EvilCorporations.com — Corporate Accountability Reporting
EPA Clean Water Act Violation · Vancouver, WA
Tesoro Logistics Ran an Oil Facility Near the Columbia River for Years Without Adequate Spill Containment
Federal regulators found three violations of federal oil spill prevention law at the petroleum giant’s Washington state terminal, all within 2,000 feet of a major river serving millions of people.
🟠 High Severity
TL;DR
Tesoro Logistics Operations LLC, a subsidiary of one of the largest oil companies in the western United States, operated a petroleum storage and distribution terminal in Vancouver, Washington without meeting basic federal oil spill prevention requirements. For more than a decade, the company’s containment infrastructure could not hold the full volume of its largest storage tank if that tank failed. The facility sits roughly 2,000 feet from the Columbia River, a critical waterway that drains to the Pacific Ocean and serves as a lifeline for communities, fisheries, and ecosystems across the Pacific Northwest. The EPA fined the company $99,000 for three separate regulatory violations, all of which were corrected only after federal scrutiny. A fine that amounts to a rounding error for a company of this scale is not accountability. It is a toll.
The Columbia River belongs to all of us. Demand that oil companies be held to the full force of the law, every time.
$99K
EPA civil penalty assessed
92,538
Barrels in the largest storage tank (shell capacity)
3,448
Barrel containment shortfall (shell vs. net capacity)
2,000 ft
Distance from the Columbia River
2013
Year first deficient SPCC Plan was created
3
Separate violations of federal Clean Water Act regulations
The Allegations: A Full Breakdown
Core Allegations
What the EPA says Tesoro Logistics did and failed to do
| 01 | Tesoro Logistics failed to include a legally required discharge prediction for overhead process piping connecting the railcar unloading area to the tank farm. Every SPCC Plan from 2013 through May 2025 omitted this required analysis. | high |
| 02 | The company failed to address general secondary containment for aboveground, overhead process piping. Under federal law, any structure capable of discharging oil must have containment; Tesoro left a key segment of its pipeline system unaddressed for years. | high |
| 03 | The company’s tank farm dike did not have the capacity to contain the full shell volume of its largest tank, Tank 93501 (92,538 barrels), as required by federal regulation. The shortfall was known internally by at least 2022 and was not fully corrected until October 2023. | high |
| 04 | The 2013 SPCC Plan used an “effective operational height” of 85,731 barrels to calculate secondary containment instead of the tank’s actual shell capacity of 92,538 barrels, a deliberate undercounting that understated the required containment volume for years. | high |
| 05 | A 2016 spill containment study repeated the same calculation error, again using effective operational height rather than shell capacity. This flawed methodology persisted across multiple SPCC plan versions. | medium |
| 06 | When a re-strapping report in March 2022 exposed the containment shortfall, Tesoro did not notify federal regulators. It reported to the Washington Department of Ecology only, and the EPA learned of the deficiency indirectly via a state letter in early 2023. | medium |
Regulatory Failures
How oversight broke down and who caught what
| 01 | The EPA did not inspect the Tesoro Vancouver facility until October 4, 2024, well over a decade after the company’s first deficient SPCC Plan was written in 2013. The containment problem existed for years before federal regulators arrived on site. | high |
| 02 | The state of Washington’s Department of Ecology identified the secondary containment shortfall in July 2022 during a routine inspection, but granted the company conditional approval to keep operating with Tank 93501 running below full capacity. This arrangement allowed Tesoro to continue operations without fixing the root problem for more than a year. | high |
| 03 | The EPA only opened this enforcement action after receiving a copy of a state letter. The federal government did not proactively monitor the facility’s SPCC compliance; it relied on state correspondence to learn about a multi-year deficiency. | medium |
| 04 | Despite settling with the EPA for $99,000, Tesoro “neither admits nor denies” the specific factual allegations in the Consent Agreement. The company pays a fine and walks away without any formal admission of wrongdoing. | medium |
Public Health and Safety
What was at stake for communities and waterways
| 01 | The Tesoro facility sits approximately 2,000 feet north of the Columbia River, one of the most important freshwater and salmon ecosystems in North America. Stormwater from the facility drains directly to the Columbia via detention ponds. | high |
