“The last Part II MIT for Well 3 (Permit IN-091-1I-006) was completed on April 6, 2018. The most recent Part II MIT was due to be completed by April 6, 2023. Well 3 was in operation without an up to date and passing Part II MIT from April 6, 2023, to August 9, 2023.”

💡 Shell operated an injection well for 125 days without verifying it would not contaminate drinking water sources.

“During this period, there were two instances in which Respondent reported maximum injection pressures (MIP) above their permitted limit. These occurred at Well 1 on January 23, 2023, and at Well 3 on June 7, 2023. There were two additional instances in which Respondent reported MIP exceedances that would have triggered an automatic well shut-off. These occurred at Well 1 on January 13, 2022, and at Well 3 on August 16, 2022.”

💡 Shell submitted pressure readings in official reports that should have triggered immediate safety responses but were actually training simulations.

“On September 11, 2023, Respondent stated that all four apparent MIP exceedances did not represent real world conditions at the wells and were caused by simulated training exercises. The monthly reports for those dates did not distinguish between actual and simulated MIP values.”

💡 The company admitted submitting simulated data as if it were real operational data without any notation in official regulatory reports.

“I certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments were prepared under my direction or supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and evaluate the information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person or persons who manage the system, or those persons directly responsible for gathering the information, the information submitted is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true, accurate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting false information, including the possibility of fine and imprisonment for knowing violations.”

💡 Every monthly report Shell submitted carried this certification, making the inclusion of uncertified simulated data a violation of federal reporting requirements.

“Part I(G)(2)(b) of the Permits requires that an approved temperature, noise, oxygen activation, or other approved log (also known as a Part II MIT) shall be run at least once every sixty months from the date of the last approved demonstration to test for movement of fluid along the bore hole.”

💡 The test Shell skipped for four months is specifically designed to detect if injected waste is leaking toward drinking water sources.

“Section 1421(d)(2) of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2), provides that underground injection endangers drinking water sources if such injection may result in the presence in underground water which supplies or can reasonably be expected to supply any public water system of any contaminant, and if the presence of such contaminant may result in such system not complying with any national primary drinking water regulation or may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.”

💡 The legal standard focuses on potential contamination, not just actual harm, meaning Shell’s testing delay created regulatory endangerment regardless of whether contamination occurred.

“Under Section 1423(c)(1) of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(1) and 40 C.F.R. Part 19, EPA may assess a civil penalty of not more than $27,894 for each day of violation, up to a maximum administrative penalty of $348,671 for SDWA violations occurring after November 2, 2015.”

💡 EPA could have assessed up to $27,894 per day for 125 days but instead settled for a total penalty of $6,710, about 0.19% of the potential maximum.

“Respondent admits the jurisdictional allegations in this CAFO and neither admits nor denies the factual allegations in this CAFO.”

💡 Standard settlement language allowed Shell to pay a penalty without publicly acknowledging the documented violations actually occurred.

“This CAFO resolves only Respondent’s liability for only federal civil penalties for only the violations alleged in this CAFO.”

💡 The settlement addresses only these specific violations, not any broader pattern of noncompliance at other Shell facilities or wells.

“Within 90 days of the effective date of this CAFO, submit to EPA for review and implement a standard operating procedure providing: (1) adequate direction to all staff or contractors in monitoring, recording, and reporting practices required by the Permits; (2) procedures for measuring and reporting injection pressure, annulus pressure, annulus/tubing differential, flow rate, temperature, sight glass level, cumulative volume, annulus fluid loss, physical characteristics of injected fluids, chemical composition of injected fluids and pH.”

💡 Shell must now create the basic compliance procedures that should have existed before operations began, suggesting fundamental systems were missing when violations occurred.

“This CAFO constitutes a ‘previous violation’ as that term is used in EPA’s UIC Penalty Policy and to determine Respondent’s ‘history of such violations’ under Section 1423(c)(4)(B) of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(4)(B).”

💡 This settlement now counts as a prior violation in Shell’s regulatory history, potentially increasing penalties if future noncompliance occurs.

“Based upon the facts alleged in this CAFO, the factors listed in Section 1423(c)(4)(B) of the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 300h-2(c)(4)(B), the appropriate EPA UIC Program Judicial and Administrative Order Settlement Penalty Policy, and Respondent’s good faith and cooperation in resolving this matter, EPA has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $6,710.”

💡 EPA explicitly reduced the penalty based on Shell’s cooperation after being caught, suggesting the actual violations warranted stronger penalties.

“There were two additional instances in which Respondent reported MIP exceedances that would have triggered an automatic well shut-off.”

💡 Shell’s monthly reports showed conditions requiring immediate well shutdown, but because the data was from training simulations, no safety response occurred and regulators were not informed.

“Upon realizing the well was past due for testing, Respondent shut off the well and reported the issue to EPA on August 9, 2023.”

💡 Shell stopped operations only after discovering the oversight internally, not due to EPA enforcement, meaning the violation could have continued longer without self-detection.

“Any permit noncompliance constitutes a violation of the SDWA, except that the permittee need not comply with the provisions of its permit to the extent and for the duration such noncompliance is authorized in an emergency permit under 40 C.F.R. § 144.34.”

💡 Shell had no emergency authorization to operate without a current mechanical integrity test, meaning the entire 125-day period was unauthorized under the permit.