Roberto Franceschi was sitting on his own couch when a battery built by one of the world’s largest chemical corporations caught fire inside his front pocket and burned through his leg.

The Nevada Supreme Court, in an opinion filed December 18, 2025, ruled unanimously that LG Chem — the South Korean industrial giant whose 18650 battery cell detonated against Franceschi’s body — cannot be held accountable in a Nevada courtroom. The reason: the battery reached Franceschi through a supply chain LG claims it didn’t control, even though LG built the battery, knew it was being sold in vape shops across Nevada, and sent letters demanding those shops stop.

That’s the world corporations have built for themselves. Build the weapon. Watch it spread. Write a letter. Walk free.

The Battery That Burned Him — And What LG Knew

The model 18650 is a cylindrical lithium-ion battery cell roughly the size of a AA battery, but far more energetically dense. LG Chem manufactures this cell and sells it in bulk to corporations — phone makers, electric vehicle companies, power tool brands, e-cigarette manufacturers. LG maintained that the 18650 was designed and sold exclusively as an industrial component part, never intended for standalone consumer use. That claim became the centerpiece of their legal defense.

But the court’s own record makes clear that standalone 18650s began appearing in vape shops and online retail channels across the United States. Consumers started buying them loose — unwrapped, without packaging, without any printed warnings — and dropping them into their vape devices as replaceable power cells. LG knew this was happening. The court confirms it explicitly: upon learning of this use, LG sent cease-and-desist letters to retailers and vape stores located all over the U.S., including Nevada.

LG wrote letters. LG added a warning to its website. LG did not engineer a physical change to the battery. LG did not trigger a public safety recall. LG did not contact regulators. LG protected its supply chain relationships and left consumers to absorb the risk their product created.

Franceschi had no idea he was holding an industrial-grade battery cell that major corporations treat as a high-risk component requiring a controlled application environment. The vape shop gave him nothing — no label, no instructions, no warning. LG’s own supply chain had failed to keep that cell away from him, and LG’s cease-and-desist letters had failed to clear it from Nevada shelves. When the battery ignited, it burned Franceschi with second- and third-degree injuries across his left leg, left hand, and left forearm.

Second and Third Degree. In His Own Living Room.

Second-degree burns destroy the outer layer of skin and damage the layer beneath it. They blister, they scar, they hurt at a level most people have never experienced. Third-degree burns go deeper — they can destroy nerve endings, require skin grafts, and leave permanent disfigurement. Franceschi sustained both grades of injury across three separate areas of his body simultaneously, in his own home, on his own couch, from a product he had no reason to believe was dangerous in the way it was dangerous.

This is the human reality that the Nevada Supreme Court’s legal framework had to navigate. And its conclusion, reached through careful application of jurisdictional doctrine, is that LG Chem does not have to answer for any of it in Nevada.

The Legal Escape Hatch: Two Supply Chains, Zero Accountability

The court’s analysis turns on a distinction between two types of supply chains: the “end-product stream of commerce” and the “derivative-product stream of commerce.” LG Chem sold 18650 batteries to large manufacturers — phone companies, e-cig brands, power tool makers — who then built those cells into battery packs inside finished products. That is the end-product stream. The court agreed LG purposefully availed itself of Nevada through that stream. LG knew those products would end up in Nevada stores. The court says that counts as doing business here.

But the derivative-product stream is different. That’s what happens when individual 18650 cells get extracted from the legitimate supply chain — by unknown third parties — and sold loose to consumers. The court ruled that because Franceschi’s injury arose from a battery that traveled through this derivative stream, and LG didn’t control that stream, Nevada cannot exercise jurisdiction over LG for this specific harm. LG’s own contacts with Nevada exist. They’re just the “wrong kind” of contacts for this particular lawsuit.

The practical result: LG gets credit for trying to stop the misuse (those cease-and-desist letters), and Franceschi gets burned — literally and legally.

The “Wrong Supply Chain” Defense Is a Corporate Gift

This ruling creates a roadmap for any manufacturer that wants to insulate itself from consumer injury lawsuits. Sell only to other businesses. Let someone else distribute your product to end consumers. When your product explodes in someone’s pocket, point to the middleman. The more layers a corporation puts between itself and the consumer, the harder it becomes for that consumer to sue in their home state.