| 02 | The Columbia River flows to the Pacific Ocean and is used in interstate and foreign commerce. An uncontained oil spill from Tank 93501 would have the potential to affect fisheries, tribal water rights, municipal water supplies, and coastal ecosystems far beyond Vancouver, Washington. | high |
| 03 | The largest storage tank at the facility holds up to 92,538 barrels of oil. For years, if that tank had failed, the surrounding dike could not have contained the full discharge plus precipitation runoff, meaning oil could have escaped into the surrounding environment and, ultimately, the Columbia River. | high |
| 04 | The overhead process piping connecting the railcar unloading area to the tank farm had no documented discharge prediction and no secondary containment plan for the entire period covered by the SPCC Plans before May 2025. A failure in this piping could have discharged oil with no systematic containment in place. | high |
Corporate Accountability Failures
Weak penalties, slow corrective action, no admission of guilt
| 01 | The maximum Class II civil penalty under the Clean Water Act, adjusted for inflation, is $295,564. The EPA settled for $99,000, roughly one third of the available maximum, for violations spanning multiple years and multiple regulatory requirements. | high |
| 02 | No individual executives at Tesoro Logistics faced any personal accountability. No employees were named in the enforcement action. The $99,000 fine lands on the corporate entity alone, and Tesoro’s parent company, a multibillion-dollar enterprise, absorbs the cost with ease. | high |
| 03 | Tesoro corrected the secondary containment deficiency in October 2023, more than 16 months after first identifying the problem internally in March 2022 and more than a year after the state of Washington told the company to fix it. The delay cost nothing beyond the eventual penalty. | medium |
| 04 | Tesoro waived all rights to contest the penalty or appeal the Final Order. This kind of administrative resolution keeps the entire matter out of court, limits public scrutiny, and allows the company to resolve serious environmental violations without any finding of liability. | medium |
Exploiting Delay
How slow compliance timelines work in the company’s favor
| 01 | Tesoro’s original 2013 SPCC Plan contained a flawed containment calculation that understated the required dike volume. This error was not caught by federal regulators for eleven years. | high |
| 02 | After identifying the containment shortfall in March 2022, Tesoro did not begin the construction design project to fix it until February 2023, nearly a year later. Onsite construction did not start until August 2023, five months after that. | medium |
| 03 | During the 2022 to 2023 period while the containment shortfall existed and was known, the Washington Department of Ecology allowed Tesoro to continue operating the facility by limiting Tank 93501 to below the net secondary containment capacity. The facility never shut down. | medium |
Timeline of Events
March 2013
Tesoro Logistics creates its first SPCC Plan for the Vancouver facility, using a flawed “effective operational height” calculation that understates the required secondary containment volume for Tank 93501.
2016
A Spill Containment Study repeats the same calculation error, again using operational height rather than shell capacity. The flawed study is later incorporated into future SPCC Plans.
Jan 6, 2022
Tesoro issues a new January 2022 SPCC Plan that still does not address the overhead piping discharge prediction or secondary containment requirements.
March 17, 2022
A re-strapping report for Tank 93501 reveals that the tank farm secondary containment volume is insufficient for the tank’s actual shell capacity. Tesoro notifies only the state, not federal regulators.
July 18, 2022
Tesoro notifies the Washington Department of Ecology of the containment deficiency discovered in March.
July 21, 2022
The Washington Department of Ecology conducts an announced inspection and identifies the secondary containment deficiency. The company is told to operate Tank 93501 below net containment capacity.
Nov. 2022
A new containment survey confirms the tank farm net containment volume is 89,090 barrels, short of Tank 93501’s shell capacity of 92,538 barrels by approximately 3,448 barrels (plus precipitation allowance).
Feb. 2023
Tesoro finally initiates a construction design project to expand the tank farm secondary containment. The EPA receives notice of the deficiency through a copy of a state letter around this time.
Aug. to Oct. 2023
On-site construction to correct the secondary containment shortfall is completed in October 2023, more than 18 months after the problem was first identified internally.
Oct. 4, 2024
EPA Region 10 conducts its first inspection of the Tesoro Vancouver facility under the Clean Water Act.
May 15, 2025
Tesoro finally updates its SPCC Plan to include the required discharge prediction and secondary containment plan for the overhead process piping. Both were missing from every prior version.
