W.R. Grace Ran an Illegal Toxic Waste Operation in Oregon for Nearly Six Years
A pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturer stored and treated classified hazardous solvents in unmarked, uninspected tanks and containers, released organic vapor into facility air, and kept no records β all while claiming a permit exemption it had no legal right to use.
The Non-Financial Ledger: What a $500,000 Check Does Not Cover
Albany, Oregon is a small city of about 55,000 people in the Willamette Valley, surrounded by farmland, the Calapooia River, and neighborhoods where people have lived for generations. It is not an abstraction. It is where people go to work, raise kids, grow food, and breathe.
W.R. Grace’s facility at 1290 Industrial Way sat inside that community for decades. The company manufactured chemicals for pharmaceutical ingredients and dietary supplements β the kind of products marketed as making people healthier. The solvents used in that process are a different story. The federal government classifies them as F002, F003, and F005 hazardous wastes: solvents that are ignitable, corrosive, and toxic. When these materials evaporate into the air β and they do evaporate, which is exactly why federal law mandates specific controls on containers and tanks holding them at 500 parts per million volatile organic concentration or greater β they become an inhalation and contamination risk.
The workers on the floor of Building 2 were the closest. They worked in a facility where hazardous solvents were moving through tanks and containers that had no required secondary containment, no weekly leak inspections, no vapor emission controls, and no “Hazardous Waste” labels. The pumps and valves that transferred those solvents between tanks were never monitored for leaks. The company had not even formally determined, and committed to paper, that these materials were hazardous waste at the point they were generated β a legal requirement that exists specifically so workers and regulators know what they are dealing with. That basic paperwork protection was absent for nearly six years.
There is no settlement figure for the workers who breathed whatever evaporated from those tanks. There is no line item for the families who live near Industrial Way and whose health outcomes are connected to what a chemical plant does or does not control. The $500,000 penalty goes to the U.S. Treasury. It does not go to Albany. It does not go to a single person who lived or worked near that facility.
W.R. Grace, for its part, neither admitted nor denied the facts in the consent agreement. That is the legal formula that allows a corporation to absorb an enforcement action as a cost of doing business, acknowledge nothing, and move on. The company closed the Albany facility in January 2024, sold it in December 2024, and is now simply somewhere else. The EPA’s enforcement record, however, stays attached to the address.
What the Non-Financial Ledger records is simpler than any legal document: a corporation producing pharmaceuticals and supplements for profit ran a hazardous waste operation in a working-class Oregon city for nearly six years without the basic safeguards the law requires. The people who worked in that building and the people who lived near it were not given the protections they were legally owed. A fine was paid. No one was named responsible. The company walked.
Legal Receipts: What the EPA’s Own Documents Prove
The following quotes are drawn verbatim from EPA Docket No. RCRA-10-2024-0073. Each establishes a specific, documented violation.
Respondent’s records did not identify whether certain residues or solid waste, at the point of generation, was (1) a listed hazardous waste; and/or (2) a characteristic hazardous waste.
β Consent Agreement, Paragraph 5.5, Count 1
- This is the foundational failure. Federal and Oregon law require generators to formally determine and document whether their waste is hazardous at the exact moment it is generated. W.R. Grace skipped this step entirely for certain waste streams in Building 2, meaning there was no official record triggering the legal protections that follow from that designation.
- Without a documented hazardous waste determination, every other protective requirement downstream β labeling, containment, inspection, monitoring β has no formal trigger. This is not a paperwork technicality; it is the entire legal infrastructure for keeping toxic materials tracked and controlled.
Respondent did not have a permit or interim status, and stored and treated hazardous waste at times in certain containers and tanks…containing spent solvents which were F-listed and/or characteristic hazardous waste.
β Consent Agreement, Paragraph 5.9, Count 2
- This is the core permit violation. Under RCRA Section 3005(a), operating a facility that stores or treats hazardous waste without a permit or interim status is a direct violation of federal law. W.R. Grace had neither.
