“Pursuant to Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), and its implementing regulations, owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling or storing a chemical in 40 C.F.R. Part 68, or any other extremely hazardous substance, have a general duty to identify hazards that may result from releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur.”

💡 This establishes the fundamental legal obligation Organicgirl allegedly violated by failing to maintain proper safety systems for years.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to document that the ammonia machinery room, ammonia pipes, ammonia sensors, ammonia and fire alarms, emergency ventilation system, electrical wiring, and exhaust fans on the roof at the Facility complied with RAGAGEP from January 2024 to August 2024.”

💡 This specific allegation shows the company could not prove critical safety equipment met basic engineering standards for eight months.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to address the hazards of the process, engineering and administrative controls applicable to such hazards, and siting of the stationary source in the PHA performed at the Facility in 2019, and also failed to establish a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations for safety devices in the 2019 PHA.”

💡 The company’s hazard analysis was fundamentally flawed and it never created systems to fix identified problems for five years.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the operating procedures printed inside the emergency control box at the Facility were outdated; the written operating procedures for the High Pressure Receiver at the Facility were inaccurate from January 2024 to April 2024; and all written operating procedures at the Facility lacked annual certifications.”

💡 Workers relied on outdated emergency procedures and inaccurate equipment instructions, increasing the risk of mistakes during critical moments.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to adequately track repairs recommended after the inspections and tests of the process equipment at the Facility during 2024 and failed to address deficient ammonia pipes and tanks, valves, emergency ventilation louvers, insulation or vapor barriers, and ammonia sensors at the Facility that were outside acceptable limits from January 2024 to August 2024.”

💡 The company knew equipment was deficient but failed to fix it for at least eight months, leaving dangerous conditions unaddressed.

“At all times relevant to this CAFO, Respondent was subject to Program 3 requirements because it had public receptors within the distance to the endpoint for the worst-case release and was subject to the OSHA process safety management standard set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.”

💡 This confirms the surrounding Salinas community was within the danger zone of a worst-case ammonia release scenario.

“At all times relevant to this CAFO, Respondent produced, used or stored more than 10,000 pounds of ammonia (anhydrous) at the Facility and was subject to the requirements of CAA § 112(r)(7).”

💡 The large quantity of toxic ammonia stored at the facility triggered the strictest federal safety requirements, which were allegedly not met.

“Ammonia (anhydrous) is a regulated toxic substance listed under CAA § 112(r)(3) with a TQ of 10,000 pounds.”

💡 Federal law specifically identifies anhydrous ammonia as dangerous enough to require strict regulation at quantities Organicgirl exceeded.

“In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 22.18(b)(2) and for the purpose of this proceeding, Respondent: (i) admits that EPA has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this CAFO and over Respondent; (ii) neither admits nor denies the specific factual allegations contained in the CAFO.”

💡 The company settled the case without publicly admitting to any of the specific safety failures alleged by the EPA.

“Respondent agrees to the assessment of a civil penalty of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE DOLLARS ($151,979) for the claims set forth herein as final settlement of the civil claims against Respondent as alleged in Section I.D of the CAFO.”

💡 This is the total financial penalty for years of alleged violations endangering workers and the community.

“In the event that Respondent fails to complete any activity required under Section I.G of this CAFO, Respondent shall pay stipulated penalties up to: ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000) per day for first to fifteenth day of delay; TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000) per day for sixteenth to thirtieth day of delay; and THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($3,000) per day for each day of delay thereafter.”

💡 The company faces additional penalties of up to $3,000 per day if it fails to complete required safety corrective actions on time.

“Within 90 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall submit a copy of the PHA recommendation tracking list demonstrating completion of all remaining open items identified in the 2022 Mechanical Integrity Audit.”

💡 Organicgirl must prove within 90 days that it has finally addressed safety issues identified in a 2022 audit that remained unresolved.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to obtain and evaluate information regarding safety performance and programs of two contractors it hired to work on the RMP processes during 2024.”

💡 The company hired contractors to work with hazardous ammonia systems without verifying those workers had proper safety training or records.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the incident investigation reports prepared by Respondent at the Facility during 2020-2021 failed to include dates of investigation, factors that contributed to the incidents, and recommendations resulting from the investigations.”

💡 When safety incidents occurred, the company failed to properly investigate them, missing opportunities to prevent future accidents.

“Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to implement written procedures to manage upgrades of the emergency ventilation system at the Facility during 2020-2023… and failed to adequately document management approval of changes to process equipment at the Facility during 2020-2023.”

💡 For three years, the company made changes to critical safety equipment without proper procedures or management approval, introducing unknown risks.