πŸ³οΈβ€βš§οΈ trans rights are human rights πŸ³οΈβ€βš§οΈ
Theme

How World Business Lenders Stole $7.8M From The Kuwaiti Royal Family

Investigative Report / Corporate Fraud / Predatory Lending

A Fraudster’s Getaway Driver: How a Baltimore Con Man, a High-Cost Lender, and a Broken Legal System Swallowed $7.8 Million

The Facts The Misconduct The Resistance

WBL’s own credit analysts put it in writing: Jean Agbodjogbe was a “high fraud risk” β€” and then their boss told them to move on and fund the loans anyway.

The Setup: A Restaurant, A Royal, and a $150,000 Handshake

In 2014, Alia Al-Sabah visited the United States and walked into Nailah’s Kitchen, a small Baltimore restaurant owned by Jean Agbodjogbe. What followed was not a business partnership. It was a 22-month-long extraction operation that ended with nearly $7.8 million gone ($7.8 million β€” roughly what it costs to build and fully staff a community health clinic for a decade).

Agbodjogbe’s pitch was textbook confidence fraud: start small, build trust, then escalate the asks. He invited Al-Sabah to co-own a new restaurant venture called N&A Kitchen β€” which he claimed stood for “Nailah’s and Alia’s Kitchen” β€” and asked her to invest $150,000 ($150,000 β€” the average cost of a four-year college education for two children) for fifty percent ownership. He sent her his driver’s license, a federal tax return, articles of organization, an operating agreement, and a contribution agreement. He even offered to submit to a background check. Al-Sabah trusted him and declined the check.

That was the last decision Al-Sabah made with full information. From that point forward, Agbodjogbe controlled every piece of paper, every company, and every dollar.

The Company She Thought She Owned β€” Was His All Along

When Agbodjogbe proposed expanding into Baltimore commercial real estate, Al-Sabah agreed β€” but on one condition: all properties had to be titled in a company she alone owned, called 9 Jewels, LLC. Agbodjogbe formed 9 Jewels. He just didn’t mention that he β€” not Al-Sabah β€” was its sole owner and controller. Every property, every asset, every deed: his name, her money.

Almost monthly, Agbodjogbe sent Al-Sabah new requests for six-figure wire transfers. Sometimes he needed renovation funds for N&A Kitchen. Sometimes he had found a promising new commercial property. He arranged the purchase of a condo in New York City for Al-Sabah’s daughter. He proposed buying a building for a Muslim aftercare program for students. He proposed buying property for a cemetery for local Muslims who could not afford burial costs. Every single pitch landed. Every single dollar transferred. The court documents confirm that Al-Sabah wired money “with little to no inquiry or hesitation,” trusting completely that Agbodjogbe was acting on her behalf.

He was not. The NYC condo was purchased in 9 Jewels’ name β€” a company Agbodjogbe secretly owned. Al-Sabah’s daughter did live there for a period, giving the scheme just enough surface plausibility to keep Al-Sabah sending money. But the most brazen move came in January 2015, when Agbodjogbe used Al-Sabah’s funds to purchase a home in Pikesville, Maryland for $469,990 ($469,990 β€” enough to fully pay off the mortgages of four median-income American families) as his own personal residence. Al-Sabah had no idea the house existed.

“When all was said and done in July 2016, Al-Sabah had transferred nearly $7.8 million over 22 months to either N&A Kitchen or 9 Jewels. She believed nearly all of it would be used to benefit 9 Jewels; in reality, Agbodjogbe alone owned and controlled it all.”

By the time Al-Sabah realized Agbodjogbe had gone silent and stopped responding to her communications, the money was already gone. She sued him for fraud on March 17, 2017. A jury agreed with her in January 2020 and she received a judgment of $7,895,277.50 ($7,895,277.50 β€” more than most Americans will earn across their entire working lives). But a paper judgment and actual money are very different things. The real estate equity that could have made her whole had already been mortgaged away β€” with the help of World Business Lenders.


Timeline of the Fraud and the Loans: 2014–2020

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Al-Sabah meets Agbodjogbe Pikesville Home Bought w/ her $ Jan 2015 WBL: “High Fraud Risk” Flag Dec 2015 Loan 1 Funded $600K β€” May 2016 Loan 2 Funded $1.2M β€” Aug 2016 $7.8M Gone Jul 2016 Lawsuit Filed + Loan 3 $360K Mar 2017 Jury Verdict: $7.9M for Al-Sabah Jan 2020 WBL Walks Nov 2025 Key events Fraud / Loans Turning points

World Business Lenders: The Machine That Turned Stolen Property Into Cash

World Business Lenders describes itself as an alternative lender serving small businesses that “have difficulty procuring loans from traditional lending sources.” Translation: WBL makes short-term, high-cost loans to people banks won’t touch, secured by real estate, and it moves fast β€” funds available “often within 7–14 days from application.” Speed is the product. Due diligence is the inconvenience.

WBL first encountered Agbodjogbe in December 2015 when he applied for a $350,000 ($350,000 β€” more than most Americans save across their entire careers) loan. A junior credit analyst at WBL immediately flagged what the company internally labeled “very large unusual deposits” in Agbodjogbe’s bank records. WBL’s own documentation used the terms “numerous character concerns” and “high fraud risk.” Those are not vague impressions. Those are WBL’s own employees, in their own files, saying this borrower looks like a fraudster.

