A hazardous waste container is supposed to tell workers what danger is inside. A containment surface is supposed to stop a spill from reaching soil or water. A tank inspection is supposed to catch corrosion, a broken seal or signs of a release before the problem grows.

At Excel TSD of Tennessee’s facility on Rivergate Road in Memphis, inspectors recorded problems in each of those protective layers. The facility receives and manages commercial hazardous wastes characterized as ignitable, corrosive, reactive or toxic, along with several categories of listed hazardous waste. That makes ordinary-looking details, such as a missing label or an unrecorded inspection, part of a larger safety system.

The EPA’s final order resolves 25 numbered alleged violations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and Tennessee’s authorized hazardous waste program. The settlement imposes a civil penalty and corrective obligations, but it does not contain a finding that someone was injured or that hazardous waste migrated beyond the site.

The safeguards were meant to work in sequence

Hazardous waste controls are layered because no single precaution can prevent every mistake or failure. Labels tell workers and emergency responders what they are confronting. Closed, sound containers reduce the chance of escape. Aisles preserve access during a fire or spill. Secondary containment is the barrier beneath the equipment. Inspections and records provide evidence that the physical systems are still working.

What inspectors recorded at the facility

The largest single observation involved labels. EPA said 125 containers in five permitted storage areas lacked an indication of the hazards of their contents. Inspectors also recorded eight containers in satellite accumulation areas without hazard indications. Other containers lacked dates, identifying numbers or the words “Hazardous Waste.”

The tank findings were not limited to visible deterioration. Excel TSD acknowledged that its ancillary equipment contacted hazardous waste containing at least 10 percent organic material by weight. EPA said calibration records showed that the leak-detection instrument was not calibrated before each day of use and was not calibrated to the required gas.

Tanks F1 and F2 also held waste with an average volatile organic concentration above 500 parts per million by weight, according to the company’s acknowledgment recorded in the order. Those tanks were subject to controls intended to limit organic air emissions. EPA alleged that the missing bolt meant a closure device was not secured as required.

Records did not match the physical warning signs

The order says daily inspection records did not note corrosion, broken seals or data from monitoring and leak-detection equipment. It also says Excel TSD lacked three years of annual inspection records for the fixed roofs and closure devices on Tanks F1 and F2.

Other documentation problems extended through the operation. Inspectors recorded two missing shipment manifests, an inaccurate daily inventory report, an emergency quick-reference guide without updated coordinator names or telephone numbers, and missing hazardous waste training for one employee who signed a manifest. The training program itself had not been reviewed and audited annually, according to EPA.

These are not interchangeable failures. A missing manifest concerns traceability. An inaccurate inventory can impair knowledge of what is stored and where. An outdated emergency guide can deprive responders of current contacts. Together, however, they weaken the information available when a leak, fire or other emergency demands a fast and accurate response.

The company “neither admits nor denies the factual allegations” but agreed to the penalty, compliance order and settlement conditions. Consent Agreement, paragraph 127

From inspection to final order

1. September 4, 2024

   EPA and Tennessee inspectors conduct the compliance evaluation inspection at the Memphis facility.

2. November 13, 2024

   Tennessee’s inspection findings are sent to Excel TSD, according to the agreement.

3. May 23, 2025

   EPA sends its inspection report to the company.

4. June 30, 2025

   Tennessee issues a new hazardous waste permit, TNHW-197.

5. June 9, 2026

   The new permit is modified. The later settlement ties specified containment work to this permit and modification.

6. September 14, 2026

   The consent agreement and final order are filed, making the settlement effective.

What Excel TSD agreed to do

The company consented to a $385,000 civil penalty, payable within 30 days of the effective date. It also waived its right to contest the allegations in this proceeding and waived appeal of the final order. The agreement says the enforcement action may be considered in any later review of the company’s compliance history.

The specified construction requirements focus on Areas 1, 2 and 3 and the Tank Farm. The order does not separately describe construction work for every other area where deteriorated containment was observed. Its broader certification provision, however, requires the company to state that all alleged violations have been corrected.

What the settlement does not establish

The document does not quantify how much material was released at the discolored vent, identify a contaminant associated with that observation or describe its duration. It does not say hazardous waste escaped the secondary containment, reached soil or water, moved off-site or injured workers or nearby residents.

Those limits matter. The order documents failures in systems designed to prevent and detect harm. It does not prove that every risk became an actual injury. Nor does the supplied record establish that the penalty has been paid or that the required repairs and certifications have been completed.

The central lesson of the order is not that one missing label or one missing bolt caused a documented disaster. It is that hazardous waste safety depends on multiple defenses remaining intact at the same time. At this facility, inspectors recorded deficiencies in the containers, tanks, containment surfaces, monitoring practices, emergency information and records that were supposed to reinforce one another.