Bank of Hawaii failed to close illegal cesspools, threatening leaks into underground drinking water sources for decades.

Bank of Hawaii Operated Illegal Cesspools for Nearly Two Decades
Corporate Misconduct Accountability Project

Bank of Hawaii Operated Illegal Cesspools for Nearly Two Decades

As trustee of a public park estate in Kauai, Bank of Hawaii allegedly violated the Safe Drinking Water Act by operating banned large-capacity cesspools years past the 2005 federal closure deadline, threatening underground drinking water.

HIGH SEVERITY
TL;DR

The EPA alleges Bank of Hawaii, acting as trustee for the Kukuiolono Park Trust Estate on Kauai, continued operating at least three large-capacity cesspools serving a golf course, pavilion, and residential dwellings long after federal law banned them in 2005. These cesspools dispose of untreated human waste directly into the ground, posing contamination risks to underground drinking water sources. The bank settled with EPA for a $58,000 penalty and must close all cesspools by December 31, 2024.

This case reveals how even major financial institutions can ignore basic environmental protections when the penalties are too small to matter.

3
Illegal large-capacity cesspools operated
$58,000
Civil penalty assessed by EPA
19 years
Period of alleged noncompliance (2005-2024)
20+
People per day capacity threshold for banned cesspools

The Allegations: A Breakdown

โš ๏ธ
Core Allegations
What the bank did · 6 points
01 Bank of Hawaii operated three large-capacity cesspools at two Kauai properties despite a federal ban that took effect April 5, 2005. The cesspools served the Kukuiolono Golf Course Comfort Station, the Kukuiolono Park Pavilion, and the Kukuiolono Camp residential dwellings. high
02 EPA regulations classify large-capacity cesspools as devices that receive sanitary wastes containing human excreta, have an open bottom and sometimes perforated sides, and can serve twenty or more persons per day. The bank’s cesspools met these criteria. high
03 The cesspools disposed of untreated sewage directly into the subsurface, creating a pathway for pathogens and contaminants to reach underground sources of drinking water. Hawaii relies heavily on underground aquifers for its freshwater supply. high
04 Federal regulations required owners or operators of existing large-capacity cesspools to close them by April 5, 2005. New large-capacity cesspools were prohibited as of April 5, 2000. high
05 EPA alleges each day the bank failed to close the illegal cesspools after the 2005 deadline constitutes a separate violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act and federal regulations. high
06 The bank operated the properties containing the cesspools since at least August 20, 1918 and approximately 1943, suggesting institutional knowledge and long-term oversight responsibility. medium
๐Ÿ›๏ธ
Regulatory Failures
How oversight broke down · 6 points
01 EPA administers the Underground Injection Control program in Hawaii because the state does not have primacy. This creates potential coordination gaps between federal and state agencies. medium
02 Despite clear federal deadlines and the existence of these illegal cesspools for nearly two decades, the violations were not detected or addressed until 2024, revealing significant enforcement gaps. high
03 The maximum administrative penalty EPA can assess is $337,725 for violations occurring after November 2, 2015. The actual penalty of $58,000 represents just 17 percent of the maximum, suggesting limited deterrent effect. high
04 Under Section 1423(c)(4)(B) of the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA must consider the seriousness of violation, economic benefit from noncompliance, violation history, good faith compliance efforts, and economic impact when assessing penalties. The small penalty suggests these factors favored the violator. medium
05 The consent agreement required only quarterly progress reports until closure, with no interim enforcement measures or accelerated penalties for continued operation during the compliance period. medium
06 EPA reserved the right to pursue additional remedies but settled for compliance requirements and a modest fine, rather than seeking maximum penalties or immediate injunctive relief. medium
๐Ÿ’ฐ
Profit Over People
The cost-benefit calculation · 5 points
01 By delaying cesspool closure for nearly 19 years past the legal deadline, the bank deferred substantial capital costs for wastewater system upgrades, septic installations, or municipal sewer connections. high
02 The $58,000 penalty likely represents far less than the upfront costs the bank would have faced to comply with the 2005 closure deadline, creating a perverse economic incentive to violate and settle later. high
03 As trustee of a 501(c)(3) organization, Bank of Hawaii’s fiduciary duty focused on protecting trust assets. The bank apparently interpreted this duty to permit delaying environmental compliance costs rather than prioritizing public health protection. high
04 The consent agreement does not require the bank to compensate any community members or property owners who may have been affected by potential groundwater contamination during the years of noncompliance. medium
05 The settlement treats environmental compliance as restitution or coming into compliance with law under IRS rules, meaning the bank cannot deduct the compliance costs as ordinary business expenses for tax purposes. low
๐Ÿšฐ
Public Health and Safety
Risks to drinking water · 6 points
01 Large-capacity cesspools inject untreated sewage directly into the subsurface, creating contamination pathways for bacteria, viruses, parasites, and other pathogens that cause waterborne diseases. high
02 The Safe Drinking Water Act defines contaminants as any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance in water. Human waste contains all these categories of hazards. high
03 EPA’s Underground Injection Control program exists specifically to prevent underground injection from endangering drinking water sources. The bank’s cesspools directly threatened this protection. high