What happened next tells you everything about how WBL operates under pressure.

The COO Told Them to Stand Down

When the junior analyst and WBL Vice President Yasemin Fakioglu raised concerns about possible money laundering β€” because the size of the wire transfers didn’t square with N&A Kitchen’s actual revenues β€” they took those concerns to Robert Pardes, WBL’s Chief Operating Officer. Pardes told them that federal regulations require Agbodjogbe’s own bank to investigate and clear large deposits, and WBL “can only assume that the depository bank has exercised the requisite due diligence.” In other words: not our problem, keep moving.

Pardes then received IRS gift tax returns prepared by Agbodjogbe’s own CPA, David Leichter, showing Agbodjogbe reported the transfers as gifts. Pardes declared those returns proof that no money laundering had occurred because, he explained, “money laundering is a discrete activity, and here the deposits are being reported to the IRS and the federal government directly.” Pardes then required his team to call Leichter directly β€” the same accountant whose returns they were relying on β€” who confirmed everything was “legitimate” and “legal.” The fox checked the fox’s references. WBL called this due diligence.

Agbodjogbe withdrew the December 2015 application before that first loan was funded. But five months later, he was back. And this time, the loans went through.

Three Loans, Three Properties Bought With Stolen Money

Between May 2016 and March 2017, WBL funded three loans totaling $2.16 million ($2.16 million β€” enough to cover emergency medical care for over 400 uninsured Americans), each secured by real estate Agbodjogbe had purchased using Al-Sabah’s stolen funds. Loan One was $600,000 ($600,000 β€” the price of roughly six median-priced American homes) against the NYC condo. Loan Two refinanced Loan One for $1.2 million ($1.2 million β€” more than 17 years of median household income) against the same condo. Loan Three was $360,000 ($360,000 β€” what a starting teacher in most states earns across an entire career) against the Pikesville home Agbodjogbe had secretly bought for himself.

Al-Sabah’s legal theory was precise: WBL served as Agbodjogbe’s “getaway driver.” By placing liens on the fraud-purchased properties, WBL converted Al-Sabah’s misappropriated money from illiquid real estate equity into liquid cash that Agbodjogbe could spend and move. When Al-Sabah eventually won her fraud judgment, the equity that should have been available to satisfy it had been mortgaged away. WBL didn’t commit the robbery. WBL drove the car.

“WBL identified ‘numerous character concerns’ associated with the loan and flagged the file as a ‘high fraud risk.’ The analyst requested more information about the source of the wires.”

WBL Loan Amounts vs. Purchase Prices of Fraud-Acquired Properties ($)

$0 $250K $500K $750K $1M $600K Loan 1 NYC Condo $1.2M Loan 2 NYC Condo $470K Pikesville Purchase Price $360K Loan 3 Pikesville Home $7.9M (off scale) Total Fraud Judgment Won Amount (USD)

The Non-Financial Ledger: What a Dollar Amount Can’t Measure

The court documents reduce everything to numbers: $7.8 million wired, $469,990 in compensatory damages, $235,000 in punitive damages reversed on appeal. Those figures are real and they are enormous. But the number that the legal system has no column for is this: Alia Al-Sabah met a man at a restaurant, decided he was honest, and trusted him completely. That trust was the actual weapon used against her.

Al-Sabah had “never participated in a business venture” before Agbodjogbe approached her. She was not a sophisticated Wall Street investor looking for a yield play. She was a person who believed she was building something β€” a restaurant, a real estate portfolio, housing for her daughter, even a cemetery for Muslims in her community who could not afford burial costs. Agbodjogbe packaged every fraud as an act of community and care. He used her faith, her family, and her generosity as entry points. The emotional architecture of this scheme was specifically designed to make her feel that questioning him would be a betrayal of shared values.

Explore by category

01

Antitrust

Monopolies and anti-competition tactics used to crush rivals.

View Cases →
02

Product Safety Violations

When companies sell dangerous goods, consumers pay the price.

View Cases →
03

Environmental Violations

Pollution, ecological collapse, and unchecked greed.

View Cases →
04

Labor Exploitation

Wage theft, worker abuse, and unsafe conditions.

View Cases →
05

Data Breaches & Privacy

Misuse and mishandling of personal information.

View Cases →
06

Financial Fraud & Corruption

Lies, scams, and executive impunity that distort markets.

View Cases →
07

Intellectual Property

IP theft that punishes originality and rewards copying.

View Cases →
08

Misleading Marketing

False claims that waste money and bury critical safety info.

View Cases →
Aleeia
Aleeia

I'm Aleeia, the creator of this website.

I have 6+ years of experience as an independent researcher covering corporate misconduct, sourced from legal documents, regulatory filings, and professional legal databases.

My background includes a Supply Chain Management degree from Michigan State University's Eli Broad College of Business, and years working inside the industries I now cover.

Every post on this site was either written or personally reviewed and edited by me before publication.

Learn more about my research standards and editorial process by visiting my About page

Articles: 1883