The court explicitly borrowed this framework from a Seventh Circuit case involving Samsung’s nearly identical 18650 battery — also sold in vape shops, also exploding in pockets. The legal architecture being built across multiple courts now systematically favors manufacturers who use business-to-business models, at the direct expense of the consumers who end up holding their products when they fail.

LG Chem America Got Away With Even Less

LG Chem America, Inc. (LGCAI) — the U.S. subsidiary based in Georgia — handled the logistics and financing of 18650 sales from LG Chem to American businesses. The court notes that upon learning that 18650s were being sold in vape shops for standalone use in e-cigarettes, LGCAI took no action, deferring entirely to its South Korean parent. LGCAI did nothing. LGCAI faces no consequences in Nevada. A subsidiary that watched a dangerous situation develop in the American consumer market and stayed silent is fully shielded by the same jurisdictional ruling.

The Non-Financial Ledger: What Money Will Never Cover

Roberto Franceschi didn’t walk into an industrial facility. He didn’t sign a liability waiver. He didn’t work in a battery plant or a testing lab. He walked into a vape shop in Nevada — the kind of store that exists in almost every strip mall in America — and bought what the store was selling. Nobody at that shop handed him a data sheet. Nobody warned him that the cell in his hand was an industrial-grade power unit that LG Chem itself considered unsuitable for standalone consumer use. He took the batteries home and put them in his pocket, the way any reasonable person would carry small batteries.

Then one of those batteries became a fire source pressed directly against his body. Second-degree burns destroy the top two layers of skin, producing blistering, intense pain, and scarring that can last years. Third-degree burns reach into the deeper tissue beneath, sometimes killing nerve endings — which sounds like relief until you understand that it means the damage runs so deep the body can no longer register it properly. Franceschi sustained both grades across his left leg, his left hand, and his left forearm. Three separate body sites. All from sitting on his own couch. The physical recovery from injuries at that scale involves wound care, potential skin grafts, infection monitoring, and months of rehabilitation. The psychological weight of knowing your own body was set on fire by something you bought at a local shop — that doesn’t appear anywhere in the court’s legal analysis.

The court’s jurisdictional ruling didn’t assess whether Franceschi deserved compensation. It assessed whether Nevada was the right venue to ask that question. The answer was no. What that ruling means in practice is that Franceschi, a Nevada resident injured in Nevada by a product purchased in Nevada, must now figure out how to pursue claims against a South Korean corporation and its Georgia-based subsidiary in some other jurisdiction — if he can. That financial and logistical burden falls entirely on him. LG Chem’s legal team, operating with the resources of a multinational chemical conglomerate, walks out of a Nevada courthouse without ever having to address the substance of his injuries on the merits.

The record also confirms that the vape shop gave Franceschi no warnings at all — not on the product, not verbally, not on a receipt. That isn’t just a regulatory failure by the shop. It reflects exactly what happens when a manufacturer uses cease-and-desist letters as its primary safety mechanism. LG Chem knew standalone sales were happening in Nevada. The letters apparently didn’t clear the shelves. Franceschi bought the batteries after LG’s own internal response to the problem. The warning system that was supposed to protect him demonstrably didn’t reach him, and the legal system that was supposed to give him recourse has now told him to look elsewhere.

Legal Receipts: The Court’s Own Words Do the Work

“Franceschi purchased standalone, model 18650 lithium-ion batteries from a vape shop in Nevada. The 18650s were sold individually, without packaging, and Franceschi was not provided with any warnings or instructions regarding the use of the product, either on the product itself or from the merchant.” Nevada Supreme Court, Opinion No. 87802 — Statement of Facts

“Upon learning of this improper use of the 18650s, LG Chem took various steps to prevent these sales, including notifying their U.S. business customers that the batteries should not be sold for standalone use, as well as sending cease-and-desist letters to retailers and vape stores located all over the U.S., including Nevada, requesting that they stop selling the 18650s for standalone use in e-cigarettes.” Nevada Supreme Court, Opinion No. 87802 — Statement of Facts

