FTC cites communications with Chevron-Hess and OPEC as a catalyst for higher oil prices

FTC Blocks Chevron-Hess Merger Over OPEC Collusion Concerns
Corporate Misconduct Accountability Project

FTC Blocks Chevron-Hess Merger Over OPEC Collusion Concerns

Federal regulators charge that Hess CEO’s communications with foreign oil cartel representatives threaten to raise gas prices for American consumers through coordinated production cuts.

CRITICAL SEVERITY
TL;DR

The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint to block Chevron’s $53 billion acquisition of Hess Corporation. The FTC alleges that Hess CEO John B. Hess maintained years of public and private communications with OPEC officials, encouraging the cartel to restrict oil production and stabilize prices. If the merger proceeds, Mr. Hess would join Chevron’s Board of Directors, giving him influence over one of the world’s largest oil companies. The FTC warns this would amplify coordination with OPEC, substantially lessening competition and increasing fuel costs for American families and businesses.

This case reveals how corporate consolidation can enable price coordination with foreign cartels at the expense of everyday consumers.

$53B
Value of proposed Chevron-Hess merger
$196.9B
Chevron’s 2023 revenue
50%
OPEC’s share of global crude oil production
40,000
Chevron employees globally

The Allegations: A Breakdown

⚠️
Core Allegations
What they did · 8 points
01 Hess CEO John B. Hess communicated publicly and privately with OPEC representatives and oil ministers about global output and crude oil market competition. These communications occurred at industry events and private meetings spanning from at least December 2016 through July 2023. high
02 Mr. Hess encouraged high-level OPEC representatives in their stated mission to stabilize global oil markets. He praised OPEC publicly for its role in stabilizing oil prices and reducing inventory levels, stating there is a direct correlation between inventory levels and oil prices. high
03 The merger agreement requires Chevron to appoint Mr. Hess to its Board of Directors. The Board directs corporate affairs, sets strategy, makes decisions on major issues, and receives competitively sensitive confidential information about company operations. critical
04 Mr. Hess appeared with OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo at a December 2016 forum, stating the OPEC agreement would accelerate the drawdown of excessive supplies and that prices would otherwise have floundered for another year in the 40 dollar range. high
05 Hess Corporation served as a gold-level sponsor of the 8th OPEC International Seminar in Vienna in July 2023. It was the only U.S. firm to sponsor the event, alongside entities from OPEC member states like Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. high
06 Mr. Hess stated publicly that OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, has become the swing supplier and Federal Reserve of oil prices, replacing U.S. shale. He praised OPEC as being very disciplined, wise, and doing a great job managing the oil market. high
07 Documents from Mr. Hess’s files include communications with OPEC officials and representatives from OPEC member states about global output and crude oil inventory management. The nature and extent of these private communications are detailed in redacted portions of the complaint. high
08 If Mr. Hess joins Chevron’s Board, he could direct, approve, or influence Chevron’s investments and policies to align more closely with OPEC’s mission and operations. Chevron is substantially larger than Hess and is the fourth-largest public, non-state-owned oil company. critical
⚖️
Regulatory Failures
How the system enabled this · 6 points
01 Contacts between competitors about commercial practices regarding output, prices, or other competitive dimensions can undermine free and fair competition and violate antitrust laws. These contacts are problematic whether made in public or in private. high
02 Coordination among competitors on output, if subject to U.S. jurisdiction and laws, would be actionable under federal antitrust laws. However, OPEC Oil Producers coordinate production targets regularly to manage global oil prices. high
03 Communications by oil executives that support and encourage OPEC members and foreign oil ministers to stabilize oil output and prices can facilitate opportunities for executives to act in support of these objectives. medium
04 OPEC accounts for approximately 50% of global crude oil production. A significant share of the global market is exposed to OPEC’s coordinated output decision-making, which affects competition. high
05 The merger agreement itself violates Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. The agreement contains the Board appointment provision that the FTC identifies as causing the competitive harm. critical
06 Oil industry executives have opportunities to communicate with OPEC representatives, oil ministers, and foreign national oil company representatives at public and private events. These forums create environments where anti-competitive coordination can occur. medium
💰
Profit Over People
Corporate priorities exposed · 6 points
01 OPEC’s stated mission is to coordinate and unify petroleum policies of member countries and ensure stabilization of oil markets to secure a steady income to producers and fair return on capital for investors. Consumer interests are secondary to producer profits. high
02 For decades, OPEC had outsized power over oil prices in the United States. Decisions made by this cartel of oil-exporting countries harm the dynamism of a competitive market and have affected what American consumers and businesses paid at the gas pump. high
03 Mr. Hess publicly stated in November 2019 that OPEC tried to put U.S. producers out of business during the 2014 price collapse. When that failed, OPEC officials had an incentive to coordinate with U.S. rivals rather than compete. high
04 OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo engaged in efforts to convince U.S. producers to coordinate oil production and inventory reserves, which would raise global oil prices above levels that would otherwise prevail. These overtures began as early as late 2016. critical
05 Mr. Hess’s participation on Chevron’s Board would amplify his supportive messaging to OPEC and others, meaningfully increasing the likelihood that Chevron would align its production with OPEC’s output decisions to maintain higher prices. critical
06 At a March 2017 industry conference, Mr. Barkindo stated that all industry participants felt the brunt of market volatility and wanted to see restoration of stability, with no one wanting a repeat of 2015 and 2016 low prices. medium
📉
Economic Fallout
The cost to consumers · 7 points
01 Harm to competition in crude oil production and sales would likely result in higher oil prices, leading to higher prices for transportation fuels including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. critical