- The company’s defense was a “conditional exemption” available to Large Quantity Generators. That exemption is not a blanket pass; it requires meeting specific operating conditions. The EPA’s document then spends nine separate counts (A through I) demonstrating that W.R. Grace failed to meet every single one of those conditions.
Respondent did not meet the conditional exemption requirements for organic air emissions control when transferring certain solvent hazardous wastes out of certain Tote containers…according to the requirements for Container Level 2 at 40 C.F.R. Β§ 265.1087(d)(2)…during the Relevant Time Period.
β Consent Agreement, Paragraph 5.17, Count 2B
- The containers holding hazardous solvents at 500 ppmw or greater required Container Level 2 air emission controls β specifically, transfers had to be conducted to minimize the hazardous waste’s exposure to the atmosphere. W.R. Grace did not do this.
- Volatile organic compounds at these concentrations, when vented to the atmosphere during uncontrolled transfers, represent direct inhalation exposure risks for workers handling the containers, as well as potential ambient air quality impacts at the facility level.
Respondent did not meet the conditional exemption requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 265 Subpart J at Β§Β§ 265.192, 265.193, 265.194 and 265.195…for the 8 Tanks when used as described in paragraph 4.14 during the Relevant Time Period.
β Consent Agreement, Paragraph 5.21, Count 2C
- The eight tanks (R-201, R-206, R-207, T-201, T-202, T-203, T-206, T-207) were used to hold hazardous solvents prior to or during neutralization before transfer to bulk waste tanks. Federal Subpart J requirements for hazardous waste tanks include design and installation standards, secondary containment to prevent leaks from reaching soil or groundwater, general operating requirements, and regular inspections.
- W.R. Grace met none of these four requirements for any of the eight tanks. Secondary containment is specifically designed to catch releases before they reach the environment. Its absence means any leak from these tanks would have had no engineered barrier between it and the ground beneath the facility.
During the Relevant Time Period, Respondent did not monitor or keep records of leaks from the pumps and valves identified in paragraph 5.35(a)-(c).
β Consent Agreement, Paragraph 5.49, Count 2I
- The specific equipment that went unmonitored included pumps and valves associated with all eight hazardous waste tanks, as well as valves numbered 4000, 4004, 4006, 4008, 4009, 4019, 4021, and 4022 on bulk waste tanks T400 and T401, plus additional pumps and valves used to transfer organic-containing hazardous waste from Totes to the bulk tanks.
- Federal law requires monthly leak detection monitoring and weekly visual inspection for pumps in light liquid service. Valves in gas/vapor or light liquid service also require monthly monitoring. W.R. Grace performed none of this monitoring for the entire Relevant Time Period β March 2019 through December 2024. Records of equipment leak information must be maintained for three years; W.R. Grace had no such records to maintain because no monitoring was ever done.
None of the containers in paragraph 4.12 were labeled with accumulation dates and neither the containers nor the 8 Tanks managing hazardous waste in paragraphs 4.12 and 4.14 were labeled “hazardous waste.”
β Consent Agreement, Paragraph 4.16, Factual Allegations
- The “Hazardous Waste” label requirement exists so that anyone who encounters a container β a worker, an emergency responder, a contractor, an inspector β immediately knows what they are dealing with. Its absence creates a direct safety hazard in any unplanned situation, including spills, fires, and medical emergencies.
- The accumulation date requirement allows regulators to verify that hazardous waste is not being held longer than the 90-day LQG exemption window. Without dates on containers, there is no way to audit compliance with the time limit β making the entire temporal condition of the exemption unenforceable against W.R. Grace’s own records.
Societal Impact Mapping
Public Health
The violations documented here created direct, unmitigated exposure risks across multiple pathways β air, potential soil contact, and worker handling β for the entire operational period.