Jan. 9, 2026
Tesoro Logistics signs the EPA Consent Agreement. The company agrees to pay a $99,000 penalty without admitting the specific factual allegations.
Direct Quotes from the Federal Record
Quote 1
Confirming the proximity of the facility to the Columbia River
Public Health and Safety
“According to the June 2025 SPCC Plan for the Facility, the Facility is located approximately 2,000 feet north of the Columbia River. Stormwater from the Facility is drained to stormwater detention ponds and subsequently to the Columbia River.”
This quote establishes that an uncontained oil spill at this facility would have a direct drainage path to one of the most ecologically significant rivers in North America.
Quote 2
Confirming the tank farm dike was undersized
Core Allegations
“[T]he tank farm dike did not have sufficient secondary containment for the shell capacity of the largest tank (i.e., Tank 93501) plus an allowance for rainfall.”
This language, drawn directly from Tesoro’s own October 2022 SPCC Plan, shows that the company knew its containment was legally insufficient and documented that fact internally.
Quote 3
Confirming Tank 93501’s actual shell capacity
Core Allegations
“The largest storage container in the tank farm, Tank 93501, has a shell capacity of 92,538 barrels.”
Federal regulation requires secondary containment sized to the shell capacity of the largest tank. Tesoro’s plans used a smaller operational figure for over a decade, understating the required containment volume.
Quote 4
Confirming the flawed calculation methodology used since 2013
Core Allegations
“The 2013 SPCC Plan relied on ‘effective operational height’ for Tank 93501 to calculate secondary containment in lieu of Tank 93501’s shell capacity as required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 112.2 and 112.8(c).”
This reveals that the regulatory violation was baked into the very first compliance plan. The company used the wrong metric, arrived at a smaller containment requirement, and built infrastructure to that smaller spec.
Quote 5
Confirming the missing discharge prediction for overhead piping
Core Allegations
“The SPCC Plans prior to May 15, 2025 failed to provide a prediction for discharges from the aboveground, overhead process piping between the railroad spur area and the Facility tank farm.”
Federal law requires facilities to analyze and document where and how oil could spill from each major piece of equipment. Tesoro left an entire piping system completely unanalyzed for the entire existence of the facility’s modern compliance documentation.
Quote 6
Confirming the no-admission settlement structure
Corporate Accountability Failures
“Respondent neither admits nor denies the specific factual allegations contained in this Consent Agreement.”
This standard settlement language allows Tesoro to pay a penalty while maintaining that it did nothing wrong. It shields the company from civil liability in any future related proceedings and sets no precedent that could be used against the company elsewhere.
Quote 7
Stating the objective of the law Tesoro violated
Regulatory Failures
“The objective of the CWA is ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.'”
This is the law Tesoro was required to follow. Its violations at a facility 2,000 feet from the Columbia River directly contradict the foundational purpose of the Clean Water Act.
Quote 8
Confirming the November 2022 net containment measurement
Core Allegations
“A subsequent containment survey completed by Respondent in November 2022 showed the tank farm containment had a net containment volume of 89,090 barrels.”
With Tank 93501 holding up to 92,538 barrels, the gap between actual containment capacity and required containment capacity was at least 3,448 barrels before accounting for precipitation. That is a real, documented, quantified failure.
Commentary
How serious are these violations?
▾
These violations are serious. Federal oil spill prevention regulations under the Clean Water Act exist precisely because facilities like this one sit near major waterways. The Columbia River is not an abstract legal concept. It is a living ecosystem, a source of drinking water, a foundation of Pacific Northwest salmon culture, and a river that has been systematically degraded by industrial activity for generations. Operating a 92,000-barrel oil storage facility next to that river without legally sufficient containment for over a decade is not a technicality. It is a failure to protect a public resource from private profit-seeking. The fine of $99,000 does not come close to reflecting the risk that was imposed on the surrounding communities and ecosystem.
Why did it take more than a decade for the EPA to inspect this facility?
▾
That question should be directed to Congress and to the EPA itself. The agency has thousands of facilities to monitor and a limited enforcement budget. But the answer is not reassuring for communities near oil infrastructure. The EPA inspected Tesoro’s Vancouver terminal for the first time in October 2024, eleven years after the first deficient SPCC Plan was written. The violations were not uncovered by proactive federal surveillance. They surfaced because a re-strapping report flagged a problem internally, Washington state caught it during an inspection, and the EPA eventually received a copy of a state letter. This is not a robust federal safety net. It is a system that relies on companies to self-report and on states to fill gaps that federal agencies leave open.
