Investment Adviser Rigged Trades to Enrich Girlfriend and Himself
SEC alleges Steven Susoeff systematically assigned winning trades to favored accounts while dumping losses on unsuspecting clients, causing over $144,000 in harm.
Between January and July 2021, investment adviser Steven Susoeff allegedly used his control over client accounts to rig the allocation of stock trades. He waited until the end of each trading day to see which trades were profitable, then assigned the winners to his girlfriend, a business associate, and himself while dumping the losers onto other clients. This scheme generated over $90,000 for favored accounts and $54,000 for Susoeff personally, while causing more than $144,000 in losses for unsuspecting clients who trusted him with their savings.
This case shows how small advisory firms can exploit technical loopholes to systematically harm the very people they are supposed to protect.
The Allegations: A Breakdown
| 01 | Susoeff placed block trades for multiple clients at once, then waited until the end of the trading day to allocate specific shares to individual accounts after he knew which trades were profitable. | high |
| 02 | He systematically assigned winning trades to his girlfriend’s account, a business associate’s account, and his own personal account while dumping losing trades onto other clients. | high |
| 03 | Favored accounts received profitable trades 89.9% of the time, while disfavored clients received profitable trades only 25.5% of the time, a disparity far beyond random chance. | high |
| 04 | The scheme ran for seven months from January 2021 through July 2021, during which Susoeff had full discretionary authority over approximately $8 million for 59 clients. | high |
| 05 | Susoeff served as both the firm’s principal and its chief compliance officer, meaning the person responsible for preventing misconduct was the same person committing it. | high |
| 06 | The broker sent Susoeff at least six separate warnings between December 2020 and July 2021 that trades must be allocated fairly and that cherry-picking was prohibited, but he continued the scheme. | high |
| 07 | On May 7, 2021, Susoeff executed multiple intraday trades in Apple stock within the block account, then allocated the profitable portions to favored accounts and the unprofitable portions to disfavored clients. | high |
| 08 | Disfavored clients suffered a net negative return of approximately -0.60% while favored accounts enjoyed a net positive return of approximately +0.61%, a statistically significant divergence. | medium |
| 01 | The broker sent repeated warnings to Susoeff on December 14, 2020, December 15, 2020, April 12, 2021, April 26, 2021, May 19, 2021, and July 13, 2021 about late allocations and the prohibition on cherry-picking, but took no immediate enforcement action to stop the conduct. | high |
| 02 | The block trading platform allowed Susoeff to delay allocations until after the market closed, creating a structural loophole that enabled him to see which trades were profitable before deciding which clients would receive them. | high |
| 03 | No independent compliance officer existed at the firm to provide oversight, as Susoeff himself held the role of chief compliance officer while simultaneously executing and allocating the trades. | high |
| 04 | Meritage Financial had written policies and procedures including a code of ethics that explicitly stated the firm owed fiduciary duties to clients, but these documents failed to prevent the systematic misconduct. | medium |
| 05 | The broker only removed Susoeff’s ability to use the block trading account in July 2021, after seven months of violations and six separate warnings had failed to stop the conduct. | high |
| 06 | Clients had no practical way to detect the manipulation from their account statements, as the losses appeared to be ordinary market fluctuations rather than systematically allocated losses. | medium |
| 01 | Susoeff personally profited by approximately $54,232 through the cherry-picking scheme, directing winning trades to his own account while his clients absorbed losses. | high |
| 02 | He used his position of trust and fiduciary authority to systematically favor his girlfriend’s account, enriching someone with whom he had a personal relationship at the direct expense of paying clients. | high |
| 03 | Susoeff also favored a business associate’s account, suggesting the scheme served to reward personal and professional relationships rather than maximize returns for all clients equally. | high |
| 04 | The firm collected asset-based management fees from all 59 clients even as Susoeff deliberately harmed the majority of them through manipulated trade allocations. | high |
| 05 | By allocating 89.9% profitable trades to favored accounts versus only 25.5% to disfavored clients, Susoeff created a two-tier system where proximity to him determined investment success rather than market performance. | high |
| 06 | The scheme demonstrates that Susoeff valued personal gain and favoritism over his legal and ethical obligation to treat all clients fairly and act in their best interests. | high |