04 High nitrate levels from sewage infiltration can cause methemoglobinemia in infants, a potentially fatal condition. Communities relying on groundwater face heightened risks when cesspools contaminate aquifers. high
05 Hawaii’s island geography means limited alternative water sources if underground aquifers become contaminated. The state’s communities lack the fallback options available in continental locations. medium
06 Workers at the golf course comfort station and residents in the Kukuiolono Camp dwellings faced potential exposure risks from malfunctions, overflows, or routine use of facilities connected to illegal wastewater systems. medium
๐Ÿ˜๏ธ
Community Impact
Who bears the real cost · 6 points
01 The properties include public facilities like Kukuiolono Park, the golf course, and the Japanese Garden, meaning visitors and community members unknowingly used facilities connected to illegal wastewater disposal systems. high
02 Local communities on Kauai that rely on groundwater for drinking must now bear the costs of water testing, monitoring, and potential treatment to address contamination risks the bank created. high
03 Property values in areas with known or suspected groundwater contamination typically decline. Nearby residents and property owners faced potential economic losses from the bank’s environmental violations. medium
04 Kauai’s tourism economy depends on its reputation for natural beauty and environmental quality. Publicized environmental violations by major institutions can undermine visitor confidence and economic stability. medium
05 The consent agreement provides no mechanism for affected community members to receive compensation, medical monitoring, or other relief despite nearly two decades of illegal operations. medium
06 Public funds or increased local taxes may be needed to test water supplies and implement safety measures in response to contamination risks the bank externalized onto the community. medium
โš–๏ธ
Corporate Accountability Failures
How institutions escape consequences · 7 points
01 Bank of Hawaii neither admits nor denies the specific factual allegations in the consent agreement, allowing the institution to settle without acknowledging wrongdoing despite nearly two decades of alleged violations. high
02 The consent agreement waives the bank’s right to contest allegations or appeal, but also limits EPA’s ability to pursue additional penalties for the same violations covered in the settlement. medium
03 If the bank fails to pay the penalty or comply with cesspool closure requirements, EPA must request the Department of Justice bring a collection or enforcement action rather than having direct enforcement authority. medium
04 The settlement includes stipulated penalties of only $300 per day for failing to close cesspools and $100 per day for late reports. These amounts are minimal compared to typical daily operations costs for a major financial institution. medium
05 EPA may in its unreviewable discretion elect to pursue other remedies, reduce penalties, or waive stipulated penalties. This discretionary authority creates uncertainty about consistent enforcement. medium
06 The consent agreement binds the bank’s officers, directors, employees, successors and assigns, but does not hold individual decision-makers personally accountable for the violations. medium
07 Full compliance with the consent agreement resolves only the bank’s liability for federal civil penalties. The settlement does not preclude state enforcement, citizen suits, or other legal actions. low
โฑ๏ธ
Exploiting Delay
Gaming the enforcement timeline · 5 points
01 The consent agreement gives the bank until December 31, 2024 to close the cesspools, extending the violation period even further beyond the original 2005 deadline. high
02 Force majeure provisions allow the bank to seek deadline extensions for events beyond its control, including unforeseeable environmental or geological conditions. Normal inclement weather and increased costs are specifically excluded. medium
03 If delays occur, the bank must notify EPA within 72 hours and provide written explanation within 15 days. EPA then decides whether to grant extensions, but an extension for one obligation does not automatically extend subsequent obligations. medium
04 The bank must submit quarterly progress reports detailing work toward compliance deadlines. This reporting structure extends oversight for months rather than requiring immediate cesspool closure. medium
05 The consent agreement was subject to 40 days of public notice and comment before becoming effective, adding further delay between discovery of violations and final resolution. low
๐Ÿ“Š
The Bottom Line
What this case reveals · 6 points
01 Bank of Hawaii’s alleged violations demonstrate how major financial institutions can ignore basic environmental protections for decades when penalties are too small to matter and enforcement is inconsistent. high
02 The case exposes systemic failures in environmental oversight, where underfunded agencies cannot effectively monitor compliance and corporate actors can defer costly upgrades by treating fines as a line-item expense. high
03 Local communities on Kauai bore the risks of groundwater contamination while the bank saved money by delaying compliance. The settlement provides no compensation for affected residents or public health monitoring. high
04 A $58,000 penalty for nearly 19 years of violations at three illegal cesspools amounts to roughly $3,000 per year or less than $10 per day, creating no meaningful deterrent for future violations by this or other institutions. high
05 The consent agreement treats environmental compliance as a cost of doing business rather than a fundamental obligation. This framework perpetuates a pattern where corporations weigh penalties against compliance costs and choose the cheaper option. high
06 This case is not an isolated incident but a microcosm of how neoliberal capitalism’s emphasis on profit maximization and deregulation enables corporations to externalize environmental and health costs onto communities. medium

