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The EPA says Airgas had some anhydrous ammonia failures at a California location

Environmental enforcement

Federal inspectors cited failed sensors, corrosion indicators, missing inspection records and other alleged deficiencies at a California facility handling more than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. Airgas agreed to a $164,931 civil penalty while neither admitting nor denying the specific factual allegations.

EPA Region 9 consent agreement • Docket CAA(112r)-09-2026-0111
Process safety

TL;DR

  • Airgas Specialty Products operated a Riverside, California, supply and distribution facility that produced, used or stored more than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.
  • After a June 2023 inspection, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency alleged two Clean Air Act violations covering ten specific equipment, documentation and maintenance issues.
  • The cited conditions included corrosion indicators, inadequately labeled emergency controls, unsecured cylinders and ammonia sensors that EPA said had been nonfunctioning for an extended period.
  • The facility was subject to the most stringent risk-management program described in the agreement because it fell under federal process-safety rules and had public receptors within the endpoint of its modeled worst-case release.
  • Airgas agreed to pay a $164,931 civil penalty and certified that it had taken the steps necessary to return to compliance.
  • Airgas neither admitted nor denied the specific factual allegations. The supplied copy does not establish that the final order was signed and filed, when it became effective or whether the penalty was paid.

The enforcement record documents potential weaknesses in the systems meant to prevent an ammonia release; it does not report that a release, injury or environmental impact occurred.

Transparency notice: This article relies on a 12-page EPA consent agreement and proposed final order. The equipment and maintenance claims are EPA allegations based on an inspection and subsequent investigation, not findings reached after a contested hearing. Airgas signed the agreement, admitted jurisdiction, neither admitted nor denied the specific factual allegations, and waived its right to contest them. The supplied copy shows the company president’s signature dated June 18, 2026, but does not show a completed EPA signature, a Regional Judicial Officer’s approval or a filing date.

The Facts

At Airgas Specialty Products’ facility on Wilderness Avenue in Riverside, federal inspectors were examining the safeguards around a large ammonia inventory. What EPA later listed was not a single paperwork error. The agency alleged that pressure-relief equipment, emergency controls, piping, storage tanks, gas sensors and inspection records all presented deficiencies under federal process-safety rules.

Airgas used the facility to supply and distribute ammonia. According to the agreement, it produced, used or stored more than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia there. That quantity brought the operation under the Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Program, which is intended to prevent or minimize accidental chemical releases and provide for an emergency response if one occurs.

EPA inspected the facility on June 7, 2023. Its subsequent investigation produced two alleged violations: one involving process-safety information and accepted engineering practices, and another involving equipment inspection, testing and correction of deficiencies.

>10,000 lb. Anhydrous ammonia produced, used or stored at the facility, according to the agreement.
10 Specific conditions or documentation problems listed across EPA’s two alleged violations.
$164,931 Civil penalty Airgas agreed to pay after the order becomes effective.

How the Prevention System Was Supposed to Work

The facility was subject to what federal rules call Program 3 requirements. In practical terms, that meant Airgas had to do more than maintain a general emergency plan. It had to document the engineering basis for covered equipment, inspect and test that equipment on an appropriate schedule, correct deficiencies and maintain an emergency-response program.

The agreement says Program 3 applied because the facility was covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s process-safety standard and because public receptors were located within the endpoint for its modeled worst-case release. The document does not identify those receptors, give their distance from the facility or describe the modeled release in greater detail.

Stage 1

A covered facility holds a regulated chemical above the federal threshold quantity.

Stage 2

The operator prepares and implements a risk-management and emergency-response program.

Stage 3

Equipment design, maintenance, inspection and testing must follow accepted engineering practices and be documented.

Stage 4

Deficiencies outside acceptable limits must be corrected before further use or handled promptly with measures that assure safe operation.

What EPA Alleged

EPA divided its case into two counts. The first concerned whether Airgas could show that the process was designed and maintained according to recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. Those practices are the industry codes and technical standards used to determine whether equipment is being operated safely.

The second count concerned mechanical integrity: whether covered equipment had been properly inspected, tested and repaired, with records showing what was examined, by whom, when and with what result.

Engineering and safety information

  • Two pressure-relief valves in the cylinder-filling area were positioned so that a release would occur within an overhanging roof structure.
  • Emergency shutoff switches near tanker-unloading towers were not adequately labeled.
  • EPA observed accelerated corrosion where piping met a pipe support, which it attributed to missing paint on the underside of the pipe.
  • Valves, pumps and process piping were not labeled throughout the facility.
  • Nameplates on multiple tanks were corroded and not clearly legible.
  • Skid pads were attached to piping near the ammonia-blending process so personnel could step on the ammonia piping.
  • Anhydrous-ammonia cylinders in a maintenance area were not secured against falling over.