02 Higher oil prices would increase costs for heating oil, chemicals, and end products such as lubricants, plastics, paints, and asphalt. These price increases would cascade throughout the economy. high
03 U.S. production growth over the past decade has injected new output into the crude oil market, ultimately lowering prices for Americans when they fill their tanks or heat their homes. The merger threatens to reverse these competitive gains. high
04 The United States has been the world’s largest oil producer for the past six years, producing more crude oil than any nation ever. This production surge challenged OPEC’s market power and lowered consumer prices. high
05 The significant and sustained drop in world oil prices from 2014 to 2016 directly impacted OPEC Oil Producers’ ability to maintain production quotas and higher crude oil prices. OPEC responded with price wars and expanded membership to OPEC Plus. medium
06 Mr. Hess noted publicly at a December 2016 event that without OPEC’s production agreement, prices would have remained in the 40 dollar range for another year. His statements signal approval of OPEC’s price stabilization efforts. high
07 Fierce new competition from U.S. producers frustrated OPEC representatives, as expanded U.S. production undercut the artificially low production levels and artificially high prices OPEC Oil Producers seek to set and impose. high
🏘️
Community Impact
Who bears the burden · 4 points
01 American consumers and businesses would pay higher prices at the gas pump if the merger increases coordination with OPEC. These costs affect household budgets, business operating expenses, and overall economic competitiveness. high
02 Hess operates crude oil production facilities in North Dakota, Montana, and the Gulf of Mexico. Workers and communities in these regions depend on competitive market conditions for employment stability and local economic health. medium
03 Chevron operates major crude oil production operations in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and the Gulf of Mexico. Communities across these regions would be affected by any shift toward OPEC-aligned production strategies. medium
04 Around a decade ago, technological breakthroughs catalyzed a surge in U.S. production. This benefited American workers and communities by creating jobs and lowering energy costs for households. medium
🔍
Corporate Accountability Failures
The accountability gap · 6 points
01 The merger agreement was executed on October 22, 2023, with an all-stock transaction valued at approximately $53 billion. Section 1.3(a) of the agreement mandates that Chevron appoint Mr. Hess to the Board of Directors. high
02 Chevron reported $196.9 billion in revenue in 2023 with approximately 40,000 employees globally. It is one of the world’s ten largest oil enterprises by market capitalization and the fourth-largest public, non-state-owned oil company. medium
03 Hess reported $10.6 billion in revenue in 2023 with approximately 1,700 employees globally. The merger would consolidate these resources under leadership that the FTC alleges has demonstrated willingness to coordinate with OPEC. medium
04 At a March 2019 CSIS event, OPEC Secretary General Barkindo remarked that Mr. Hess’s wise guidance and great sincerity to him personally and to OPEC as an organization is always immensely appreciated. high
05 Mr. Hess stated at a December 2016 forum that the key question is whether shale and OPEC can coexist, and his answer was absolutely yes. He distinguished shale as short cycle and OPEC as long cycle, stating both are needed for sustainable prices. high
06 The complaint charges that the merger agreement itself constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition, separate from the Clayton Act Section 7 violation if the merger is consummated. critical
📢
The PR Machine
Public statements vs. private actions · 6 points
01 At a December 2016 CSIS forum, Mr. Hess stated publicly that everyone tends to talk about shale becoming the new OPEC, but that is not the case. He positioned OPEC and U.S. shale as complementary rather than competitive. high
02 Mr. Hess told reporters after meeting with OPEC Secretary General Barkindo in March 2017 that it was a very good exchange of information and views about oil, and he commended the OPEC Secretary General for the outreach. high
03 In investor conferences from 2020 to 2022, Mr. Hess stated that OPEC was responsible for the stability of oil markets and oil prices. He signaled his approval of OPEC’s actions and praised them as very clever, intelligent, and wise. high
04 On Hess’s July 28, 2021 earnings call, Mr. Hess stated that the swing supplier going forward and the Federal Reserve of oil prices is going to be OPEC Plus led by Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other members, with U.S. shale playing a back seat role. critical
05 Mr. Hess stated publicly that Saudi Arabia had done a masterful job leading OPEC Plus, giving the market what it needs but not oversupplying it, and that the balance and stability of markets is finally in OPEC’s hands. high
06 At the March 2017 conference, Mr. Hess characterized OPEC’s message as stating we are all in the same boat. Mr. Barkindo stated at the same event that all participants want to see restoration of stability with no repeat of 2015 and 2016. high
⚖️
The Bottom Line
What this means · 7 points
01 The FTC charges that the effect of the proposed acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the global market for crude oil production and sales, violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. critical
02 The merger agreement constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. The proposed acquisition, if consummated, would also violate Section 5 of the FTC Act. critical
03 Mr. Hess’s history of communications with OPEC heightens the risk of harm to competition if he assumes a seat on Chevron’s Board of Directors. The amplification of his influence increases the potential for industry coordination. critical
04 The transaction would meaningfully increase the risk of industry coordination in the global market for oil production and sale. This increased coordination would facilitate an unfair method of competition. critical
05 The complaint identifies crude oil as a relevant product market that purchasers generally cannot switch away from without facing substantial costs. The relevant geographic market is global in scope. medium
06 Chevron and Hess compete against OPEC Oil Producers in the global production and sale of crude oil. The merger would eliminate this competitive dynamic by aligning one major competitor with OPEC’s coordination objectives. high
07 Both Chevron and Hess are engaged in activities in or affecting commerce as defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act and Section 1 of the Clayton Act. The FTC has jurisdiction over this matter and authority to challenge the merger. medium