- Solvents classified as F002, F003, and F005 hazardous wastes include materials that are ignitable, corrosive, and/or toxic under federal classification. These are not low-grade nuisances; they are substances requiring specific engineering controls because uncontrolled exposure poses documented health risks.
- The hazardous solvents in the Tote containers and the eight tanks had average volatile organic concentrations of 500 ppmw or greater, the federal threshold that triggers mandatory air emission controls. W.R. Grace never applied those controls during transfers or storage, meaning organic vapor was released into the facility environment at quantities above the threshold that activates legal protection requirements.
- The maximum organic vapor pressure of the solvents in the eight tanks was documented at 76.6 kPa β a high-vapor-pressure profile that accelerates evaporation and atmospheric release, particularly relevant in a manufacturing environment where workers are physically present and handling the materials.
- The eight tanks used to hold hazardous solvents were never equipped with secondary containment, as required by Subpart J. Secondary containment is the engineered barrier that prevents a tank leak or spill from reaching the surrounding floor, soil, and potentially subsurface groundwater. Its absence for nearly six years means any leak during that period had no engineered capture mechanism.
- Workers in Building 2 handled and transferred these solvents in containers and tank systems that were never labeled “Hazardous Waste,” were never inspected weekly for leaks and deterioration as required, and whose associated pumps and valves were never monitored monthly for organic emissions. Workers operating equipment with no labeling, no inspection records, and no leak monitoring were operating without the hazard communication protections federal law requires.
- Emergency responders entering the facility in the event of a fire or chemical release would have had no labels indicating hazardous waste materials in the tanks and containers, a life-safety gap created directly by the labeling violations.
Economic Inequality
The structure of this enforcement outcome reflects a systemic pattern in which corporations that violate environmental law pay administrative fines that function as operational costs, while affected working-class communities absorb the uncompensated externalities.
- Albany, Oregon is a mid-size Willamette Valley city with a significant manufacturing and agricultural workforce. Industrial facilities in communities like this are major employers, which creates a structural power imbalance: the workers most exposed to violations are often economically dependent on the company committing them.
- The $500,000 penalty is paid to the U.S. Treasury, not to Albany, Linn County, the state of Oregon, or any individual harmed by the violations. No portion of the fine is directed to environmental remediation of the facility, medical monitoring of former workers, or community health resources.
- W.R. Grace agreed to the penalty under a consent agreement in which it “neither admits nor denies specific factual or legal allegations.” This means the company faces no legal liability that a private party could use as a basis for a civil claim β the consent agreement explicitly settles only the EPA’s civil penalty claims and preserves EPA’s right to pursue other relief, but the evidentiary record is not an admission that could anchor independent accountability.
- The maximum statutory penalty under RCRA Section 3008(a), inflation-adjusted for violations assessed after December 27, 2023, is $121,275 per day of noncompliance. The Relevant Time Period spans approximately 1,766 days. At the maximum rate, total exposure could have reached hundreds of millions of dollars. The $500,000 settlement represents a fraction of that theoretical ceiling β less than one day of maximum penalty for a six-year violation period when viewed against the adjusted daily rate.
- The facility was sold to a third party on December 31, 2024. The new property owner now holds a site with an EPA enforcement docket, an approximately six-year hazardous waste violation history, and unanswered questions about subsurface conditions given the absence of secondary containment on tanks storing toxic solvents for years.
- Residents near Industrial Way β whose proximity to the facility they did not choose β had no mechanism to learn of the violations during the period they were occurring. The EPA inspection happened in August 2021; the formal enforcement proceeding was not filed until 2024; the final order was issued April 2025. The community was not a party to any of these proceedings.
The “Cost of a Life” Metric
The $283-per-day figure is not a fine. It is a business expense. A manufacturing facility generating chemical intermediates for pharmaceutical ingredients and dietary supplements operates on margins that make $283 per day invisible. The penalty structure of RCRA allows this: the maximum daily rate ($121,275, inflation-adjusted) was not applied. The $500,000 total represents a negotiated number that closes the case and lets both sides move on.