Inspection and mechanical integrity

  • Airgas was unable to provide proper documentation for inspections and tests performed on process equipment.
  • Gaps between anhydrous- and aqueous-ammonia tanks and their tank saddles presented signs of accelerated corrosion.
  • Ammonia sensors had been nonfunctioning for what the agreement describes as an extended period.
The record describes multiple layers of prevention at issue at once: physical equipment, warning systems, identification labels and the documents needed to prove that inspections occurred.

Who or What Was Affected

The agreement establishes a potential-exposure context, not documented harm. It says public receptors were within the endpoint of the facility’s modeled worst-case release, but it does not identify the number or type of receptors. It also does not report an accidental release, an injury, an evacuation or environmental damage tied to the cited conditions.

That distinction matters. EPA’s case concerned the systems intended to keep an accidental ammonia release from occurring or to limit its consequences. The settlement document does not establish that those alleged deficiencies produced an actual release.

How the Case Developed

The consent agreement refers to an inspection and a later show-cause letter, but the underlying inspection report, photographs, maintenance records and December 2024 letter are not included in the supplied source. The agreement itself provides the detailed list of EPA’s allegations.

June 7, 2023

EPA inspected the Riverside facility for compliance with federal chemical-reporting and accidental-release prevention requirements.

December 12, 2024

EPA issued a show-cause letter that, according to the agreement, described the alleged deficiencies in greater detail.

June 18, 2026

Airgas President Dave Richardson signed the consent agreement on the company’s behalf.

Effective date not shown

The agreement says it becomes effective when a Regional Judicial Officer signs the final order and it is filed with the Regional Hearing Clerk. The supplied copy does not show that filing date.

Airgas’s Response

Airgas did not admit the specific factual allegations. It also did not deny them. For purposes of the proceeding, the company admitted EPA’s jurisdiction, accepted the civil penalty and other conditions, and waived its right to contest the allegations or appeal the final order.

The company also certified under penalty of law that it had taken all steps necessary to return to compliance with the Clean Air Act requirements underlying EPA’s allegations. The agreement does not describe the individual repairs or corrective actions, provide completion dates or attach records verifying the work.

What the Settlement Actually Decides

The agreement settles an administrative civil-penalty case without a complaint being litigated and without adjudication of any factual or legal issue. Airgas agreed to pay $164,931 within 30 calendar days after the order’s effective date.

If the order becomes effective, compliance resolves Airgas’s federal civil-penalty liability only for the violations specifically alleged in the agreement. It does not operate as a permit, remove obligations under other laws or release unrelated claims. Those reservations do not establish any additional violation; they define the settlement’s limits.

The document also establishes escalating stipulated penalties if Airgas fails to meet a requirement: $500 per day for the first 15 days of delay, $1,000 per day for days 16 through 30, and $5,000 per day after that. Those amounts are contingent consequences, not penalties the source says have accrued.

What Remains Unresolved

No contested hearing determined whether each alleged condition existed exactly as EPA described it. The source does not say how long the ammonia sensors were out of service, whether they all failed at the same time, when the corrosion developed or how the missing records affected the agency’s ability to reconstruct past maintenance.

The procedural status is also incomplete in the supplied copy. Airgas’s signature appears, but the visible EPA signature line is blank and the document does not show approval by a Regional Judicial Officer or filing with the Regional Hearing Clerk. Because filing triggers both the effective date and the 30-day payment period, this copy alone does not establish that the penalty became due or was paid.

What a Legitimate Fix Looks Like

Editorial analysis

A durable correction would have to address both the equipment and the recordkeeping failures EPA alleged. That means functioning and tested ammonia sensors; secured cylinders; readable labels and tank nameplates; properly managed relief-valve discharge locations; and inspection of corrosion at pipe supports and tank saddles.

The paper trail is part of the safeguard. Inspection records should identify the date, inspector, equipment, procedure and result, as the regulation described in the agreement requires. Without those records, a facility may be unable to demonstrate that a component was inspected on schedule or that a known deficiency was corrected. Airgas certified that it returned to compliance, but the supplied document does not disclose the work behind that certification.

What to Watch

  • Whether the EPA Region 9 docket records a signed and filed final order, establishing the settlement’s effective date.
  • Whether subsequent public records establish that Airgas Specialty Products paid the agreed penalty and completed every requirement without triggering stipulated penalties.

The central evidentiary gap is narrow but important: the agreement records detailed allegations and a company compliance certification, while the supplied copy does not include the corrective-action records or the filing needed to show that the settlement took legal effect.

The source document for this investigation is attached below.

Aleeia
Aleeia

I'm Aleeia, the creator of this website.

I have 6+ years of experience as an independent researcher covering corporate misconduct, sourced from legal documents, regulatory filings, and professional legal databases.

My background includes a Supply Chain Management degree from Michigan State University's Eli Broad College of Business, and years working inside the industries I now cover.

Every post on this site was either written or personally reviewed and edited by me before publication.

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