Timeline of Events

December 2016
Mr. Hess appears with OPEC Secretary General Barkindo at CSIS forum, stating OPEC agreement would accelerate drawdown of excessive supplies and prevent prices from floundering in the 40s for another year.
March 2017
Mr. Hess attends CERA Week meetings between Barkindo and senior oil executives. Barkindo states all want to see restoration of stability with no repeat of 2015-2016. Mr. Hess praises the outreach as a good exchange of information.
March 2019
Mr. Hess introduces Barkindo at CSIS luncheon conversation. Barkindo remarks that Mr. Hess’s wise guidance and sincerity to him personally and to OPEC is always immensely appreciated.
November 2019
At Bank of America conference, Mr. Hess describes how OPEC tried to put U.S. producers out of business in 2014 price collapse, but American ingenuity and productivity improvements allowed shale to survive.
July 2021
On Hess earnings call, Mr. Hess states that OPEC Plus led by Saudi Arabia and Russia will be the swing supplier and Federal Reserve of oil prices going forward, with U.S. shale playing a back seat role.
August 2022
Haitham Al Ghais assumes office as OPEC Secretary General, replacing Barkindo. Mr. Hess subsequently meets with Al Ghais at industry events.
March 2023
Mr. Hess and Al Ghais meet at CERA Week industry conference, continuing pattern of engagement between Hess leadership and OPEC officials.
July 2023
Mr. Hess speaks at 8th OPEC International Seminar in Vienna. Hess Corporation serves as gold-level sponsor, the only U.S. firm to sponsor the OPEC summit.
October 22, 2023
Chevron and Hess execute merger agreement for approximately $53 billion all-stock transaction. Agreement requires Chevron to appoint Mr. Hess to its Board of Directors.
2024
Federal Trade Commission files complaint to block the proposed acquisition, charging violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.

Direct Quotes from the Legal Record

QUOTE 1 OPEC’s anti-competitive mission allegations
“OPEC’s stated mission is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry.”

💡 OPEC explicitly coordinates output among competitors to stabilize prices, which would violate U.S. antitrust laws if domestic companies engaged in the same behavior.

QUOTE 2 Hess praised OPEC’s market manipulation allegations
“You say, why is this agreement so important? We had a glut, it was a stubborn glut from over-production, and even though demand was increasing every year for oil, a million barrels a day, the glut remained… What this deal does is accelerate the draw down of those excessive supplies to get to inventories in the world where they’re comfortable, but not excessive, and if this agreement hadn’t been done, I think probably prices would have floundered for another year in the 40s.”

