSR” means this was not a single mistake or one bad call. The Telemarketing Sales Rule has specific rules about advance fees, misrepresentations, and required disclosures. Violating multiple provisions simultaneously indicates a systematic operation, not an isolated incident.
“Judgment in the amount of SEVEN MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND, FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE Dollars ($7,403,445) is entered in favor of the FTC against Settling Defendant, as monetary relief pursuant to Section 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. Β§ 57b, for Settling Defendant’s violations of the TSR and Section 521(a) of the GLB Act.”
- Section 19 of the FTC Act authorizes courts to award monetary relief directly to injured consumers. This $7.4 million figure was stipulated by the parties as representing the consumer injury alleged in the complaint, meaning both the FTC and the defendant agreed on record that this is what the fraud cost people.
- The judgment is entered against Marco Manzi personally. This is not a corporate fine that gets paid from a company checking account and written off as a business expense. It is a personal monetary judgment against an individual human being.
“Robinhood Markets, Inc. shall, within 10 days of receipt of a copy of this Order, liquidate and transfer to the FTC or its designated agent all holdings in the name of Marco Manzi… Upon completion of the asset transfers set forth in Section VII.B of this Order, the remainder of the judgment is suspended.”
- The suspension of the judgment means Manzi pays whatever was in his Robinhood brokerage account and the remaining balance of the $7.4 million is waived, provided he was truthful on his sworn financial disclosures. This is standard FTC practice when a defendant claims inability to pay, but it is worth naming plainly: the students lost $7.4 million collectively, and the person who ran the scheme pays only the amount currently sitting in one investment account.
- Ordering Robinhood directly to liquidate and transfer is significant. The court did not rely on Manzi to voluntarily hand over the funds. The order goes straight to the financial institution, cutting out the possibility of the defendant moving, hiding, or spending the assets before the transfer happens.
“The suspension of the judgment will be lifted as to Settling Defendant if, upon motion by the FTC, the Court finds that Settling Defendant failed to disclose any material asset, materially misstated the value of any asset, or made any other material misstatement or omission in the financial representations identified above.”
- This clause is the enforcement teeth underneath the settlement. If the FTC finds evidence that Manzi hid assets, undervalued assets, or lied anywhere on his sworn financial statements, the full $7,403,445 becomes due immediately, plus interest calculated from the date the order was entered.
- The financial statements in question include sworn disclosures signed by all three individual defendants on August 27, 2023, and sworn corporate financial statements signed September 1, 2023. Five separate sworn documents. Each one is now a potential trigger for full judgment enforcement if any material inaccuracy is found.
“The facts alleged in the Complaint will be taken as true, without further proof, in any subsequent civil litigation by or on behalf of the FTC… The facts alleged in the Complaint establish all elements necessary to sustain an action by the FTC pursuant to Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Β§ 523(a)(2)(A), and this Order will have collateral estoppel effect for such purposes.”
- Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code is the provision that makes debts obtained through fraud non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. By stipulating this clause into the order, the court ensures that Manzi cannot file for bankruptcy and walk away from this judgment. If the suspended balance is ever reinstated, it survives bankruptcy.
- Collateral estoppel means these facts cannot be relitigated. In any future proceeding, Manzi cannot argue that the fraud did not happen or that the consumer injury was not real. The facts are now legally established for all future purposes.
“Disclosing, using, or benefitting from customer information, including the name, address, telephone number, email address, social security number, FSA ID, other identifying information, or any data that enables access to a customer’s account (including a student loan account, credit card, bank account, or other financial account) that any Defendant obtained prior to entry of this Order in connection with the marketing or sale of Secured or Unsecured Debt Relief Products or Services.”
- This clause lists exactly what kind of data the defendants had collected from victims. FSA IDs are the login credentials for the federal student aid portal. Social Security numbers and bank account numbers were also in their possession. The breadth of this list confirms the operation had access to information that could enable identity theft, unauthorized loan modifications, or direct account access well beyond the original fraud.
- The order permanently prohibits any use of this data and requires it to be destroyed within 30 days of a written direction from the FTC. The FTC retains the authority to direct that destruction at the time of their choosing.
Societal Impact Mapping: Who Actually Gets Hurt by This
Public Health
Financial exploitation of people in debt distress creates documented downstream health consequences. The following harms are grounded in the specific conduct described in the court order.
- Student loan debt is already linked in public health research to elevated rates of anxiety, depression, and delayed health-seeking behavior due to cost concerns. Defrauding borrowers who sought relief adds a specific betrayal layer to that baseline stress, the discovery that the help you trusted and paid for was a lie, compounding psychological harm.
- The Gramm-Leach-Bliley violations mean victims’ Social Security numbers, FSA IDs, and bank account credentials were obtained under false pretenses and held by an operation the FTC had to seize by emergency court order. The ongoing uncertainty about whether that data was misused, for how long, and by whom represents a sustained threat to borrowers’ financial safety with no clear endpoint.
- Borrowers who believed the service was actively managing their loans may have stopped engaging with their actual loan servicers, potentially allowing their loans to enter delinquency or default, which carries credit score damage, wage garnishment eligibility, and tax refund interception, all of which directly impact housing access and basic financial stability.