“Upon learning that 18650s were being sold in vape shops for standalone use in e-cigarettes, LGCAI took no action, on the understanding that LG Chem had already begun investigating and responding to the situation.” Nevada Supreme Court, Opinion No. 87802 — Statement of Facts (on LG Chem America)

“When there is a mismatch between a defendant’s manipulation of a stream of commerce and the circumstances attending the injuries alleged in the underlying lawsuit, an exercise of personal jurisdiction is foreclosed.” Nevada Supreme Court, Opinion No. 87802 — citing Samsung SDI Co. (7th Cir. 2025)

“Yet, the court noted that it would be a much closer call if the plaintiff’s injuries had resulted from the explosion of 18650s encased in a battery pack powering a laptop that had traveled from Samsung into the computer through the end-product stream of commerce. In that scenario, there would have been a more direct link between Samsung’s contacts and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Nevada Supreme Court, Opinion No. 87802 — citing Samsung SDI Co. (7th Cir. 2025)

That last quote is the most important one. The court is telling you, in plain language, that if Franceschi’s laptop battery had exploded, he probably would have won. But because a vape shop sold him a loose battery cell instead of a sealed device, the legal architecture collapses. The difference between accountability and total immunity comes down to the type of packaging the product was in when it entered his hands.

Societal Impact Mapping: Who Else Gets Hurt By This Ruling

The Cost of a Life: What This Protection Is Worth to LG

LG Chem is one of the largest chemical and battery manufacturers in the world. Its 18650 cells power electric vehicles, smartphones, laptops, and power tools sold globally. The company’s annual revenues are measured in tens of billions of dollars (enough to give every American household a $230 check). The cost of sending cease-and-desist letters to vape shops was essentially rounding error. The cost of a more aggressive safety intervention — redesigning the cell’s external casing, funding a recall, proactively notifying regulators — would have been manageable for a corporation of this scale. Instead, letters went out, the batteries stayed on shelves, and Franceschi got burned.

The court’s ruling means LG faces no financial consequence in Nevada for this outcome. The cease-and-desist strategy, which the court cites as evidence that LG “attempted to foreclose such a market,” now functions as a legal shield rather than a genuine safety mechanism. Corporations watching this case learn an efficient lesson: document your objections, keep your supply chain indirect, and let someone else absorb the liability.

What Now: Corporate Roles, Watchlists, and What You Can Do

The Corporate Entities Involved

• LG Chem, Ltd. — South Korean parent company; manufactured the 18650 battery cell; operates B2B-only sales model
• LG Chem America, Inc. (LGCAI) — Delaware corporation, principal place of business in Georgia; U.S. subsidiary; knew of standalone battery sales and took no independent action
• [REDACTED – Not in Source] — Unknown third-party distributor who moved loose 18650 cells into Nevada’s vape shop retail channel
• [REDACTED – Not in Source] — Nevada vape shop that sold the batteries to Franceschi with no packaging, warnings, or instructions

Regulatory Watchlist: Who Should Be Paying Attention

• Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) — Has jurisdiction over battery safety standards for consumer products; standalone lithium-ion cell sales fall within its mandate
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA) — Regulates e-cigarette devices and components; the vape-to-battery pipeline is a documented safety gap
• Federal Trade Commission (FTC) — Has authority over deceptive practices; selling industrial battery cells as consumer products with no warnings raises consumer protection questions
• State Attorneys General — Nevada, California, Texas, and other states with documented 18650 vape-shop sales should be investigating retail compliance
• Department of Transportation (DOT) / Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) — Governs lithium battery transport and labeling requirements in commerce

What You Can Actually Do Right Now

File a complaint with the CPSC at SaferProducts.gov if you have purchased loose lithium-ion battery cells from a vape shop or retail outlet without safety labeling. Every report builds the administrative record that regulators need to act. Share this story with anyone who vapes and uses replaceable batteries — the legal system just confirmed they have no guaranteed recourse if those batteries fail. Support grassroots consumer safety organizations that lobby for mandatory lithium battery labeling at the retail level. And remember: a cease-and-desist letter is not a recall, and a website warning is not consumer protection. Demand the difference.