What could have happened if Tank 93501 had failed while the containment was undersized?
▾
If Tank 93501 had ruptured or overflowed while the dike was sized below the tank’s shell capacity, oil could have escaped the containment area. The facility’s stormwater system drains to detention ponds that discharge to the Columbia River. Even a partial escape of petroleum into that drainage system could have caused serious ecological damage: oil-coated waterfowl, contaminated salmon habitat, toxins entering the river’s food web, and potential impacts on downstream drinking water intakes. The larger the spill and the faster it occurred, the less time responders would have had to stop it from reaching the river. This is exactly why federal law requires properly sized containment. Tesoro bet that nothing would go wrong, and for years, nothing did. That is not a safety record. That is luck.
Is $99,000 an appropriate penalty for violations of this nature?
▾
No. The maximum civil penalty available under the Clean Water Act’s Class II administrative process, adjusted for inflation, is $295,564. The EPA settled for $99,000, or about one third of the legal ceiling, for three violations spanning years of regulatory exposure at a facility adjacent to one of the most important rivers in the country. For context, Tesoro Logistics’ parent company, MPC (Marathon Petroleum Corporation), reported billions of dollars in annual revenue. A $99,000 penalty is not a deterrent. It is not a punishment. It is a business cost that is cheaper than compliance would have been. This is what corporate accountability looks like in the current regulatory environment: a company violates environmental law for years, corrects the problem only after being caught, pays a fine that costs less than many corporate legal bills, and walks away without admitting a single fact.
Who is Tesoro Logistics Operations LLC?
▾
Tesoro Logistics Operations LLC is a subsidiary within the Marathon Petroleum Corporation family of companies. The Vancouver, Washington facility is an oil storage, transshipment, and distribution terminal. Oil arrives by railcar, is stored in large tanks (including Tank 93501 at over 92,000 barrels of shell capacity), and is then distributed onward. This type of facility plays a central role in moving fossil fuels from extraction points to refineries and consumers. It is not a small operation, and the company operating it is not a marginal player. This is a major petroleum logistics firm operating under federal environmental regulations that it failed to meet for years at a site with direct environmental exposure to a major navigable waterway.
What does “neither admits nor denies” actually mean in practice?
▾
It means the company pays the fine without ever being found liable. In a “neither admits nor denies” settlement, there is no judicial or administrative finding of fact. The company cannot be held to those facts in future litigation. If someone tried to sue Tesoro for damages related to these violations, the EPA’s enforcement order could not be used as proof that the company actually violated the law. This structure protects corporate defendants far more than it protects the public. It is a standard feature of how large companies resolve environmental enforcement actions in the United States, and it is one of the primary reasons these settlements fail to create real deterrence or accountability.
What happened to the communities near the Tesoro facility during all of this?
▾
The communities of Vancouver, Washington and the broader Columbia River corridor lived for years adjacent to an oil storage facility that did not meet federal environmental protection standards. They were not notified when the containment shortfall was discovered in 2022. They were not consulted about the conditional approval that allowed the facility to keep operating. They were not parties to the consent agreement. They had no formal role in the settlement. This is the standard treatment of frontline communities in corporate environmental enforcement: the polluting company negotiates directly with the regulator, and the people who live downstream are observers, not participants. That is not justice. It is a system designed to resolve liability, not to protect communities.
What can I do to prevent this from happening again?
▾
Start by making this case visible. Share this story. Contact your representatives in Congress and demand increased EPA inspection budgets and mandatory minimum penalties for Clean Water Act violations at facilities near navigable waters. Contact the EPA Region 10 office directly and ask about their inspection schedule for industrial facilities in the Columbia River corridor. Support organizations like Earthjustice, Columbia Riverkeeper, and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations that do legal and advocacy work to protect the Columbia River. Attend public comment periods for permits and environmental review processes for oil infrastructure in your region. And hold Marathon Petroleum accountable at the shareholder level if you have any exposure to that company’s stock through retirement accounts or funds. Every one of these actions matters. Corporate environmental violations persist because the systems that allow them go unchallenged.
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