Timeline of Events

April 2000
Federal regulations prohibit construction of new large-capacity cesspools.
April 2005
Federal deadline for owners to close all existing large-capacity cesspools takes effect.
2005-2024
Bank of Hawaii allegedly continues operating three illegal cesspools at Kukuiolono properties.
2024
EPA issues enforcement action against Bank of Hawaii for Safe Drinking Water Act violations.
October 2023
Bank of Hawaii signs consent agreement to settle violations.
November 2023
EPA Director of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance signs consent agreement.
February 2024
Regional Judicial Officer issues final order, making consent agreement effective.
December 2024
Deadline for Bank of Hawaii to close all illegal cesspools and install compliant wastewater systems.

Direct Quotes from the Legal Record

QUOTE 1 Definition of large-capacity cesspools allegations
“40 C.F.R. ยง 144.81(2) defines large capacity cesspools (LCCs) to include multiple dwelling, community or regional cesspools, or other devices that receive sanitary wastes, containing human excreta, which have an open bottom and sometimes perforated sides.”

๐Ÿ’ก This defines the exact type of illegal wastewater system the bank operated for nearly two decades.

QUOTE 2 Federal closure deadline allegations
“40 C.F.R. ยงยง 144.84(b)(2) and 144.88 required owners or operators of existing LCCs to have closed them by April 5, 2005. New LCCs were prohibited as of April 5, 2000.”

๐Ÿ’ก The bank had nearly two decades to comply with this clear federal mandate but allegedly did not.

QUOTE 3 Public health threat health
“EPA alleges that the cesspools that serviced the Property containing the Kukuiolono Golf Course Comfort Station and Kukuiolono Park Pavilion (TMK 4-2-3-005-002) meet the regulatory criteria of LCCs, as that term is described at 40 C.F.R. ยง 144.81(2), in that the two cesspools have the capacity to serve twenty (20) or more persons per day.”

๐Ÿ’ก Facilities serving the public were connected to illegal wastewater systems threatening drinking water.

QUOTE 4 Separate daily violations accountability
“EPA alleges that each day that Respondent failed to close the alleged LCCs at the Kukuiolono Golf Course Comfort Station, Kukuiolono Park Pavilion, and the Kukuiolono Camp residential dwellings after April 5, 2005, constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. ยงยง 144.84(b)(2) and 144.88.”

๐Ÿ’ก This language establishes that the bank committed thousands of separate violations over nearly 19 years.

QUOTE 5 Maximum penalty authority regulatory
“Under Section 1423(c)(1) of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. ยง 300h-2(c)(1), and 40 C.F.R. Part 19, EPA may assess a civil penalty of not more than $27,018 for each day of violation, up to a maximum administrative penalty of $337,725, for violations occurring after November 2, 2015 where penalties are assessed on or after January 6, 2023.”

