Inside the Seven Ammonia Safety Gaps EPA Found at Ben E. Keith

The Facts

At its facility at 1 Ben E. Keith Way in New Brockton, Alabama, the company operated a refrigeration system using anhydrous ammonia. EPA’s agreement says the system held 28,000 pounds of the chemical.

That amount placed the facility under the Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Program. The program applies when a regulated substance reaches a specified threshold inside an industrial process. For anhydrous ammonia, the threshold cited in the agreement is 10,000 pounds. Covered facilities must develop an accidental-release prevention program and submit a Risk Management Plan to EPA.

EPA inspected the facility’s records and equipment on May 2, 2024. The inspection examined compliance with federal chemical-accident prevention rules and with what regulators call “recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices,” or RAGAGEP. In practical terms, those are established engineering and safety standards used to design, maintain and operate covered equipment.

The Controls EPA Said Were Missing

EPA’s observations covered seven separate conditions. Several involved the ammonia machinery room; others concerned related fuel and chemical storage around the facility.

EPA used these observations to allege that Ben E. Keith failed to ensure and document that the covered process was designed and maintained in accordance with accepted engineering practices. Because the case ended through consent rather than adjudication, the observations weren’t tested in a contested hearing.

The Hazard List That Wasn’t Being Tracked

A separate problem appeared in the facility’s own hazard-review process. A March 2021 process hazard analysis had produced 45 recommendations. By the May 2024 inspection, only five were documented as complete.

EPA didn’t conclude that every other recommendation remained physically unfinished. Its agreement expressly leaves open the possibility that additional work had been done. The records, however, didn’t track that work. That distinction matters: a safety action that cannot be traced to a decision, deadline and completion record leaves regulators—and the facility itself—without reliable evidence that the identified hazard was resolved.

Federal rules required a system to address the analysis team’s findings, resolve recommendations on time, document the actions to be taken, create a written schedule and communicate those actions to employees whose work could be affected. EPA alleged that Ben E. Keith failed across that chain of responsibilities.

How the Enforcement Case Developed

Who Had to Rely on These Controls

The agreement doesn’t document an ammonia release, fire, spill, injury or environmental impact. It therefore doesn’t support claims that workers or nearby residents suffered physical harm.

It does identify the people expected to rely on the prevention system. Operating and maintenance employees were among those who should have received information about hazard-analysis actions affecting their assignments. Trained refrigeration staff and emergency responders were supposed to find shutdown instructions and contact information near the ammonia system. Inspectors found that required signage absent.

The practical consequence established by the record is a prevention program EPA considered deficient. Pipe supports, spill containment, hazard labels, controlled storage and documented follow-through are separate layers of protection. The settlement addresses gaps in those layers, not the aftermath of a documented accident.

The record documents missing safeguards and incomplete tracking. It does not document an ammonia release or resulting injury.

The Company’s Response

Ben E. Keith resolved the case without admitting or denying EPA’s factual allegations. It accepted the $55,864 penalty, waived its right to contest the alleged violations and waived an appeal of the accompanying final order.

The company also certified, to the best of its knowledge, that it was in compliance with the relevant Clean Air Act requirements and that all alleged violations had been corrected. The consent agreement doesn’t describe the corrective work, provide completion records or identify which of the hazard-analysis recommendations were ultimately carried out.

What the Order Actually Does

The final-order text approves the consent agreement and directs Ben E. Keith to comply with its terms upon filing. The company must pay the civil penalty within 30 calendar days of the agreement’s effective date. The supplied material doesn’t show that filing date, so it doesn’t establish when the payment deadline began.

Full compliance resolves the company’s federal civil-penalty liability only for the facts and violations specifically alleged in this case. The agreement doesn’t amount to a finding that the company committed the alleged violations. It also doesn’t remove the company’s continuing duty to comply with federal, state and local law.

What Remains Unresolved

What a Legitimate Fix Looks Like

The company’s compliance certification is legally significant, but a durable safety system requires records that can be checked later. Each hazard recommendation should have an assigned action, responsible person, deadline, completion evidence and a record showing that affected employees were informed.

The physical corrections should be equally traceable: adequate pipe supports, visible emergency information, secondary containment, proper hazard markings, controlled combustible storage, grounded equipment where required and compliant oil-removal hardware. Those controls also have to remain in place after the enforcement file closes.

The agreement supplies a certification of correction, not the underlying corrective record. Whether that record now accounts for every recommendation and each observed condition is the central question the supplied document leaves unanswered.