Economic Inequality
Student loan debt relief scams do not target wealthy borrowers. The economic profile of the people harmed here reflects the specific inequality these operations exploit.
- The FTC’s telemarketing charges indicate the scheme used outbound phone calls to reach victims. Telemarketing-based debt relief fraud disproportionately targets borrowers who lack access to professional financial advice, people who cannot afford an attorney or financial planner and rely on whoever calls them with a solution. This is predatory targeting of people already excluded from higher-cost legitimate help.
- The $7,403,445 in total consumer injury was spread across the operation’s full victim pool. The court order’s monetary relief structure is designed to return funds to harmed consumers through an FTC-administered redress fund, but only to the extent the assets recovered are sufficient. The suspended judgment structure means actual student restitution may fall significantly short of the $7.4 million figure, with the gap representing a net transfer of wealth from defrauded borrowers to a defendant who claimed inability to pay.
- The advance fee model, prohibited under the Telemarketing Sales Rule for debt relief services precisely because of its exploitative history, takes money from people before delivering anything. For borrowers already stretched thin, an upfront fee extracted under false pretenses is not an inconvenience. It is a month’s grocery budget, a car payment, a utility bill.
- The permanent bans imposed on Manzi, while an appropriate remedy, do not restore lost funds to victims or undo credit damage. The structural disparity remains: a company collected millions in fees it was never entitled to, and the individual operators move on while borrowers continue to carry the original debt plus the cost of the fraud.
The “Cost of a Life” Metric
What You Were Told vs. What Was Actually Happening
The Prohibited Business Activities section of the court order (Section III) reveals the categories of misrepresentation the FTC charged the defendants with making. This is what the operation sold versus what it delivered.
What Now? The People Responsible, Who Watches Them, and What You Can Do
Two corporate entities and three individuals are named in this case. Here is where accountability stands and where the pressure still needs to go.
Named Defendants (as identified in the court order)
- Marco Manzi β Individual Defendant, Settling Defendant. Signed the Express Enrollment LLC financial statement. Permanently banned from debt relief sales and telemarketing. Subject to $7.4 million judgment (partially suspended). Robinhood assets ordered liquidated.
- Robert Kissinger β Individual Defendant. Named in the complaint. Signed a sworn financial statement August 27, 2023. Resolution of claims against Kissinger is not addressed in this specific order, which covers only Manzi as the Settling Defendant.
- Ivan Esquivel β Individual Defendant. Named in the complaint. Signed the Intercontinental Solutions LLC corporate financial statement September 1, 2023. Resolution of claims against Esquivel is also not addressed in this specific order.
- Intercontinental Solutions LLC β Corporate Defendant. Now under federal receivership. Being wound down and liquidated within 365 days of the March 15, 2024 order.
- Express Enrollment LLC β Corporate Defendant. Also under federal receivership with full liquidation ordered.
Regulatory Watchlist: These Agencies Have Jurisdiction
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) β Primary enforcement body in this case. Report ongoing student loan scams at reportfraud.ftc.gov. Monitor the FTC’s case docket for updates on Kissinger and Esquivel, whose cases were not resolved in this specific order.
- Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) β Covers student loan servicer abuses and debt relief fraud separately from the FTC. File complaints at consumerfinance.gov/complaint if you believe you paid a fraudulent debt relief company.
- Department of Education / Federal Student Aid (FSA) β If your FSA ID or federal loan account was accessed without authorization, report it immediately to studentaid.gov. Your FSA ID credentials should be changed right now if you provided them to any third-party service claiming to manage your loans.
- State Attorneys General β Most states have consumer protection divisions that pursue debt relief fraud independently from the FTC. Your state AG’s office can act faster and with more local knowledge than federal regulators on specific regional operations.
- Department of Justice (DOJ) β If you have evidence that Kissinger or Esquivel (whose cases are unresolved) engaged in conduct rising to criminal fraud, the DOJ’s Consumer Protection Branch handles criminal referrals from the FTC.
Mutual Aid, Local Organizing, and What You Can Actually Do Right Now
- If you paid any company for student loan relief services and did not receive the promised outcome, file a complaint with the FTC at reportfraud.ftc.gov. The FTC uses complaint data to identify patterns and build future cases. Your complaint is not performative; it is evidence.
- Share the FTC’s free student loan resources with anyone you know who has student debt. The Department of Education’s official loan servicers (accessible through studentaid.gov) provide income-driven repayment plan enrollment, Public Service Loan Forgiveness applications, and deferment requests at no cost. No company should ever charge you for these services.
- Connect with student debt mutual aid networks and local financial justice organizations. Groups like the Debt Collective (debtcollective.org) provide free organizing resources, debt dispute tools, and community for borrowers fighting back against predatory systems.
- If you are in California, where this scheme operated, the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (DFPI) regulates debt relief companies at the state level. File a complaint at dfpi.ca.gov if you were targeted by any operation offering student loan services.
- Demand your elected representatives support legislation that would permanently close the loopholes that allow advance-fee debt relief telemarketing to operate. The Telemarketing Sales Rule already prohibits upfront fees for debt relief, but enforcement depends on funding and political will. Contact your congressional representative and specifically ask where they stand on FTC enforcement funding.
The source document for this investigation is attached below.
https://evilcorporations.com/when-guaranteed-relief-leads-to-deeper-student-debt
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