💡 Mr. Hess publicly endorsed OPEC’s production cuts as necessary to prevent prices from staying low, signaling support for cartel coordination over competitive markets.

QUOTE 3 Acknowledgment of coordination attempts regulatory
“Faced with reinvigorated competition from U.S. producers, and having failed to win a price war, OPEC officials had an incentive to coordinate with these rivals rather than compete.”

💡 The FTC explicitly identifies OPEC’s shift from competing with U.S. producers to attempting coordination, which the Hess CEO’s communications allegedly facilitated.

QUOTE 4 The harm to American consumers economic
“Harm to competition in crude oil production and sales would likely result in higher oil prices, leading to higher prices for transportation fuels (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel), heating oil, chemicals, and end products such as lubricants, plastics, paints, and asphalt.”

💡 The FTC directly connects reduced competition to increased costs across the entire economy, affecting every American household and business.

QUOTE 5 Board appointment amplifies the threat accountability
“If Mr. Hess were to join Chevron’s Board of Directors, he could direct, approve, or influence Chevron’s investments and policies to align more closely with OPEC’s mission and operations.”

💡 The merger specifically threatens competition because it gives an OPEC-aligned executive control over one of the world’s largest oil companies.

QUOTE 6 Size matters for competitive harm profit
“Mr. Hess’s participation on Chevron’s Board of Directors would amplify Mr. Hess’s supportive messaging to OPEC and others, thereby meaningfully increasing the likelihood that Chevron would align its production with OPEC’s output decisions to maintain higher prices.”

💡 Because Chevron is substantially larger than Hess, the merger amplifies the competitive threat by giving Mr. Hess’s OPEC-supportive views much greater market impact.

QUOTE 7 Hess positioned OPEC as price controller pr_machine
“So shale will play a role, but it’s going to have a back seat in terms of being the swing supplier. The swing supplier going forward and really the Federal Reserve of oil prices is going to be OPEC led by or OPEC+ led by Saudi Arabia, Russia and the other members.”

💡 On a public earnings call, Mr. Hess explicitly described OPEC as controlling oil prices like the Federal Reserve controls monetary policy, signaling his acceptance of cartel price management.

QUOTE 8 Public praise for OPEC’s market management pr_machine
“OPEC, I think, has done a great job managing the oil market… Saudi Arabia had done a masterful job leading OPEC plus, giving the market what it needs, but not oversupplying it.”

💡 Mr. Hess repeatedly praised OPEC publicly for restraining supply to maintain prices, demonstrating alignment with cartel objectives rather than competitive market principles.

QUOTE 9 OPEC’s appreciation for Hess’s support accountability
“Mr. Barkindo remarked that Mr. Hess’s wise guidance, and great sincerity to me personally, and to OPEC as an Organization, is always immensely appreciated.”

💡 OPEC’s Secretary General publicly thanked Mr. Hess for his guidance and support, demonstrating the close relationship that concerns regulators.

QUOTE 10 Contacts with competitors harm competition regulatory
“Contacts between competitors about their commercial practices regarding output, prices, or other competitive dimensions, whether made in public or in private, can undermine free and fair competition and violate the antitrust laws.”

💡 The FTC establishes that both public and private communications about output and prices with competitors are anti-competitive, regardless of the forum.

QUOTE 11 U.S. production boom challenged OPEC economic
“Around a decade ago, technological breakthroughs catalyzed a surge in U.S. production. Partly as a result, the United States for the past six years has produced more crude oil than any nation ever. U.S. production growth has injected new output into the crude oil market, ultimately lowering prices for Americans when they fill their tanks or heat their homes.”

💡 U.S. production increases directly benefited consumers by lowering prices, which the merger threatens to reverse by enabling coordination with OPEC.

QUOTE 12 OPEC tried to eliminate U.S. competition profit
“And I think OPEC itself probably misplayed their cards when they thought when the free fall in oil prices happened in 2014, that basically, they would put U.S. producers out of business because basically, as oil prices went down, American independent ingenuity went up.”

💡 Mr. Hess acknowledged that OPEC attempted to drive U.S. producers out of business through price manipulation, revealing the cartel’s anti-competitive intent.

QUOTE 13 The legal violations charged conclusion
“The effect of the Proposed Acquisition, if consummated, may be to substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, in the relevant antitrust market in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”

💡 The FTC formally charges that this merger violates federal antitrust law by substantially lessening competition in global oil markets.

QUOTE 14 The merger agreement itself violates the law conclusion
“The Merger Agreement between Chevron and Hess constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended.”

💡 The FTC charges that the agreement itself is illegal as an unfair method of competition, even before the merger is completed.