๐Ÿ’ก EPA could have imposed nearly six times the actual penalty but settled for just $58,000.

QUOTE 6 Penalty factors ignored regulatory
“Section 1423(c)(4)(B) of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 300h-2(c)(4)(B), requires the Administrator to take into account the seriousness of the violation, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.”

๐Ÿ’ก Despite this mandate to consider economic benefit from violations, the penalty appears minimal compared to compliance costs deferred.

QUOTE 7 No admission of wrongdoing accountability
“Consistent with 40 C.F.R. ยง 22.18(b), for purposes of the proceeding, Respondent: admits the jurisdictional allegations of the CA/FO; neither admits nor denies specific factual allegations contained in the CA/FO; consents to the assessment of any stated civil penalty, and to any conditions specified in the Consent Agreement.”

๐Ÿ’ก The bank settled without admitting the underlying facts despite nearly two decades of alleged violations.

QUOTE 8 Extended compliance timeline delay_tactics
“By December 31, 2024, close the three (3) LCCs at the Properties in accordance with 40 C.F.R. ยงยง 144.84(b)(2), 144.88(a), and 144.89(a), and all other applicable requirements, including all Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) closure, conversion, and/or replacement requirements.”

๐Ÿ’ก Rather than requiring immediate closure, EPA gave the bank nearly a full year after settlement to finally comply.

QUOTE 9 Minimal stipulated penalties accountability
“If Respondent fails to make the payment specified in Section V.A. or fails to comply with the requirements regarding the closure of the alleged LCCs at the properties specified in Section V.B., Respondent agrees to pay in addition to the assessed penalty, a stipulated penalty of $300 per day per violation for each day the Respondent is late meeting the applicable requirements.”

๐Ÿ’ก A $300 daily penalty for continued operation of illegal cesspools is trivial for a major financial institution.

QUOTE 10 Limited liability resolution accountability
“Full payment of the penalty as described in Section V.A., above, and full compliance with this CA/FO as described in Section V.B. shall only resolve Respondent’s liability for federal civil penalties for the violations and facts alleged in Section IV of this CA/FO.”

๐Ÿ’ก The settlement narrowly resolves only federal civil penalties, not broader liability or compensation to affected communities.

QUOTE 11 Tax treatment reveals true nature profit
“This civil penalty represents an administrative civil penalty and shall not be deductible for purposes of federal taxes. 26 U.S.C. ยง 162(f).”

๐Ÿ’ก The penalty is officially characterized as punishment, not a business expense, yet its small size undermines deterrent effect.

QUOTE 12 Compliance as restitution profit
“For purposes of the identification requirement of Section 162(f)(2)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. ยง 162(f)(2)(A)(ii), performance of Section V.B. is restitution or required to come into compliance with law.”

๐Ÿ’ก The agreement frames cesspool closure as restitution, implicitly acknowledging harm caused by the violations.

QUOTE 13 Groundwater contamination risk health
“Section 1421 of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. ยง 300h, requires that the Administrator of EPA promulgate regulations, which shall include permitting requirements as well as inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements, for state underground injection control (UIC) programs to prevent underground injection from endangering drinking water sources.”

๐Ÿ’ก The entire regulatory framework exists to prevent exactly what the bank allegedly did for nearly two decades.

QUOTE 14 Trustee responsibility accountability
“Respondent is the Bank of Hawaii solely in its capacity as Trustee of the Kukuiolono Park Trust Estate, and not in its individual or corporate capacity. The Kukuiolono Park Trust Estate is a trust treated as a 501(c)(3) organization whose headquarters is located at 111 South King Street, Honolulu, Hawaii.”

๐Ÿ’ก Even in its charitable trustee role, the bank allegedly prioritized cost savings over environmental compliance and public health.

QUOTE 15 Long-term property control allegations
“Respondent has operated one parcel of real property located at 854 Puu Road (TMK 4-2-3-005-002) in Kalaheo on the Island of Kauai, comprised of the Kukuiolono Golf Course, Golf Course Comfort Station, Kukuiolono Park Pavilion, and Kukuiolono Japanese Garden, and another parcel of real property located at 4255 Papalina Road (TMK (4) 2-3-005: 024) in Kalaheo on the Island of Kauai, comprised of the Kukuiolono Camp residential dwellings, since at least August 20, 1918 and approximately 1943, respectively.”