| 01 | Disfavored clients collectively suffered over $144,566 in first-day losses on trades that were systematically allocated to harm them. | high |
| 02 | These losses represent real harm to individuals who may have been saving for retirement, education, or other critical life goals and trusted Susoeff to act in their best interests. | high |
| 03 | The scheme transferred wealth from unsuspecting clients to favored insiders, generating over $90,334 in gains for the girlfriend and business associate at the direct expense of other clients. | high |
| 04 | Clients paid management fees to Meritage Financial for professional investment advice while simultaneously being systematically harmed through manipulated allocations. | medium |
| 05 | The -0.60% net negative return imposed on disfavored clients versus the +0.61% positive return for favored accounts represents a wealth transfer mechanism disguised as normal investment activity. | medium |
| 06 | Beyond direct financial losses, clients now face the uncertainty and cost of finding new advisers and the emotional toll of discovering their trusted fiduciary betrayed them. | medium |
| 01 | Susoeff held the position of chief compliance officer at his own firm, creating an accountability structure where the person responsible for oversight was the same person committing fraud. | high |
| 02 | Meritage Financial maintained a written code of ethics and policies manual that explicitly prohibited the conduct Susoeff engaged in, showing that formal compliance documents alone cannot prevent misconduct. | high |
| 03 | The firm had no independent compliance function or outside oversight to detect or prevent systematic trade manipulation by its principal. | high |
| 04 | Despite receiving six separate warnings from the broker over seven months, Susoeff continued the scheme without any internal accountability mechanism stopping him. | high |
| 05 | The SEC filed its complaint on February 1, 2023, nearly two years after the misconduct began, illustrating the significant time lag between harm and accountability. | medium |
| 06 | No criminal charges are mentioned in the complaint, meaning Susoeff may face only civil penalties despite allegedly engaging in systematic fraud against his own clients. | medium |
| 07 | The small size of the firm meant fewer internal controls and checks, but also meant that a single individual could harm dozens of clients without immediate detection. | medium |
| 01 | The 59 clients who trusted Meritage Financial represented individuals and families relying on professional investment advice to build financial security for retirement, education, and other life goals. | high |
| 02 | Clients who suffered systematic losses may now face delayed retirement, reduced educational funding for children, or other life disruptions due to the financial harm inflicted by someone they trusted. | high |
| 03 | The betrayal of fiduciary duty erodes public trust in investment advisers generally, making it harder for honest financial professionals to serve their communities. | medium |
| 04 | Small investment advisory firms often serve local communities and build relationships based on personal trust, making this type of betrayal particularly damaging to community cohesion. | medium |
| 05 | The case demonstrates how even modest sums of money stolen from working families can have devastating impacts on household financial security and long-term planning. | medium |
| 06 | Victims may experience not only financial harm but also emotional distress, anxiety about their financial future, and loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole. | medium |
| 01 | This case illustrates how a single individual with discretionary authority and inadequate oversight can systematically harm dozens of clients over months while enriching himself and his inner circle. | high |
| 02 | The structural design of block trading platforms creates opportunities for manipulation when allocation timing is not strictly controlled and when advisers can see trade performance before making allocation decisions. | high |
| 03 | Formal compliance structures like codes of ethics and policies manuals are meaningless when the person responsible for enforcement is the same person committing the violations. | high |
| 04 | The broker’s six warnings over seven months demonstrate that awareness of potential wrongdoing does not automatically translate into timely intervention to protect victims. | high |
| 05 | Small advisory firms managing millions of dollars for dozens of families can operate with minimal independent oversight, creating conditions where systematic fraud can persist undetected. | medium |
| 06 | The case underscores the need for mandatory separation of compliance and trading functions, real-time allocation requirements, and independent audits to protect investors from cherry-picking schemes. | medium |
Timeline of Events
Direct Quotes from the Legal Record
“Of the trades allocated to the Favored Accounts, 89.9% were profitable on the day of allocation. By contrast, of the trades allocated to the Disfavored Clients, only 25.5% were profitable on the day of allocation.”
