FTC Blocks Chevron-Hess Merger Over OPEC Collusion Concerns
Federal regulators charge that Hess CEO’s communications with foreign oil cartel representatives threaten to raise gas prices for American consumers through coordinated production cuts.
The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint to block Chevron’s $53 billion acquisition of Hess Corporation. The FTC alleges that Hess CEO John B. Hess maintained years of public and private communications with OPEC officials, encouraging the cartel to restrict oil production and stabilize prices. If the merger proceeds, Mr. Hess would join Chevron’s Board of Directors, giving him influence over one of the world’s largest oil companies. The FTC warns this would amplify coordination with OPEC, substantially lessening competition and increasing fuel costs for American families and businesses.
This case reveals how corporate consolidation can enable price coordination with foreign cartels at the expense of everyday consumers.
The Allegations: A Breakdown
| 01 | Hess CEO John B. Hess communicated publicly and privately with OPEC representatives and oil ministers about global output and crude oil market competition. These communications occurred at industry events and private meetings spanning from at least December 2016 through July 2023. | high |
| 02 | Mr. Hess encouraged high-level OPEC representatives in their stated mission to stabilize global oil markets. He praised OPEC publicly for its role in stabilizing oil prices and reducing inventory levels, stating there is a direct correlation between inventory levels and oil prices. | high |
| 03 | The merger agreement requires Chevron to appoint Mr. Hess to its Board of Directors. The Board directs corporate affairs, sets strategy, makes decisions on major issues, and receives competitively sensitive confidential information about company operations. | critical |
| 04 | Mr. Hess appeared with OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo at a December 2016 forum, stating the OPEC agreement would accelerate the drawdown of excessive supplies and that prices would otherwise have floundered for another year in the 40 dollar range. | high |
| 05 | Hess Corporation served as a gold-level sponsor of the 8th OPEC International Seminar in Vienna in July 2023. It was the only U.S. firm to sponsor the event, alongside entities from OPEC member states like Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. | high |
| 06 | Mr. Hess stated publicly that OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, has become the swing supplier and Federal Reserve of oil prices, replacing U.S. shale. He praised OPEC as being very disciplined, wise, and doing a great job managing the oil market. | high |
| 07 | Documents from Mr. Hess’s files include communications with OPEC officials and representatives from OPEC member states about global output and crude oil inventory management. The nature and extent of these private communications are detailed in redacted portions of the complaint. | high |
| 08 | If Mr. Hess joins Chevron’s Board, he could direct, approve, or influence Chevron’s investments and policies to align more closely with OPEC’s mission and operations. Chevron is substantially larger than Hess and is the fourth-largest public, non-state-owned oil company. | critical |
| 01 | Contacts between competitors about commercial practices regarding output, prices, or other competitive dimensions can undermine free and fair competition and violate antitrust laws. These contacts are problematic whether made in public or in private. | high |
| 02 | Coordination among competitors on output, if subject to U.S. jurisdiction and laws, would be actionable under federal antitrust laws. However, OPEC Oil Producers coordinate production targets regularly to manage global oil prices. | high |
| 03 | Communications by oil executives that support and encourage OPEC members and foreign oil ministers to stabilize oil output and prices can facilitate opportunities for executives to act in support of these objectives. | medium |
| 04 | OPEC accounts for approximately 50% of global crude oil production. A significant share of the global market is exposed to OPEC’s coordinated output decision-making, which affects competition. | high |
| 05 | The merger agreement itself violates Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. The agreement contains the Board appointment provision that the FTC identifies as causing the competitive harm. | critical |
| 06 | Oil industry executives have opportunities to communicate with OPEC representatives, oil ministers, and foreign national oil company representatives at public and private events. These forums create environments where anti-competitive coordination can occur. | medium |
| 01 | OPEC’s stated mission is to coordinate and unify petroleum policies of member countries and ensure stabilization of oil markets to secure a steady income to producers and fair return on capital for investors. Consumer interests are secondary to producer profits. | high |