QUOTE 15 Coordination threatens market competition conclusion
“Because the effect of the transaction may be substantially to lessen competition by increasing the risk of harm to competition and meaningfully increasing the likelihood of industry coordination in the global market for the production and sale of oil, the Proposed Acquisition violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”

💡 The FTC’s core theory is that the merger increases coordination risk with OPEC, which would harm competition and raise consumer prices across the economy.

Frequently Asked Questions

What exactly did Hess CEO John B. Hess do wrong?
According to the FTC complaint, Mr. Hess maintained years of public and private communications with OPEC officials, including two OPEC Secretaries General and representatives from OPEC member states. He publicly praised OPEC’s efforts to stabilize oil markets by restricting production, encouraged inventory drawdowns to support prices, and sponsored OPEC events. The FTC alleges these communications support OPEC’s cartel objectives and could increase coordination if Mr. Hess gains a board seat at Chevron.
Why is this merger different from other oil company mergers?
The merger agreement specifically requires Chevron to appoint Mr. Hess to its Board of Directors. Because Mr. Hess has a documented history of communications with OPEC that the FTC views as encouraging production coordination, his elevation to the board of one of the world’s largest oil companies would amplify his influence and meaningfully increase the risk of industry coordination with the foreign cartel.
How would this merger affect gas prices for ordinary Americans?
The FTC alleges that if the merger proceeds, it would increase the likelihood of Chevron aligning its production with OPEC’s output decisions to maintain higher prices. This coordination would likely result in higher oil prices, which would cascade to higher costs for gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, heating oil, and products made from petroleum like plastics, paints, and asphalt.
Is OPEC illegal? Why can it coordinate production when U.S. companies cannot?
OPEC is an organization of foreign governments and state-owned oil companies. The FTC complaint notes that coordination among competitors on output would be actionable under federal antitrust laws if subject to U.S. jurisdiction. However, OPEC operates outside U.S. legal authority. The concern is that U.S. companies might align with OPEC’s coordination objectives, effectively extending the cartel’s influence into American markets.
What evidence does the FTC have of communications between Hess and OPEC?
The complaint documents multiple public appearances where Mr. Hess shared platforms with OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo and his successor Haitham Al Ghais at events including CSIS forums, CERA Week conferences, and the 8th OPEC International Seminar. It also references private communications found in ordinary course documents from Mr. Hess’s files, though many details are redacted in the public version of the complaint. Additionally, the complaint cites numerous public statements from earnings calls and investor conferences where Mr. Hess praised OPEC’s market management.
What role does Chevron’s size play in the FTC’s concerns?
Chevron reported $196.9 billion in revenue in 2023 compared to Hess’s $10.6 billion. Chevron is one of the world’s ten largest oil enterprises by market capitalization and the fourth-largest public, non-state-owned oil company. The FTC argues that because Chevron is substantially larger than Hess, Mr. Hess’s participation on Chevron’s Board would amplify his supportive messaging to OPEC, giving his OPEC-aligned views much greater impact on global oil markets.
Did Hess Corporation sponsor OPEC events?
Yes. According to the complaint, Hess Corporation served as a gold-level sponsor of the 8th OPEC International Seminar in Vienna, Austria in July 2023. It was the only U.S. firm to sponsor the event, alongside entities associated with OPEC member states like Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission. Mr. Hess also spoke at the summit.
What legal violations is the FTC charging?
The FTC charges three violations: First, that the merger if consummated would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition in global crude oil markets. Second, that the merger agreement itself violates Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. Third, that the proposed acquisition constitutes an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
How has U.S. oil production affected OPEC’s market power?
The complaint describes how technological breakthroughs around a decade ago led to a surge in U.S. shale oil production. The United States has been the world’s largest oil producer for the past six years, producing more crude oil than any nation ever. This production growth injected new supply into global markets and lowered prices for American consumers. The significant price drop from 2014 to 2016 directly challenged OPEC’s ability to maintain production quotas and higher prices, frustrating OPEC representatives.
What can consumers do about this merger?
Consumers can submit comments to the FTC expressing their concerns about how the merger might affect fuel prices and competition. They can contact their elected representatives in Congress to demand stronger antitrust enforcement in the oil industry. Consumer advocacy groups often coordinate efforts to oppose anti-competitive mergers. Additionally, staying informed and sharing information about corporate practices that harm competition helps build public pressure for accountability.
Post ID: 2995  ·  Slug: chevron-hess-higher-oil-prices-ftc  ·  Original: 2025-03-26  ·  Rebuilt: 2026-03-20

You can read the legal complaint on the Federal Trade Commission’s website: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Chevron-Hess-Complaint.pdf

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