๐Ÿ’ก The bank’s century-long oversight of these properties underscores institutional knowledge and responsibility.

Frequently Asked Questions

โ“What exactly did Bank of Hawaii do wrong?
EPA alleges the bank operated three large-capacity cesspools at properties it manages as trustee on Kauai. These cesspools dispose of untreated human waste directly into the ground. Federal law required all such cesspools to be closed by April 5, 2005, but the bank allegedly continued operating them until at least 2024.
โ“Why are large-capacity cesspools dangerous?
Large-capacity cesspools inject untreated sewage containing bacteria, viruses, parasites, and chemical contaminants directly into the subsurface. This creates pathways for pathogens to reach underground drinking water sources. In Hawaii, where communities rely heavily on groundwater aquifers, this poses serious public health risks including waterborne diseases and nitrate contamination.
โ“How long did these violations continue?
EPA alleges the violations continued from the April 5, 2005 closure deadline until the 2024 enforcement action, a period of nearly 19 years. The consent agreement gives the bank until December 31, 2024 to finally close the cesspools, extending the violation period even further.
โ“What was the penalty for almost two decades of violations?
EPA assessed a civil penalty of $58,000. This represents just 17 percent of the maximum administrative penalty of $337,725 that EPA could have imposed. Averaged over 19 years, the penalty amounts to roughly $3,000 per year or less than $10 per day.
โ“Will affected community members receive compensation?
No. The consent agreement does not include any compensation for community members who may have been exposed to contaminated drinking water, property owners whose values may have declined, or public health costs. The settlement only requires the bank to pay the penalty and close the cesspools.
โ“Did Bank of Hawaii admit wrongdoing?
No. Under the terms of the consent agreement, the bank admits the jurisdictional allegations but neither admits nor denies the specific factual allegations about operating illegal cesspools. This is standard in EPA settlements but allows institutions to resolve violations without acknowledging the underlying conduct.
โ“Why did it take so long to discover these violations?
The document does not explain why the violations went undetected for nearly two decades. This gap likely reflects systemic enforcement challenges including underfunded regulatory agencies, limited inspection capacity, and the large number of potential violation sites compared to available oversight resources.
โ“What happens if the bank fails to close the cesspools by the deadline?
The consent agreement includes stipulated penalties of $300 per day per violation if the bank fails to close the cesspools. However, EPA must request the Department of Justice to bring an enforcement action to collect these penalties. The bank can also seek deadline extensions for force majeure events.
โ“How does this violation affect public trust in corporate environmental responsibility?
The case undermines trust in corporate self-regulation and fiduciary responsibility. Bank of Hawaii is a major financial institution managing a charitable trust estate, yet allegedly ignored basic environmental protections for nearly 20 years. This suggests that even well-resourced institutions with strong reputations may prioritize cost savings over public health when penalties are minimal and enforcement is inconsistent.
โ“What can concerned citizens do about cases like this?
Citizens can file complaints with EPA about suspected environmental violations, support increased funding for regulatory enforcement agencies, advocate for stronger penalties that exceed the cost of compliance, demand corporate transparency about wastewater systems and environmental compliance, participate in public comment periods for consent agreements, and support community-based water quality monitoring programs to detect contamination early.
Post ID: 2464  ยท  Slug: bank-of-hawaii-failed-to-close-illegal-cesspools-threatening-leaks-into-underground-drinking-water-sources-for-decades  ยท  Original: 2025-03-10  ยท  Rebuilt: 2026-03-20

EPA’s source file for this pollution: https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-11/uic-09-2024-0016-cafo-bank-of-hawaii-trustee-kukuiolono-park-trust-estate.pdf

๐Ÿ’ก Explore Corporate Misconduct by Category

Corporations harm people every day โ€” from wage theft to pollution. Learn more by exploring key areas of injustice.

Aleeia
Aleeia

I'm the creator this website. I have 6+ years of experience as an independent researcher studying corporatocracy and its detrimental effects on every single aspect of society.

For more information, please see my About page.

All posts published by this profile were either personally written by me, or I actively edited / reviewed them before publishing. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Articles: 1691