| 02 | For decades, OPEC had outsized power over oil prices in the United States. Decisions made by this cartel of oil-exporting countries harm the dynamism of a competitive market and have affected what American consumers and businesses paid at the gas pump. | high |
| 03 | Mr. Hess publicly stated in November 2019 that OPEC tried to put U.S. producers out of business during the 2014 price collapse. When that failed, OPEC officials had an incentive to coordinate with U.S. rivals rather than compete. | high |
| 04 | OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo engaged in efforts to convince U.S. producers to coordinate oil production and inventory reserves, which would raise global oil prices above levels that would otherwise prevail. These overtures began as early as late 2016. | critical |
| 05 | Mr. Hess’s participation on Chevron’s Board would amplify his supportive messaging to OPEC and others, meaningfully increasing the likelihood that Chevron would align its production with OPEC’s output decisions to maintain higher prices. | critical |
| 06 | At a March 2017 industry conference, Mr. Barkindo stated that all industry participants felt the brunt of market volatility and wanted to see restoration of stability, with no one wanting a repeat of 2015 and 2016 low prices. | medium |
| 01 | Harm to competition in crude oil production and sales would likely result in higher oil prices, leading to higher prices for transportation fuels including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. | critical |
| 02 | Higher oil prices would increase costs for heating oil, chemicals, and end products such as lubricants, plastics, paints, and asphalt. These price increases would cascade throughout the economy. | high |
| 03 | U.S. production growth over the past decade has injected new output into the crude oil market, ultimately lowering prices for Americans when they fill their tanks or heat their homes. The merger threatens to reverse these competitive gains. | high |
| 04 | The United States has been the world’s largest oil producer for the past six years, producing more crude oil than any nation ever. This production surge challenged OPEC’s market power and lowered consumer prices. | high |
| 05 | The significant and sustained drop in world oil prices from 2014 to 2016 directly impacted OPEC Oil Producers’ ability to maintain production quotas and higher crude oil prices. OPEC responded with price wars and expanded membership to OPEC Plus. | medium |
| 06 | Mr. Hess noted publicly at a December 2016 event that without OPEC’s production agreement, prices would have remained in the 40 dollar range for another year. His statements signal approval of OPEC’s price stabilization efforts. | high |
| 07 | Fierce new competition from U.S. producers frustrated OPEC representatives, as expanded U.S. production undercut the artificially low production levels and artificially high prices OPEC Oil Producers seek to set and impose. | high |
| 01 | American consumers and businesses would pay higher prices at the gas pump if the merger increases coordination with OPEC. These costs affect household budgets, business operating expenses, and overall economic competitiveness. | high |
| 02 | Hess operates crude oil production facilities in North Dakota, Montana, and the Gulf of Mexico. Workers and communities in these regions depend on competitive market conditions for employment stability and local economic health. | medium |
| 03 | Chevron operates major crude oil production operations in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and the Gulf of Mexico. Communities across these regions would be affected by any shift toward OPEC-aligned production strategies. | medium |
| 04 | Around a decade ago, technological breakthroughs catalyzed a surge in U.S. production. This benefited American workers and communities by creating jobs and lowering energy costs for households. | medium |
| 01 | The merger agreement was executed on October 22, 2023, with an all-stock transaction valued at approximately $53 billion. Section 1.3(a) of the agreement mandates that Chevron appoint Mr. Hess to the Board of Directors. | high |
| 02 | Chevron reported $196.9 billion in revenue in 2023 with approximately 40,000 employees globally. It is one of the world’s ten largest oil enterprises by market capitalization and the fourth-largest public, non-state-owned oil company. | medium |
| 03 | Hess reported $10.6 billion in revenue in 2023 with approximately 1,700 employees globally. The merger would consolidate these resources under leadership that the FTC alleges has demonstrated willingness to coordinate with OPEC. | medium |
| 04 | At a March 2019 CSIS event, OPEC Secretary General Barkindo remarked that Mr. Hess’s wise guidance and great sincerity to him personally and to OPEC as an organization is always immensely appreciated. | high |