๐ก This extreme disparity proves the allocation was not random but systematically manipulated to favor certain accounts.
“As a result of this cherry-picking scheme, the Disfavored Clients experienced over $144,000 in first-day losses, while the Favored Accounts experienced over $90,000 in first-day profits.”
๐ก This quantifies the direct wealth transfer from unsuspecting clients to Susoeff’s favored insiders.
“Susoeff personally profited by approximately $54,232 as a result of cherry-picking.”
๐ก This shows Susoeff directly enriched himself at his own clients’ expense while serving as their fiduciary.
“On or about December 14, 2020, December 15, 2020, April 12, 2021, April 26, 2021, May 19, 2021, and July 13, 2021, Broker A sent Susoeff emails or messages reminding him that allocations must be fair and equitable to all clients.”
๐ก Six separate warnings over seven months show that awareness of the problem did not stop the misconduct.
“After the close of trading on a given day and with full knowledge of whether a particular trade was profitable that day, Susoeff then allocated the profitable trades to certain accounts and the unprofitable trades to other accounts.”
๐ก This describes the core mechanism by which Susoeff manipulated outcomes by waiting to see results before allocating trades.
“The Favored Accounts included an account belonging to Susoeff’s girlfriend, an account belonging to a business associate, and Susoeff’s own personal account.”
๐ก This reveals Susoeff used his authority to enrich his girlfriend and associates at other clients’ expense.
“Meritage’s policies and procedures manual and code of ethics stated that the Firm owed fiduciary duties to its clients, which included a duty of loyalty and a duty not to engage in any scheme or artifice to defraud.”
๐ก Susoeff violated his firm’s own written ethical standards while serving as chief compliance officer.
“Susoeff had discretionary authority over client accounts and made decisions to buy and sell securities on clients’ behalf without their approval of each transaction.”
๐ก Clients trusted Susoeff with full authority to act on their behalf, which he systematically abused.
“The Favored Accounts had an overall net positive rate of return of approximately +0.61%, while the Disfavored Clients had an overall net negative rate of return of approximately -0.60%.”
๐ก This consistent divergence in returns proves systematic manipulation rather than market forces or chance.
“On May 7, 2021, within the Block Account, Susoeff purchased shares of Apple, Inc. in the morning, sold those shares in mid-morning, and then purchased shares again in early afternoon.”
๐ก This specific example shows how Susoeff used multiple intraday trades to create profitable and unprofitable positions that he then selectively allocated.
“From January 2021 through July 2021, Meritage managed approximately $8 million for approximately 59 clients.”
๐ก This shows the scheme affected a substantial number of ordinary investors who trusted a small advisory firm.
“Susoeff served as Meritage’s Chief Compliance Officer.”
๐ก The person responsible for preventing fraud was the same person committing it, eliminating internal accountability.
Frequently Asked Questions
Complaint PDF from the SEC’s website: https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2025/comp26239.pdf
๐ก Explore Corporate Misconduct by Category
Corporations harm people every day โ from wage theft to pollution. Learn more by exploring key areas of injustice.
- ๐ Product Safety Violations โ When companies risk lives for profit.
- ๐ฟ Environmental Violations โ Pollution, ecological collapse, and unchecked greed.
- ๐ผ Labor Exploitation โ Wage theft, worker abuse, and unsafe conditions.
- ๐ก๏ธ Data Breaches & Privacy Abuses โ Misuse and mishandling of personal information.
- ๐ต Financial Fraud & Corruption โ Lies, scams, and executive impunity.