What Now: Who Is Accountable and What Can You Do
The consent agreement identifies the responsible parties by their roles. Here is who signed the documents and who oversees them.
Who Signed for W.R. Grace
- Anthony McBride, Vice President, EHSSQ & Product Stewardship, W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. signed the consent agreement on behalf of the company. EHSSQ stands for Environmental, Health, Safety, Security, and Quality β the exact function responsible for RCRA compliance.
- Apple Chapman, Assistant General Counsel, Regulatory and EH&S, W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., received service of the final order at the company’s headquarters at 7500 Grace Drive, Columbia, Maryland 21044.
- W.R. Grace retained outside counsel from Beveridge & Diamond, P.C. (Seattle, WA) β a law firm that specializes in environmental law β to represent it in this enforcement proceeding.
Who Signed for the EPA
- Edward J. Kowalski, Director, Enforcement & Compliance Assurance Division, EPA Region 10 (Seattle), signed the consent agreement on April 8, 2025 as Complainant.
- Richard Mednick, Regional Judicial Officer, EPA Region 10, issued and signed the Final Order on April 9, 2025.
- U.S. EPA Region 10 (Seattle): The enforcement body that brought this case. EPA Region 10 covers Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Alaska, and Pacific Island territories. Contact: epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-region-10-pacific-northwest.
- Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ): Oregon holds EPA-authorized primacy over its hazardous waste program. ODEQ was formally notified of this enforcement action under RCRA Section 3008(a)(2) and has independent state authority over the Albany facility site. Contact: oregon.gov/deq.
- EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA): The national-level office that sets enforcement policy and tracks RCRA compliance nationally. Relevant if you believe similar facilities in your region are operating without permits.
- Oregon OSHA: The state occupational safety body with jurisdiction over worker exposure conditions at industrial facilities in Oregon. The air emission violations documented here directly implicate worker exposure. File complaints at osha.oregon.gov.
- Request the facility’s closure documentation from ODEQ. W.R. Grace notified the state of completed closure activities on May 23, 2024, and sold the property December 31, 2024. Oregon residents have the right to request public records related to facility closure, soil sampling, and groundwater monitoring under Oregon’s Public Records Law (ORS Chapter 192). File a public records request at oregon.gov/deq.
- Verify the new owner’s RCRA status. The facility at 1290 Industrial Way, Albany, Oregon (EPA ID ORD085979474) was sold to a third party on December 31, 2024. The new owner’s environmental compliance status can be checked through EPA’s ECHO (Enforcement and Compliance History Online) database at echo.epa.gov.
- Connect with Oregon environmental justice organizations. Groups like Oregon Environmental Council (oeconline.org) and Front and Centered (frontandcentered.org) organize around industrial pollution accountability and can connect affected workers and residents to legal resources and community coalitions.
- If you worked at the Albany facility during the Relevant Time Period (March 2019 β December 2024), consult an occupational health attorney regarding your right to information about chemical exposures. Oregon workers have rights under Oregon OSHA’s Hazard Communication standard (OAR 437-002-0360) and the federal OSHA Hazard Communication Standard (29 C.F.R. Β§ 1910.1200). Oregon Legal Aid (oregonlawhelp.org) can provide referrals for workers without resources to hire private counsel.
- Demand legislative accountability at the federal level. Contact your U.S. Representative and Senators to push for RCRA penalty reform that ties civil penalties to actual economic benefit of the violation β not a negotiated fraction of the statutory maximum. The current enforcement math incentivizes non-compliance for profitable industrial operators.
The source document for this investigation is attached below.
Please visit this link from the EPA’s website to see the source for this legal story: https://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/3B4E587F09BE548B85258C67006335F0/$File/CAFO%20WR%20Grace%20n%20Co%20Conn%20RCRA%2010%202024%200073.pdf
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