| 05 | Mr. Hess stated at a December 2016 forum that the key question is whether shale and OPEC can coexist, and his answer was absolutely yes. He distinguished shale as short cycle and OPEC as long cycle, stating both are needed for sustainable prices. | high |
| 06 | The complaint charges that the merger agreement itself constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition, separate from the Clayton Act Section 7 violation if the merger is consummated. | critical |
| 01 | At a December 2016 CSIS forum, Mr. Hess stated publicly that everyone tends to talk about shale becoming the new OPEC, but that is not the case. He positioned OPEC and U.S. shale as complementary rather than competitive. | high |
| 02 | Mr. Hess told reporters after meeting with OPEC Secretary General Barkindo in March 2017 that it was a very good exchange of information and views about oil, and he commended the OPEC Secretary General for the outreach. | high |
| 03 | In investor conferences from 2020 to 2022, Mr. Hess stated that OPEC was responsible for the stability of oil markets and oil prices. He signaled his approval of OPEC’s actions and praised them as very clever, intelligent, and wise. | high |
| 04 | On Hess’s July 28, 2021 earnings call, Mr. Hess stated that the swing supplier going forward and the Federal Reserve of oil prices is going to be OPEC Plus led by Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other members, with U.S. shale playing a back seat role. | critical |
| 05 | Mr. Hess stated publicly that Saudi Arabia had done a masterful job leading OPEC Plus, giving the market what it needs but not oversupplying it, and that the balance and stability of markets is finally in OPEC’s hands. | high |
| 06 | At the March 2017 conference, Mr. Hess characterized OPEC’s message as stating we are all in the same boat. Mr. Barkindo stated at the same event that all participants want to see restoration of stability with no repeat of 2015 and 2016. | high |
| 01 | The FTC charges that the effect of the proposed acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the global market for crude oil production and sales, violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. | critical |
| 02 | The merger agreement constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. The proposed acquisition, if consummated, would also violate Section 5 of the FTC Act. | critical |
| 03 | Mr. Hess’s history of communications with OPEC heightens the risk of harm to competition if he assumes a seat on Chevron’s Board of Directors. The amplification of his influence increases the potential for industry coordination. | critical |
| 04 | The transaction would meaningfully increase the risk of industry coordination in the global market for oil production and sale. This increased coordination would facilitate an unfair method of competition. | critical |
| 05 | The complaint identifies crude oil as a relevant product market that purchasers generally cannot switch away from without facing substantial costs. The relevant geographic market is global in scope. | medium |
| 06 | Chevron and Hess compete against OPEC Oil Producers in the global production and sale of crude oil. The merger would eliminate this competitive dynamic by aligning one major competitor with OPEC’s coordination objectives. | high |
| 07 | Both Chevron and Hess are engaged in activities in or affecting commerce as defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act and Section 1 of the Clayton Act. The FTC has jurisdiction over this matter and authority to challenge the merger. | medium |
Timeline of Events
Direct Quotes from the Legal Record
“OPEC’s stated mission is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry.”
💡 OPEC explicitly coordinates output among competitors to stabilize prices, which would violate U.S. antitrust laws if domestic companies engaged in the same behavior.
“You say, why is this agreement so important? We had a glut, it was a stubborn glut from over-production, and even though demand was increasing every year for oil, a million barrels a day, the glut remained… What this deal does is accelerate the draw down of those excessive supplies to get to inventories in the world where they’re comfortable, but not excessive, and if this agreement hadn’t been done, I think probably prices would have floundered for another year in the 40s.”
💡 Mr. Hess publicly endorsed OPEC’s production cuts as necessary to prevent prices from staying low, signaling support for cartel coordination over competitive markets.
“Faced with reinvigorated competition from U.S. producers, and having failed to win a price war, OPEC officials had an incentive to coordinate with these rivals rather than compete.”
💡 The FTC explicitly identifies OPEC’s shift from competing with U.S. producers to attempting coordination, which the Hess CEO’s communications allegedly facilitated.
“Harm to competition in crude oil production and sales would likely result in higher oil prices, leading to higher prices for transportation fuels (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel), heating oil, chemicals, and end products such as lubricants, plastics, paints, and asphalt.”
💡 The FTC directly connects reduced competition to increased costs across the entire economy, affecting every American household and business.
“If Mr. Hess were to join Chevron’s Board of Directors, he could direct, approve, or influence Chevron’s investments and policies to align more closely with OPEC’s mission and operations.”
💡 The merger specifically threatens competition because it gives an OPEC-aligned executive control over one of the world’s largest oil companies.
“Mr. Hess’s participation on Chevron’s Board of Directors would amplify Mr. Hess’s supportive messaging to OPEC and others, thereby meaningfully increasing the likelihood that Chevron would align its production with OPEC’s output decisions to maintain higher prices.”
💡 Because Chevron is substantially larger than Hess, the merger amplifies the competitive threat by giving Mr. Hess’s OPEC-supportive views much greater market impact.
“So shale will play a role, but it’s going to have a back seat in terms of being the swing supplier. The swing supplier going forward and really the Federal Reserve of oil prices is going to be OPEC led by or OPEC+ led by Saudi Arabia, Russia and the other members.”
💡 On a public earnings call, Mr. Hess explicitly described OPEC as controlling oil prices like the Federal Reserve controls monetary policy, signaling his acceptance of cartel price management.
“OPEC, I think, has done a great job managing the oil market… Saudi Arabia had done a masterful job leading OPEC plus, giving the market what it needs, but not oversupplying it.”
💡 Mr. Hess repeatedly praised OPEC publicly for restraining supply to maintain prices, demonstrating alignment with cartel objectives rather than competitive market principles.
“Mr. Barkindo remarked that Mr. Hess’s wise guidance, and great sincerity to me personally, and to OPEC as an Organization, is always immensely appreciated.”
💡 OPEC’s Secretary General publicly thanked Mr. Hess for his guidance and support, demonstrating the close relationship that concerns regulators.
“Contacts between competitors about their commercial practices regarding output, prices, or other competitive dimensions, whether made in public or in private, can undermine free and fair competition and violate the antitrust laws.”
💡 The FTC establishes that both public and private communications about output and prices with competitors are anti-competitive, regardless of the forum.
“Around a decade ago, technological breakthroughs catalyzed a surge in U.S. production. Partly as a result, the United States for the past six years has produced more crude oil than any nation ever. U.S. production growth has injected new output into the crude oil market, ultimately lowering prices for Americans when they fill their tanks or heat their homes.”
💡 U.S. production increases directly benefited consumers by lowering prices, which the merger threatens to reverse by enabling coordination with OPEC.
“And I think OPEC itself probably misplayed their cards when they thought when the free fall in oil prices happened in 2014, that basically, they would put U.S. producers out of business because basically, as oil prices went down, American independent ingenuity went up.”
💡 Mr. Hess acknowledged that OPEC attempted to drive U.S. producers out of business through price manipulation, revealing the cartel’s anti-competitive intent.
“The effect of the Proposed Acquisition, if consummated, may be to substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, in the relevant antitrust market in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”
💡 The FTC formally charges that this merger violates federal antitrust law by substantially lessening competition in global oil markets.
“The Merger Agreement between Chevron and Hess constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended.”
💡 The FTC charges that the agreement itself is illegal as an unfair method of competition, even before the merger is completed.
“Because the effect of the transaction may be substantially to lessen competition by increasing the risk of harm to competition and meaningfully increasing the likelihood of industry coordination in the global market for the production and sale of oil, the Proposed Acquisition violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”
💡 The FTC’s core theory is that the merger increases coordination risk with OPEC, which would harm competition and raise consumer prices across the economy.
Frequently Asked Questions
You can read the legal complaint on the Federal Trade Commission’s website: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Chevron-Hess-Complaint.pdf
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